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Technology plays a vastly important role -- some would argue a dom-
inant one -- in the lives of contemporary human beings. Yet until a few 
decades ago little systematic attention was given to its impact on human 
life by scholars and philosophers. In recent years, interest has bur-
geoned. Though some investigators have sought to trace and measure the 
rising significance of technology, and others have sought to assess 
technology from an ethical or moral point of view, their work has tended 
to proceed in mutual isolation. 
In was in order to help bridge the gap between descriptive and 
normative appraisals of technology that the symposium on which this vol-
ume is based was convened. Under the rubric "Values and Technology - A 
Dialectical Investigation," scholars from Iowa State University and 
other institutions came together on April 21-23, 1977, in a pioneering 
attempt to discuss the mutual interaction of technology and values in an 
interdisciplinary context. Representatives of fields as diverse as 
physics, philosophy, literature, history, and the fine arts contributed 
insights derived from their differing perspectives not only on the 
problems of how technology has been or should be affected by human val -
ues but also on the questions of how technology in its turn has affected 
our individual and social values. 
The present collection of essays includes the major papers presented 
at the conference, with some contributions of a more specialized nature 
necessarily omitted because of considerations of space. Given the vast-
ness and complexity of our subject matter, our emphasis has not been on 
providing answers but on raising questions , and it is hoped that the 
symposium will induce others to take up the task of examining the im-
portant issues raised. Whatever value these essays have in opening up a 
truly dialectical discussion of the relationship between technology and 
values is due not only to the work of their respective authors, but also 
to the labors of the Iowa State Humanities Symposium Committee, chaired 
by Jane Vallier and Buford Norman, who were responsible for bringing the 
participants together. 
*Department of Government; Georgetown University, Washington, D.C. 
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TECHNOLOGY THE CIVILIZER 
Melvin Kranzberg* 
ABSTRACT. Technology has not only made a high degree of material afflu-
ence possible for the average person in modern societies, it has been a 
civilizing force as well, making possible a high level of participation 
in cultural activity. In addition, technology has its own inherent aes-
thetic values. To the extent that technology contributes to the lowering 
of cu l tural standards, the fault is attributable to how it is used, not 
to technology itself. 
INTRODUCTION 
Many of the titles of the papers included in this symposium juxta-
pose man and the machine, technology and humanism. Indeed, one of the 
cultural cliches of our times is the notion that technology is something 
divorced from the essence of humanity. 
Obviously, words no longer mean what they used to. For most of 
man's history, the term "humanistic" was used to distinguish what was 
human from what was brutal and coarse, or animal. But now we find that 
humanist is contrasted with "scientist" and "technologist" and the word 
"humanities" is used to distinguish everything else from science and 
technology. Even worse, in some cases the humanities have become the 
home of anti-rationalists who deny that rational attempts to deal with 
man's material wants and spiritual needs have any bearing upon pursuit 
of the "civilized life ." 
The historian of technology tends to find himself baffled by a view 
that posits a conflict between man and his technology, as if the two 
were somehow opposed to each other and locked in mortal combat. The pre-
historical facts indicate quite th.e opposite. Seeking the origins of 
mankind, anthropologists tell us that our species is the product of 
technology. Man as we know him probably could not have evolved or sur-
vived without tools -- he is too weak and puny a creature to fight na-
ture with only his hands and feet. Tools extended man's hand and ampli-
fied his muscle power, enabling him to adjust his hereditary organic 
equipment to an almost infinite number of operations in virtually any 
environment. The anthropological-archaeological excavations of the past 
two decades provide incontrovertible evidence of the linkage of man's 
physical evolution toward our present species with a rising level of 
technology. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that many anth ropologists define 
the human species on the basis of tool using and tool making , o r, to be 
more exact, tool dependency. Modern physiology, psychology, evolution-
ary biology, and anthropology all combine to demonstrate to us that Homo 
.6a.pie.no (man the thinker) cannot be distinguished from homo " fia.beA" (man 
the maker). Indeed, we now realize that man could not have become a 
thinker had he not at the same time been a maker. 
*Callaway Professor of the History of Technology, Department of Social 
Sciences, Georgia Institute of Technology, Atlanta, Georgia. 
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But, I am herein concerned not with man's physical evolution but 
rather with his cultural development. Civilization is a cultural attri-
bute, not a physical one. What has technology to do with civilization? 
Here the cultural anthropologists point to the role technology 
played in the very beginnings of civilization. In his book Th~ Raw and 
.th~ Coo~~' the great French structural anthropologist, r.evi-Strauss, 
finds that the dividing line between nature and culture is control of 
the technology of fire. The primitive man eats his food raw; civiliza-
tion begins when man cooks his food. 1 The British anthropologist Childe 
found a different starting point. He equated the beginning of civiliza-
tion with the development of settled communities. But that, too, rests 
on a technological innovation: agricultur~. 2 Prior to the invention of 
agriculture, men had been hunters and food gatherers; in a sense they 
had been parasites on nature. We do not know exactly how or when agri-
culture began, but we do know that once men discovered that they could 
cooperate with nature by sowing seeds and waiting for nature to perform 
the miracle of growing crops, there arose the possibility -- indeed, the 
necessity -- of settled and peaceful life. For the agriculturist had to 
cooperate not only with nature but with other human beings. If he spent 
all his time fighting, he would have neither time nor energy for carry-
ing on agricultural pursuits; yet, if he ran away from his enemies, the 
crops would go untended and he would lose his livelihood. The coming of 
agriculture, therefore, required man to live and work together with oth-
ers, which is one of the hallmarks of civilization. 
THE UNITY OF ART AND TECHNOLOGY 
But surely there is more to civilization than growing and cooking 
food. What about the cultivation of the arts: music, painting, sculp-
ture, drama, literature -- the whole panoply of humanistic endeavors? 
To many humanists, the technologist seems concerned only with the output 
of material goods, as contrasted with the humanist's sensitivity to the 
human condition. My humanist colleagues ask: "What is human about a 
monkey wrench, a lathe, a computer?" What repels them about technology 
is the very "inhumanity" of its objects -- for example, the computers 
which take over htunan functions -- or the "anti-humanity" of its byprod-
ucts -- such as the pollution which threatens our environment. To them, 
technology is hostile to the human creative imagination and to artistic 
endeavors and expressions. 
Yet, looking at this matter historically, we discover that, during 
most of man's time on this earth, art and technology were the same 
thing. The artifacts uncovered by archaeological digs provide subject 
matter for both historians of art and historians of technology, for the 
crafts of early man were both his artistic expression and his technical 
activity. Indeed, until a half century ago, much of what we today call 
engineering was referred to as the "technical arts," or the "mechanical 
arts," or simply "the arts," as distinguished from what later came to be 
called the "fine arts. " 
Throughout most of history, the practitioner of the fine arts and 
the t echnical arts was the same individual. Ceramists gathered together 
in one quarter at the gate of Athens produced superb wares for common 
household use as well as for ritualistic purposes; they made no distinc-
tion between beauty and utility. Nor did the glassmakers, goldsmiths, 
stone cutters, tapestry weavers, and master masons who produced the 
g l orious medieval cathedrals. Institutionally, too, there was no 
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difference. Thus the painters of the early Middle Ages belonged to the 
guild of apothecaries, because both painters and apothecarie s used 
ground mineral and vegetable materials. 
During the Renaissance, Leonardo was one of the most progressive 
engineers of his time as well as the sublime artist of all times; 
Michelangelo, while displaying his mastery of sculpture and painting, 
also designed means for constructing the dome of St. Peter. The fact 
that both of these men were geniuses would reinforce the notion that the 
creative elements in both the arts and technology are closely related, 
which also is what modern psychological studies of creativity tell us . 
Although humanists deny the intellectual content of technology, 
their disdain for the man-made world is founded upon false premises. An 
advancing technology requires just as much in the way of human ingenu-
ity, imagination, creativity, sensitivity, and skill as do achievements 
in literature, art, or the other accoutrements of high culture. Tech-
nologists express themselves in steel, concrete, glass, and electric 
circuitry. Is this any less noble than expression through words, music, 
or painting? 
THE PRECDNDITIONS OF CIVILIZATION 
Implied in what has been said thus far is a definition of "civili-
zation." Civilization means that men live together in some kind of 
peaceful community. It also means that they are able to cultivate the 
arts, including the fine arts, the "high culture." 
When we look at the first of these conditions for civilization --
men living together in peaceful community -- we find that technology's 
record is spotty. Although the technology of agriculture might require 
men to live together in peace, they do not always abide by this techno-
logical "imperative." Instead, we find that technology has been utilized 
throughout much of human history to develop the arts of war. We thus 
have a paradox: technology, from earliest agriculture to today's indus-
trial interdependency, necessitates that men live in peace, but it also 
provides the instruments and sometimes the conditions which bring men to 
war against one another. 
New modes of transportation and communication have made national 
boundaries meaningless in the 20th century. But while nationalism may be 
technologically obsolete, it remains one of the most powerful political 
and social forces of our times and a constant source of international 
strife. Only a few years ago we thought that faster global transporta-
tion and communication would bring mankind closer together and that this 
would inevitably lead to a peaceful world. We now know that man's bel-
licosity does not diminish in inverse ratio to his speed of travel. In-
deed, seemingly, his irritation increases in direct proportion to the 
speed and immediacy of communications. Hatred spreads faster than love. 
In this case, technology has only amplified man. If he is worse than he 
used to be, it is only because he looked better than he actually was. 
So while technological advancement would seem to require peace, it 
also enhances the possibilities for more horrible warfare, and there 
have been times in the past when technology has ensured the spread and 
destructive power of war. 
Thus one must question the view of technology as a neutral tool 
which man can use or not as he sees fit. That view is well expressed by 
White, in his important book on Medleva.1. TeQhnology and Soc)_a.1_ Change, 
wherein he states that "a new device merely opens a door; it does not 
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compel one to enter." 3 But this view of technology as a neutral enabling 
instrument raises more questions than it answers. Who determines which 
doors to open? And while a n open door does not compel one to enter, an 
open door is certainly an invitation. Furthermore, once man has crossed 
the threshold, are not hi s future actions perhaps molded by the contours 
of the chambers or corridors which h e has entered? And once having 
crossed the threshold, can man ever return? 
TECHNOLOGY IS NOT NEUTRAL 
White's dictum begs these questions. I h ave therefore formulated 
Kranzberg's First Law, which states: Technology is neither good nor bad, 
nor is it neutral. By this I mean that technology interacts with society 
in ways which are not necessarily inherent in the technology itself. If 
one wants to see how technology and its social applications interact, 
one has merely to look at the role of the automobile in American soci-
ety. The automobile has b een far more than neutral in its impact, for it 
has become one of the prime determinants of whe re we work, live, play, 
and pray. 
The case of the automobile also demonstrates Kranzberg's Law by 
showing the unforeseen consequences, which arise when apparently benign 
technologies are employed on a massive scale. At the turn of this cen-
tury, automobiles were regarded as a solution to the pollution, conges-
tion, and safety problems created by horse -drawn transportation. In New 
York City alone horses were depositing some t wo and one-half million 
pounds of manure and 60,000 gallons of urine in one day. The automobile 
promised cleaner, safer, and more rapid transportation; but, as we know, 
pollution, congestion, and safety problems have returned in altered form 
as a result of the large-scale use of the automobile. 
Some say that America's love affair with the automobile is over. 
This is not quite true. Instead, we have married the automobile and, as 
in many marriages, the cost of divorce is too high to contemplate. We 
cannot immediately eliminate the private automobile because we have or-
ganized our society, both spatially and economically, around the automo-
bile and the mobility which it offers us. 
It would b e difficult to say t h at in the case of the automobile, 
technology proved i tself completely neutral . Instead, it interacted with 
our society in such a way that the automobile became more than simply a 
mode of transportation; it became a characteristic form of our society. 
Yet we take the automobile for granted. Our daily lives have become so 
inextricably bound up with our automobile technology that we fail to 
realize how unique and significant it is until we are faced with alter-
ing our driving patterns by a sudden energy crisis. 
In the case of the arts, as in social interactions, we find that 
technology follows Kran zberg's First Law: It is not neutral. How does 
it interact with the arts? Technology h as provided the conditions of 
leisure and the materials and techniques which have been indispensable 
in the development of the arts. Equally important, there are aesthetic 
elements within technology itself. 
In a subsistence economy, one where men are barely able to scratch 
out a living, civilization is minimal. Only when technology enables man 
to eke out a surplus from nature can he afford the leisure to attend to 
cultural pursuits. Leisure is indispensable for the good life. Aris-
totle extolled leisure as essential for intellectual activity, and in 
the 19th century, Lord Tennyson asked: "Why s hould life all labor be?". 
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The great productivity of modern technology is providing those in 
the industrial nations with larger amounts of leisure time. No longer 
do men labor by the sweat of their brows from sunup to sundown for six 
days a week. By the end of the 19th century in Britain, Saturday had 
become a half day of work, and by the mid-20th century in America, the 
work we.ek was down to five days a week and the work day to eight hours. 
Even the forty-hour week is no longer sacrosanct and there are pressures 
to reduce it still further. Modern union contracts demand more holidays 
and vacations. 
Not all people use this new-found leisure time in ways which cul-
tural elitists would approve. Instead of going to museums or listening 
to symphonies, they go to rock concerts or take their recreational camp-
ers out to despoil the parklands and the remaining vestiges of the natu-
ral environment. Yet, enough people do use their leisure time to become 
actively involved in cultural activities so that, as we will see, tech-
nology has democratized the arts in our times and made them into partic-
ipatory activities. 
It is easy, of course, to trace technology's contributions to the 
media used by artists throughout the centuries. The cave man's tools 
and pigments were part of his primitive technology. The sculptor had to 
go to the quarry for his stone. The goldsmith depended upon the smelter 
and the founder. The painter looked to contemporary technology for his 
paints and surfaces. The cathedrals were dependent upon the craft of 
the stonemason, and orchestras changed in accordance with the technology 
of musical instruments. As we approach our own times, we can point to 
the ways in which changes in technology have provided sculptors, paint-
ers, and musicians with enlarged capabilities for expressions of light, 
color, form, and sound. Our 20th-century technology allows artistic 
imaginations to soar in a manner impossible for earlier generations of 
artists with a more restricted bag of tools and set of media. Today's 
artists can and do employ sound and motion in their art; they use laser 
light, holography, and videotape. They explore the potentiality of the 
computer with varying degrees of success in music, literature, and art. 
While it is easy to see how changing technology has offered artists 
greater variety and opportunity, it is not so easy to trace the impact 
of art upon technology. But it is there. C. S. Smith, the metallurgist 
and historian of technology, has demonstrated that much of the improve-
ment in materials throughout the aqes is the result of aesthetic motiva-
tions. Early craftsmen , according to Smith,- experimented with different 
materials because they were fascinated by the differences in touch, 
feel, and appearance made possible by a variety of materials and the 
ways in which they were produced and processed. ~ Jewelers, goldsmiths, 
and silversmiths pioneered in developing metallurgical techniques which 
were later employed on a larger, industrial scale. 4 
The classical aesthetics was based upon order, harmony, and sym-
metry; thus the builders of the great monuments of classical antiquity 
were both engineers and artists. Henry Adams, in Mon..t St. -M,{c.he.t and 
Cua.Jl;tJteA, rhapsodized over the union of religion and art in the medieval 
cathedrals. 5 But those great monuments also represent the technical 
achievements of many different crafts. The combined religious-aesthetic 
stimulus forced the craftsmen to the limits of the technical arts of the 
times. 
Relationships between art and technology are not always linear 
cause-effect ones -- of artists using new materials and media provided 
by an advancing technology, or technology advancing in response to aes-
thetic stimuli. In more modern times (ever since the onset of the Indus-
trial Revolution} the relationship between art and technology has become 
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increasingly complex. In Afd and ~he Fu.tuJte, Davis described the many 
different "isms" in 20th-century art, which reflect the complicated 
interplay between artistic expression and the new tools and knowle dge 
which science and technology have placed in the hands of the artist: 
Futurism, Constructivism, Dadaism, Surrealism, all with European roots; 
then the American movements of the pre- and post-war periods, including 
Pop Art, Rappenings, Minimal Art, Op Art, Video Art, Electronic Art, and 
Computer Art.6 
Some artistic movements derived direct inspiration from modern tech-
nology. In the first "Manifesto on the Foundation of Futurism" issued 
in 1909, Marinetti stated: "A roarinq motor car is more beautiful than 
the Victory of Samothrace." 7 The exaltation of the machine by the Fu-
turists was taken up by the Constructivists in Russia and Germany in the 
1920s. But the most famous wedding of art and technology was in the Bau-
haus movement, in post-World War I Germany. Its goal was to reconstruct 
society by reshaping the environment, and its techniques were derived 
from the formal discoveries of modern art and the production capabili-
ties of modern technology. Art and technology were to be brought to-
gether to produce functional and aesthetic prototypes for modern living 
and enjoyment. 
But technology provides more than tools and inspiration to art. 
There are aesthetic elements within technology itself. Some scientific 
instruments, for example, which are beautiful in abstract design are as 
expressive in our times as the Parthenon sculptures were to the ancient 
Greeks. Invention and craftsmanship, the traditional parents of the arts, 
are still successfully mated in many of today's machines. 
Kubric, director of the well-known science fiction film, 2001: A 
Spac.e Odtj.6.6elj, has said: "There is a sexiness to beautiful machines . 
The smell of a Nikon camera. The feel of an Italian sportsca r, or a 
beautiful tape recorder .... Man has always worshipped beauty, and I think 
there's a new kind of beauty afoot in the world. " 8 When Nervi, the Ital-
ian architect, first visited New York City and viewed the George Wash-
ington Bridge, he said: "This is a beauty which Nature didn't know about 
before we technicians invented it. 119 Nervi was perhaps thinking of the 
economy of line which found voice in Wright's architectural dictum: 
"Form follows function." It is no wonder that the launch towers at Cape 
Kennedy, severely functional in design, have been called "some of the 
most brilliant and progressive monuments of our civilization," and tha t 
the great Swiss architect, LeCorbusier, apotheosized America's grain 
elevators. 
Other foreigners have also found aesthetic delight in America's 
technology. When Gide visited this country, he was taken to view Times 
Square at night. "Oh, what a beautiful siqht," he is rumore d to have 
said, "for those who can't read! .. 10 Gide's comment points up one of the 
complexities in art-technology relationships. The light, color, variety, 
movement of the billboards of Times Square can provide visual delight 
but the social message can be altogether different. One of the roles of 
the artist is to serve as an interpreter: an interpreter of nature to 
man, of man to society, of man to himself. As individuals of sensitivity 
and imagination, artists should be particularly able to perform that 
function. 
THE ARTIST AS CRITIC OF TECHNOLOGY 
In the 19th century, as industrial technology began to transform so-
ciety, the interpretive function took on a new dimension, that of social 
criticism. Some art critics viewed with dismay the transition from 
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traditional ways of life to an urban industrialized society. In England, 
Ruskin and Morris sought to hold back the tides of change by returning 
to "Ye Olde Merrye Englande" -- to a romantic, idyllic version of the 
medieval past which had never existed in reality. The onrush of the In-
dustrial Revolution could not be halted by this kind of wishful romanti-
cism. 
Yet, as individuals of great sensitivity, artists and writers were 
more aware than others of the seamy and unseemly side of the Industrial 
Revolution. The result was that the artist became a social critic, and, 
insofar as society owed its makeup and institutions to technology, he 
became a critic of technology. It is not that art and technology are 
necessarily opposed but, rather, that many social critics oppose the 
type of society which industrial technology has brought into being. 
Paradoxically, while artists, in their capacity as craftsmen, were uti-
lizing the tools and materials and media provided by the new technology, 
they were at the same time, in their roles as social critics, utilizing 
their art to attack the institutions and values of the society which 
that technology has brought into being. 
There may be chains of causation of which we human beings are not 
fully aware; hence it is not always easy to trace the interactions be-
tween technology and high culture -- the arts and humanities. I should 
like to suggest, however, that one major effect of advancing technology 
in American society has been to democratize culture, and it seems at 
least possible that this democratizing effect is what has alienated many 
of our intellectuals and humanists who, underneath their veneer of demo-
cratic liberalism, are basically intellectual snobs and elitists. 
TECHNOLOGY AND THE DEMOCRATIZATION OF CULTURE 
All of us realize that democracy is more than a political system . 
There is social democracy, too, and the flood of goods made possible 
through technology allows everyone, except the poorest members of our 
society, to obtain some of life's amenities. Nearly everyone can enj oy 
the same entertainment as the rich merely by turning a dial, can enjoy 
clothes which look like those hand-tailored by a Paris coutourier even 
though mass-produced on New York's Seventh Avenue, can step into auto-
mobiles which take them to their destination as quickly and as surely as 
the Rolls-Royces of the wealthy. 
The democratization of social classes can be seen in such everyday 
items as clothing. There was a time (and this still holds true for some 
of the older, status-bound nations, such as Britain) when a person's 
clothes revealed his social position or status, as, for example, the 
farmer. Such distinctions have now disappeared. Blue jeans have become 
a universal uniform from Plains, Georgia, to Madison Avenue. And the 
craze for "recycled jeans" epitomizes a society where clothes fashions 
have become democratized. It also shows how rich our s0ciety truly is: 
we pay someone else to wear out our pants for us! 
But fashions in clothes are scarcely an adequate measure of tech-
nology's democratizing influence on some more basic elements of society. 
In the case of education, technological development both demands and 
makes possible more schooling for larger segments of society. In order 
to contribute usefully in the increasingly complex world of production, 
workers must be able to read and write. Technology has provided the me-
chanical means for broadening literacy and education through cheap pub-
lication and distribution of reading matter. Equally important is 
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technology's indirect contribution to education. Increasing productivity 
has meant that children are no longer required to become wage earners; 
thus, their entrance into the work force is delayed while they are yet 
in school. 
Thomas Jefferson, who believed both in education and in equality, 
proposed an educational master plan for the state of Virginia, which 
limited access to higher education to only a select few. This was not 
because Jefferson was an elitist, but because the agrarian society for 
which Jefferson proposed his educational system could spare only a hand-
ful of persons for such pursuits. Only when technology expanded the 
surplus available to society was mass education possible. 
Increasing productivity has also allowed the years of schooling to 
be extended. First, elementary schooling was made compulsory and, · later, 
secondary schooling. Then, in the 20th century, America committed itself 
to making higher education available to all, sometimes irrespective of 
their ability to take advantage of it. Thus, only one out of every eight 
Americans at work in 1930 had been to high school; by 1960 four out of 
five of those of high-school age attended high school; and today high 
school attendance is virtually universal, although many students drop 
out before graduating. In 1930 only about four percent of the appropri-
ate age group attended college and universities; by 1960 the figure was 
about 35 percent; in 1970 about 50 percent; and, with the burgeoning of 
community colleges, that figure is still rising. In brief, we have de-
mocratized higher education; and only a very rich society, made so by 
technological productivity, could afford to do this. Not everybody fin-
ishes college, of course, but we have reached the point where great num-
bers of today's Americans have had the equivalent education of yester-
day's upper class. 
The advances in education and the increased leisure time made pos-
sible by technological progress have had an explosive impact upon cul-
ture. Hence, one can speak of an "arts explosion" in our times, just as 
one might speak of a "population bomb." 
In terms of publication alone, mass culture is here. Magazine cir-
culation has multiplied tenfold in the past half-century, and Boolu. in 
Pft.,{yz,t shows an almost _equal growth in the number of works available 
within just the past two decades. Of course, a preponderance of what is 
printed is trash, but that is by no means unique to our times. And even 
Playboy magazine published articles and interviews with such stalwarts 
of culture as Norman Mailer and Jimmy Carter! 
Television and the movies, new art forms developed through tech-
nology, hold the possibility of brinqing to every man the best of art, 
literature, philosophy, and music throughout the centuries. And they do 
it just often enough to remind one that it is possible. 
Similarly, technology has made possible long-playing records and 
tapes which amplify man's auditory memory, and which document and dis-
seminate the sounds of our times. Classical music has been popularized 
by hundreds of FM radio stations; and more than twenty million classical 
records are sold in a typical year. But people are not only listening, 
they are also playing. The number of amateurs playing instruments rose 
from nineteen million in 1950 to nearly forty million two decades later 
and the number of symphony orchestras grew from about 800 to 1300, play-
ing to annual audiences of over ten million. 
In addition to books and records, great works of art are also now 
available in reproduction. Mu~eums and art galleries have sprung up 
throughout the country. In the period from 1955 to 1965, the annual 
attendance at the Metropolitan Museum of Art in New York City rose from 
less than three million to nearly six million. The exhibition of the 
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Treasures of Tutankhamun in Washington, D.C., drew waiting lines as long 
as those for tickets to world series baseball games. 
The theater is also flourishing. It is no longer limited to Broad-
. way, "the fabulous invalid," for there are now many playhouses with top-
quality repertory in the "provinces." There are some 5,000 nonprofes-
sional theater groups in the United States, not counting those in col-
leges. When we talk about democratizing of culture, then, we must real-
ize that we are faced with an entirely new phenomenon. People are 
participating in the cultural arts and not simply regarding them pas-
sively. 
The possibility of mass participation is also shown in the fine 
arts. We do not know how many amateur painters there are in this coun-
try, but the number is certainly above ten million. In 1940 the manu-
facturers of art material did only three million dollars worth of busi-
ness annually; a decade later the amount had risen to forty million; 
since then, sales have more than tripled. 
Mass culture is here. Toffler has called us a nation of "culture 
consumers. 11 1 1 But Toffler is wrong in thinking that we are only consum-
ers of culture; we are culture "doers," with many more people partici-
pating in artistic life than ever before. 
THE CHALLENGE FOR HUMANISTS 
To the ''bleeding-heart humanists," statistics about participation 
in cultural activities are meaningless. They say that we cannot measure 
cultural activities quantitatively, but must think in qualitative terms. 
Today's cultural dictators deprecate mass culture and fail to see the 
aesthetic elements in vernacular art forms. They view with disdain 
and rightly so -- the trashy literature, debauched movies, trivial or 
violence-ridden television programs, and the debased aesthetic tastes of 
the masses. 
I do not defend bad taste. Nevertheless, it is possible to ask 
who is to blame -- the technologists or the humanists? It may be true 
that little of importance is said on television, but whose fault, over 
three decades, is that? Who writes the movies, who writes the television 
shows? Not the engineers who build the sets, but the gentlemen of our 
literary subculture. And who taught them? The humanists in charge of 
the high culture in our colleges and universities, of course. These same 
arbiters of taste then turn and attack not only mass taste but the tech-
nological means by which that taste could be elevated. 
There have always been bad music, bad art, bad writing. Must ours 
be charged to technology? What is surprising is that there is so much 
that is good, so much that is changing, and that so many people are in-
volved in cultural enterprises. For the first time in history, it is 
possible to have a truly organic cultural expression for an entire soci-
ety because all the people can share in its high culture. "Participatory 
democracy" thus has its counterpart in "participatory arts," "participa-
tory theater," and "participatory music." 
is no longer the property of a small group. 
larger society. 
In today's America, "culture" 
It is being extended to the 
American culture, according to Henry Adams writing during the last 
part of the 19th century, was confined almost entirely to literature, 
theology, and oratory; and as late as 1940 American theater, music, and 
painting were still behind Europe's. But today America has taken world 
leadership in art, literature, and music. 
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Because ours is a scientific and technological age, preeminence in 
these areas has made America the scientific and technical leader of the 
world. If science and technology are hostile to the arts and the humani-
ties, how do we explain the fact that America is also enjoying cultural 
leadership? The center of the artistic world has shifted from Paris to 
New York, as earlier it had shifted from Rome to Paris. The center of 
the scientific world has shifted from Cambridge, England, to Cambridge, 
Massachusetts. 
Are these shifts related? Despite the anti-scientific and anti-
technological -- one might even say anti-rational -- stance of some of 
our modern social critics and humanists , is it possible that our scien-
tific and technical prowess has served to stimulate the arts and humani-
ties? Or might one point the causal finger in the other direction; might 
the burgeoning of our artisti c and cultural life have helped develop our 
science and technology? Or might both these phenomena be regarded as a 
joint and interactive product of an efflorescence of American spirit and 
enthusiasm fueled by technological advance? 
Technology and a technological society are not hostile to aesthetic 
development and cultural enterprise. In the 19th century, when society 
was coming under the sway of industrial technology, a great new form of 
literary expression, the novel, sprang into popularity. This period was 
also rich. in poetry, in art, and in music . If industrialization is 
inimical to aesthetic creativity, how are we to account for the flour-
ishing of the arts in the 19th century? How are we to account for the 
cultural explosion in the 20th century? 
In his book CU-ltuJz.e and AnaJLQhy (1869), Arnold, the major cultural 
critic of the 19th century, attacked the smugness and materialism of 
Victorian England. He divided English society into three classes: the 
Barbarians, the Philistines, and the Populace. Surprisingly, the Bar-
barians were not at the bottom of the social pyramid; instead, they were 
the high-spirited aristocracy concerned primarily with serenity and good 
manners and breeding -- and largely inaccessible to any intellectual 
currents. The Philistines, against whom he concentrated his ire, were 
the middle-class people who ruled Eritish industry. They had energy and 
morality but they had insufficient "sweetness and light," which he de-
fined as culture. The masses comprised the Populace; Arnold regarded 
them as raw and blind and incapable of being affected by cultural mat-
ters. .H:is objective was to educate and "humanize" the Philistines, who 
controlled society, and thereby to advance culture. 
Today's America is not Victorian England. Arnold's concepts of cul-
ture are no longer applicable, nor is his ignorance and disdain for the 
masses, who are now the ones who must be educated and humanized -- and 
mass education and mass cultural participation provide us with the op-
portunity to do so. 
But we must not expect technology to advance civilization automati-
cally. Technological developments do not inevitably bring human happi-
ness because man is more than his technology. But technology does pro-
vide us with the opportunity to improve the values and cultural satis-
factions of man and society, which go far beyond elementary animal 
needs. The imaginations of our artists, our poets, our playwrights, our 
essayists are freer to roam over human potentialities and capabilities 
than ever before. 
What help will our humanists offer us in this endeavor? Will human-
ists redefine our values and help bring culture to Arnold's Populace? 
Until now they have mostly stood aloof from this challenge. Yet they are 
custodians of our values and preservers of our cultural heritage . They 
are the "heart of the civilizing process," the elevators of our spirit, 
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and the keepers of wisdom. They endow us with purpose. Their concern 
for man's ultimate destiny, for dignity, and for such enduring values as 
justice, virtue, beauty, and truth is deep. They have vision, inspira-
tion, and purpose. But they have no new ideas. For they are still 
wedded to the culture of the past, and they refuse to see the changes 
which time and an advancing technology have wrought in human participa-
tion in cultural endeavors. Worse yet, they extol emotion over reason, 
and feeling over thought. 
Surely we cannot accept the prayer of Rousseau in his early V.lo-
c.ol.Ul.,5e_ on. the. Aw aVl.d Sue.Vl.C.e!.> (1750): "Almighty God: Thou who holdest 
in Thy hand the minds of men, deliver us from the fatal arts and sci-
ences of our forefathers; give us back ignorance, innocence, and pover-
ty, which alone can make us happy and are precious in Thy siqht. 1112 The 
whole human experience cries out against the notion that poverty will 
make man happy, and while poverty may be precious to God, which I doubt, 
it is certainly not precious to man. Surely we cannot believe that ig-
norance and innocence will solve our problems and make us happy. 
Yet, to many of our academic humanists, Rous seau has re-emerged as 
a hero, and they embrace his anti-rationalism in their fear of an ad-
vancing technology which they do not claim -- and do not want -- to 
understand. But if we turn away from reason and think with our blood, 
then we are indeed "upon a darkling plain ... where ignorant armies clash 
by night" -- and with no one to turn on the lights. 
The challenge to our humanists is not to shrink from technology and 
to condemn it for the low state of public taste and the brutal and de-
meaning elements of the pop culture of our times. In the task of rede-
fining old values and creating new ones more in keeping with our tech-
nological and democratic civilization, the humanists must take the lead, 
because the scientists and technologists cannot -- and should not -- do 
it alone. 
Whitehead once wrote, "It is the business of the future to be dan-
gerous." But we can accept the risks with confidence and composure if 
all of us -- humanists, social scientists, engineers, scientists -- will 
take cognizance of the civilizing potentials of our technology and will 
carry on a continuing dialectic on the interplay of values and our sci-
entific and technological society. 
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WHAT THE CHEMISTS FOUND IN PANDORA'S BOX: 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CHLORINATED HYDROCARBONS 
Robert P. Multhauf* 
ABSTRACT. This paper traces the history of the discovery and the use of 
chlorine and chlorine compounds. The initial production of chlorine as 
an industrial by-product led to a succession of large scale uses. Major 
production and use have now resulted in negative effects, among which 
the scale of production in itself presents inherent problems. The chlo-
rine industry is an example of one among many industries that have vast-
ly proliferated during the last century. 
I 
In 1774 that indefatigable discoverer, Scheele, discovered a green-
ish gas with a "suffocating odor like that of warm aqua regia" (mixed 
hydrochloric and nitric acids), which dissolved slightly in water, giv-
ing it an acid taste, and which corroded metals and bleached colored 
flowers and leaves. The gas, which was chlorine, entered the rap idly 
filling hopper of new discoveries in this turbulent period in the his-
tory of chemistry, ultimately to emerge as an element. 
Chlorine proved to be one of the most potent ingredients in the hop-
per. In 1811, Dulong lost an eye and a finger from an explosion of ni-
trogen chloride, the product of mixing chlorine and sal ammoniac (ammo-
nium chloride.) 1 In 1810, thirty-six years after its discovery, Humphry 
Davy, having tried in vain to decompose chlorine, had decided that it 
is an element. In further experiments he too was injured by an explosion 
of nitrogen chloride, an indisposition which gave his assistant, Fara-
day, his first professional opportunity. And although Faraday was also 
soon injured by nitrogen chloride, he persisted, and wrote to a friend 
that chlorine was his "favorite object. 11 2 
In support of his brother's work, John Davy experimented with the 
exposure to light of a mixture of chlorine and oarbon monoxide, and wa~ 
rewarded by the discovery of another deadly compound -- but at least not 
explosive -- phosgene (COC1 2 ) .
3 By similarly exposing "carburetted hy-
drogen" (ethylene), Faraday was to discover tetrachloroethane (C2H2Cl4) 
and hexachlorine (c 2c1 6 ) .
4 In this he began, unwittingly, since this 
was no part of his plan, the history of chlorine as a guide to the 
structure of organic substances. Chlorine, it seemed, could be made to 
replace the hydrogen atoms in organic compounds one by one, or "volume 
for volume," as Berthelot put it a half century later, in crediting 
Faraday "above all." for this unique key to the mysteries of organic 
structure. s 
Organic compounds containing chlorine are virtually unknown in na-
ture. In ~ddition to those discovered by Dulong, Davy, and Faraday, it 
was found that two others had already been made, the "spirit of salt and 
wine" described by the pseudonymous Basil Valentine about 1600, 6 and the 
*Museum of History and Technology, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, 
D. C. 
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"Dutch liquid," which gave collective irrunortality to four Dutch chemists 
who made it in 1794. 7 The Dutch liquid was e thylene chloride (C2H4Cl2) 
and Valentine's "spirit" was ethyl chloride (C 2H5Cl). From Faraday's 
time the discovery of new chlori na t ed hydrocarbons was the "favori te ob-
ject" of many chemists, over ninety such compounds being mentioned in 
1842 in the multivolurne handbook of "pure and applied" chemis t ry edited 
by Liebig and others. 8 
Why were the chemists so interested in chlorinated hydrocarbons? 
The great question of organic chemistry was how the "innumerable" com-
pounds of organic nature could be formed from so few element s , namely 
carbon and hydrogen, and, less frequently, oxygen, nitrogen , sulphur and 
a few others. To account for this remarkable deviation from "inorganic " 
chemistry, where different compounds usually conta ined different ele-
ments, it was surmised that organic molecules might differ in structure 
- - the spatial arrangement of atoms. From experiments the idea emerged 
that these elements had different numbers of available "connections " 
("valences," as they came to be called); carbon had a valence of four, 
nitrogen three, oxygen two, and hydrogen one. Thus the spatial arrange -
ment of atoms in methane, the simplest hydrocarbon, would be (reduced to 





Among the experiments which led to this conclusion none were more 
important than those which led to the formation of chlorinated hydrocar -
bons. For these compounds, being man - made, were no more innumerable than 
the chemist chose to make them. As they came out of the laboratory , one 
by one, they could be studied with a confidence which was not possible 
with naturally occurring compounds. No less important was another pecu-
liarity of the chlorinated hydrocarbons, their resemblance to the parent 
hydrocarbons which the chem~sts were trying to elucidate . This property 
was spectacularly demonstrated when in 1838 Dumas announced tri chloro -
acetic acid (cc1 3cOOH), a compound in which three-fourths of the hydro -
gen in acetic acid (CH3COOH) has been replaced by chlorine without 
greatly changi ng its resemblance to acetic acid . 9 , 
Because the atomic weight of chlorine is so much higher t han those 
of oxygen, carbon, and hydrogen, trichloroacetic acid is 65 percent 
chlorine by weight. That such a compound could resemble acetic acid was 
too much for many a traditional chemist. In 1840 Liebig's Annal~n p ub -
lished a letter in which the correspondent claimed that he had succeeded 
in replacing with chlorine not only the hydrogen in manganese aceta te 
[(CH3C00) 2Mn] , but a l so the oxygen, carbon, and even the manganese --
leaving a compound consisting entirely of chlorine which reta i ned t he 
properties of manganese ace t ate . 10 The letter, signed S . C. H . Windler, 
was a spoof, originating with Liebig's friend , Wohler. 
But the conclusion of their adversaries, that the properties of the 
chlorinated hydrocarbons "are extremely analogous to those of the primi -
tive body," while changing gradually with chlorination, 11 was to pre-
vail. The experiments which led to the "substitution" and "type" theo-
ries on the structure of the organic molecule were most frequently ex-
periments in the action of hydrochloric acid and chlorine on organic 
materials, and Laurent's final version of the "substitution " t heory was 
reached in consequence of his chlorination of hydrocarbons on a grand 
scale. 12 
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II 
Scheele had noticed the bleaching properties of chlorine, and with-
in two decades it was introduced as a medium for the bleaching of cloth. 
Down through the century bleaching is given as the principal use of • 
chlorine, and even down to the present, as one may note in the latest 
(1975) edit ion of the EnQycloped{,a B!L-U:anniQa.1 3 In fact, only 16 per -
cent of the chlorine produced in the United States was used for bleach-
ing in 1962 , and the proportion is probably smaller today. The story of 
the use of chlorine , its "technology ," has a very tenuous connection 
with the history of the science of chlorine. 
Chloroform (CHCl3), chloral (CCl3CHO), and the hydrate of the lat-
ter, had been discovered by Liebig in 1831-32, in the course of an ef-
fort better to understand the action of chlorine on alcohol. In the 
1850s these compounds , especially chloroform, came into use as anes-
thetics, and gave rise to a controversy concerning the relative demerits 
of the extremely inflammable (sulphuric) ether and the poisonous chloro-
form for that application. After a controversy reminiscent of that in 
the seventeenth century when different schools of pharmacy matched sta-
tistics as to which had killed the most patients, chloroform gave way 
to ether. "How often," lamented Muspratt in his 1860 treatise on the 
applications of chemistry, "the good things introduced by science are 
absurd. 111 4 
Muspratt, who was zealous to demonstrate the utility of chemical 
research, found it unnecessary to introduce an article on chlorine, al-
though in addition to chloroform he had an article on ethyl chloride 
(CH 3cH 2Cl), a "favorite old remedy in medicine and for dissolving gold" 
(p. 832), which had found some legitimate use in his time as an anti-
spasmodic. It was indeed "a favorite old remedy," for it was the "spir-
it" Valentine had described 250 years earlier. 
Some writers . sn chemi~a~ techn~lo~y were at least more hopeful. 
Dumas, in his T~a.A;te de Qh.i.m~e appLlquee aux o.!Lt6, had mentioned some-
thing over ten chlorinated hydrocarbons (including such oddities as 
"chloralcoholic oil"), with vague notes on real or possible uses. Nearly 
a century later, Thorpe was onl y relatively less vague, in the 1912-13 
edition of his Vic)j_o~y ofi AppLled Chem,Wbz.y . The new uses Thorpe 
found for chlorinated hydrocarbons were modest, consisting mainly in 
noting that carbon tetrachloride_ (CCl4), because of its non-inflammabil-
ity, had replaced carbon disulphide as a solvent for organic materials, 
and was itself being replaced by tetrachloroethane (one of Faraday's 
discoveries) ; and that methyl chloride (CH3Cl) had been found useful in 
the coal tar dye industry (as a methylating agent) and in refrigeration, 
to replace the toxic sulphur dioxide and ammonia. 1 5 
III 
One reason for the appearance of methyl chloride as a commercial 
material was its appearance as an inexpensive by-product in sugar-beet 
residues. 1 6 Thus a "surplus" existed, for which a use was sought . There 
had never been a significant surplus of chlorine itself. It was made 
from hydrochloric acid, a material in enormous oversupply, for it belch-
ed endlessly out of the smokestacks and waste waters of the increasingly 
numerous artificial soda works . Desperate attempts were made by soda 
manufacturers to find uses for hydrochloric acid, but its conversion 
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into chlorine was no solution, for demand for that substance was quanti-
tatively negligible. 
With the appearance after 1890 of the electrolytic soda industry, 
chlorine emerged as the by-product and soon replaced hydrochloric acid 
as "the problem." Again the scale of production far exceeded the demand 
by the textile industry and by such new consuming industries as paper 
bleaching and the purification of water and deodorization of sewage. 
Chlorine was now sometimes converted into hydrochloric acid. 
A use, of sorts, appeared in the First World War, when chlorine 
itself became the first "war gas," and was succeeded by certain chlori -
nated hydrocarbons as the second, third, and later "imp roved" war 
gases. 17 This proved (fortunately one may say) a temporary solution, 
and worsened the problem, for chlorine p roduction was accelerated during 
the war. Lamentation over the inadequacy of demand to the supply of 
chlorine reached a crescendo in the post-war period. 18 At a symposium 
on chlorine held by the American Electrochemical Society in 1926 some 
comfort was derived from the use of a few chlorinated hydrocarbons as 
intermediates in the synthetic dye industry, and a representative of the 
petroleum industry claimed that "the o rganic complexity of [its) materi-
al promises a variety of transformati ons more numerous than have been 
obtained from the products of coal tar." But the petroleum industry did 
not supply pu!Le hydrocarbons; investigators found that with chlorine 
"they either scarcely react at all or the reaction proceeds beyond the 
point of maximum utility ," and the apparatus often failed to survive the 
presence of chlorine and hydrochloric acid. Even in the most promising 
new use, as solvents in dry-c leaning and in degreasing metals, the un-
chlorinated petroleum solvents were cheaper . 1 9 
But circumstances were beginning to rectify the lack of demand for 
chlorine, the most important of which was the rapid increase in the num-
ber of automobiles. By 1914 use by automobiles had caused the price of 
ord inary petroleum so~vents (which were also fuels) to rise to the point 
that a whole series of chlorinated hydrocarbons were tried as substi-
tutes. 2 0 The vigorous pursuit of our supposedly inexhaustible petroleum 
resources subsequently depressed the price of petroleum solvents, but by 
1920 overproduction depressed the price of chlorine even more; the non-
flammability of chlorinated hydrocarbons was belatedly discovered, and 
they (especially carbon tetrachloride) became established as solvents. 
A more direct contribution of the automobile to the solution of the 
chlorine problem was in the area of what are now called "automotive 
fluids. 11 2 1 About 1920, Midgley introduced the industry to tetraethyl 
lead, the celebrated anti - knock remedy added to gasoline. It used as a 
raw material ethyl chloride, the favorite old remedy of Valentine. Its 
use, moreover, required a "scavenger" to remove the lead deposited, and 
for this purpose the celebrated Dutch liquid (ethylene chloride) was 
utilized. And by 1926 ethylene glycol, for which the raw material is 
also ethylene chloride, was "being introduced" as an anti-freeze . 22 
About 1940 the quantity of chlorine consumed in making chlorinated 
hydrocarbons surpassed the total consumption of chlorine a decade ear-
l ier. But the Second World War caused chlorine production to jump again, 
and the industry remained apprehensive. The editors of Chemical and 
Me,taLluJLgical EnginevU_ng were optimistic, as they reported in 1944 on 
"postwar plans. 112 3 Carbon tetrachloride was being superseded as a dry-
cleaning solvent, but by other chlorinated hydrocarbons, tri- and tetra-
chloroethylene. And "carbon tet" found new demand, as the raw material 
for the misnamed "fluorocarbons," methane derivatives in which part of 
the hydrogen has been replaced by chlorine and p arty by flourine. The 
fluorocarbons, of which CCl3F and CCl2F2 are examples, had become the 
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most common refrigerants (as "freon") since their introduction by the 
indefatigable Midgley in 1928. And in 1943 the fluorocarbons had been 
adopted as "aerosols," propellants in the now familiar spray can. More-
over, the exigencies of war, especially the rubber shortage, had ener-
gized the plastics industry to pursue the long known polymerizing prop-
erties of some of the chlorinated hydrocarbons and their derivatives. 
The synthetic rubber, Thiokol, was made of ethylene chloride, Neoprene 
was made of chloroprene , and the new silicone resins from silicon tetra-
chloride. Most important were the polymers derived from monochloro-
ethylene (CH2=CHCl), better known as vinyl chloride, which emerged from 
the war in such humdrum uses as phonograph records, floor tiles, and 
automobile upholstery. 
Still another source of demand emerged, from what seems to have been 
(although it shouldn't have) an unexpected source. The varying toxicity 
of different chlorinated hydrocarbons had been noticed by their discov-
erers, and had been publicized in the mid-19th-century controversy over 
chloroform and other anesthetics. But the concern in that controversy 
was to ame1.A_o~a;t.e toxicity, and when the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
reported in 1947 on tests made of potential pesti cides over the previous 
two decades, only about one percent of over 7,000 compounds tested were 
chlorinated hydrocarbons, and those seem to have been included because 
this empirical enterprise included all of the familiar solvents. They 
discovered that 28 percent of those materials found suitably toxic were 
chlorinated hydrocarbons. But the discovery was superfluous, for DDT 
(another chlorinated hydrocarbon), introduced as a pesticide in 1942 (it 
had been known since 1874) had, as the editors put it, "pointed the way 
to new fields of insect control. 11 2 4 
Whether or not this galaxy of uses was adequate to soak up the chlo-
rine gushing from the cells of what was now called the "chlor-alkali in-
dustry" was still doubted five years later, 25 but the apprehensions seem 
to have dissipated during the following decade. In the per iod 1945-56, 
annual production of the most familiar chlorinated hydrocarbons jumped 
between 160 percent (tetrachloroethylene) and 240 percent (carbon tetra-
chloride). Noting that t he per capita consumption of chlorine in the 
United States had increased from 3.5 pounds in 1935 to 41 pounds in 
1955, the author of this information predicted that by 1975 it would be 
100 pounds. 26 
He was better than most prophets, for production of chlorine was in 
fact just over 100 pounds per capita in the United States in 1975. 27 It 
is clear that this was enough to solve the time-honored chlorine prob-
lem, for by 1970 we encounter reference to a soda problem. 28 Chlorine 
was now the principal produce of the electrolytic cell and the demand 
problem had been transferred to the sodium which accompanied it. By 
1974, 47 percent of the salt (sodium chloride) produced in the U.S. went 
to the primary purpose of making chlorine, 29 and that chlorine found 
only one other application (pulp and paper bleaching) quantitatively 
comparable to its use in making any one of a half dozen of the most 
widely used chlorinat ed hydrocarbons.30 
Production data were beginning to assume astronomical dimensions. 
Nearly five and a half billion pounds of vinyl chloride were produced in 
1973. The "fastest growing" compound, ethylene chloride (again the Dutch 
liquid), was produced at the rate of nearly eight billion pounds, thanks 
primarily to its use in producing over seven billion pounds of ethylene 
g l ycol . Already in 1960, 670 million aerosol cans were produced here, 
and DDT had succeeded so well that its use was being curtailed. The 
consumption of chlorine for the production of organic chemicals, 470 
pounds in 1940, had risen t o 2,120 million by 1950 and to 3,500 million 
pounds by 1960. 
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IV 
Thus Muspratt had been justified; chemical research is indeed "of 
practical benefit." How could the chemists of the first half of the 19th 
century have been so indifferent to the application of the chlorinated 
hydrocarbons? That "the time was not ripe" is doubtful, for insecti-
cides, non-flammable solvents, and useful plastic materials were hardly 
less desirable then than now. There was probably l ess confidence that 
the chemist could conjure up such miracles, and the chemists themselves, 
who had only recently cast off a long background of mysticism and won-
der-working empiricism, had gui ded them into the science of organic 
chemistry. Was this not enough? 
It was not enough for Muspratt. But he represented a group, the 
applied chemists, which found a home among the practi cal men, the engi-
neers, whose spectacular productions, such as the steam engine, electric 
light, and mass production, amazed the world of t he late 19th century. 
To this galaxy the applied chemi st had contributed the artificial soda 
industry, whose noxious residues aroused the fury of its neighbors, the 
baneful spectre of government regulation , and finally led to the humili-
ation of economic extinction at the hands of a more tidy chemical indus-
try which utilized its by-products . 
That industry, the German synthetic chemical industry, had emerged 
almost unnoticed from the laboratories of a new breed of theoret ical 
chemist. It was to prove the prototype of a new chemi cal industry where 
the theoretician and the p rac tical man could coexist and where problems 
such as those which had plagued the old soda industry could be solved. 
The scientific technologist of the 20th century was not to be frustrated 
for very long by the p roblem of the chlorine surplus. 
And yet the solution to one problem seems to reveal another, for 
the ubiquitous chlorinated hydrocarbons have "side effects." The wide-
spread use of DDT seemed to threaten the balance of nature, extending 
even to the decimation of marine life; and it was only the first of a 
spectrum of similar pesticides. Even those chlorinated hydrocarbons 
which are relatively nontoxic disintegrate at high temperatures to re -
lease a veritable spectrum of t oxi c materials such as phosgene , hydro -
chloric acid, and chlorine itself;33 and they have done so in vehicle 
and electrical fires. Otherwise, not being biodegradable, they become 
the most intractable ingredients of "solid waste," or , if volatile, 
"disappear" into the atmosphere. The quantity of solvents added to the 
atmosphere annually is approximately equal to the quantit y produced. 
The "fluorocarbons" are alleged to be threatening the protec tive ozone 
layer of the outer atmosphere . 
Who deserves the credit -- or the blame? The credit is easier to 
assign. The chemists produced one of the most spectacular advances in 
the history of science, the scientific explanation of the chemical con-
stitution of the organic kingdoms . The t echnologists found the by-
products of this enterprise to be, as Muspratt had predicted, of practi -
cal benefit. And the proprietors of the chemi cal industry made this 
benefit a reality. The rest of us, "the public," have enjoyed the spec -
tacle of the science and the convenience of the t echnology. So what has 
gone wrong? 
What has gone wrong, it seems to me, is our failure to give atten-
tion to the factor of scale. The "negative factors" which plagued the 
artificial soda industry of a century ago, and its neighbors, were fac -
tors of scale, and that factor is independent of the solution to parti-
cular problems. During the thirty years , 1930-1960 , per capita 
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consumption in the United States of solvents, p lastics, and other cate-
gories of chlorinated hydrocarbons mentioned, multiplied from seventeen-
to nearly thirty-fold; and since 1960 the rest of the world has been 
catching up.3 4 One thing l eads to another, and our successes in promot -
ing scientific discovery, technological improvement, and economic growth 
have created problems of which our ancestors could not have dreamed. The 
case of the chlorinated hydrocarbons is only an exemplification, but a 
notable one. Their uses are so multifarious and so quantitative that we 
have overlooked the fact that we are producing in enormous quantities 
materials unknown in nature, with negative "side effects" which are now 
becoming apparent on a grand scale. It is a scale which distorts the 
science of the chemist, the philanthropic intentions of the technolo-
gist, and the economic calculations of the industrialist. 
r~ One element in the solution to this problem, as to any problem, is 
an awareness of its historical development. If it seems unthinkable to 
curtail or reverse the production and use of chlorinated hydrocarbons, 
it is useful to recall that the scientists of a century ago saw no rea-
son even to pursue the possibility of their utility. They were remark-
ably indifferent to the application of science; we are perhaps too de-
termined to pursue it. In any case this problem is little more than a 
generation old, and not beyond the point of no return unless we choose 
to make it so. 
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ABSTRACT. The assumption that technology acts as an independent variable 
in society is examined and it is argued that the social and cultural 
values of a society themselves affect the rate of technological change. 
These interrelationships are explored through a study of different rates 
of technological change in France, Britain, and the United States in the 
nineteenth century. 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea that the introduction of western technology can by itself 
promote economic growth and social chanqe in ' non-industrial societies 
has been challenged by a number of studies. It is now widely accepted 
that the ability of societies to respond to new tasks is affected by 
their own cultural and social values. 1 For example, ironworkers in West 
Africa have been unable to increase their production in response to ex-
panding markets for their products because the new technical procedures 
which would be required threaten their existing modes of living, especi-
ally the sex division of labor and the ritual cycles of service to an-
cesters and e.lders.2 Similarly , cattle-raisers in Ruanda have accepted 
new techniques for raising stock but they have resisted new methods of 
slaughtering and marketing. These contrary reactions, again, were deter-
mined by social and cultural factors. The value of the herds is reckoned 
not in economic terms but as a measure of social status. Increasing the 
size of the herds, therefore, could be considered good in terms of the 
native culture while marketing the animals for food could not.3 
That there is considerable variation in the response of developing 
nations to technological change is well documented. By contrast, histo-
rians and economists describe industrialized nations as a unified group 
with common ideas and values, and, in particular, a commitment to eco-
nomic growth through technological progress . Western industrialization 
is reaarded as a "model" with well-defined staaes~ of growth, which pro-
vides a auide to the preconditions and policies necessary to achieve 
industrialization elsewhere. 4 Fears are expressed in many quarters that 
technology has become the master of Western Man, molding his society, 
changina his institutions, and warpina his values. 
A comparative study of the process of industrialization in Britain, 
France, and the United States durinq the nineteenth century, however, 
challenges these views; it suaaests that in these countries, also, tech-
nological change has been mediated by prevailing social and cultural 
values. The rate of technological chancre can be shown to have varied 
both between these industrial nations and also over time within the same 
*Department of History, Polytechnic of North London, London, N.W.S . 
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nation. Even in the West, it can be demonstrated that industrial tech-
nology did not inevitably and progressively erode existing social values 
but, rather, acceptance of technoloqical change was itself socially de-
termined. 
The social variables which seem to have had the most significant 
impact on the rate of technological change were family structure, espec-
ially parent-child relationships, and class structure, especially the 
response of the pre-industrial elite to the "nouveau riche" entrepre-
neurs in business and industry. 
In 19th-century France, the nature of family life and the social 
structure acted as a brake on technological change, while in Britain 
these factors stimulated change in the first half of the century but re-
tarded it in the second half. In the United States, technological change 
accelerated throughout the century, and especially after 1850, until by 
1900 the process had become institutionalized. To see how social fac-
tors interacted with advances in technology, it is useful to compare the 
situation in Britain and in France at the beginning of the 19th century, 
and that in Britain and in the United States at the end of the 19th cen-
tury. Finally, I will discuss recent events in the United States, which 
could affect social values and which might modify the commitment of the 
United States to an economic progress based on technological solutions 
to problems . 
BRITAIN AND FRANCE 
The British and French economies in the first half of the 19th cen-
tury stood in striking contrast to one another. British economic growth 
between 1760 and 1850 had been exceptionally rapid and her lead over all 
other countries, including France, was extensive. During this period 
Britain established herself as the first industrial nation, and her suc-
cess was crowned by the Great Exhibition held in London in 1851. The 
world came to London to admire Britain's achievements in industrial 
technology. It was clear that, in many fields, British machines were the 
most advanced; in others, British machines were the only ones available. 
Through revolutioni.zing textile production, iron production, mining, 
and transport, Britain earned the title "the workshop of the world." 
French industry, on the other hand, showed no such general progress. 
France was slow to adopt mechanization in her textile industries, and 
canal and railway building was neglected until the government took the 
initiative after the coup d'etat of Napoleon III in 1851. French per 
capita income was well below that of Britain, a reflection of France's 
lack of enterprise in developing and applying new techniques. 
Economic historians have sought explanations for these differences 
between Britain and France and have emphasized the importance of econom-
ic variables. Some, however, have admitted that economic explanations 
are insufficient in themselves. Figures relating to demand, supply of 
raw materials, population growth, and capital flow can only explain how 
a country might industrialize, but they cannot by themselves explain why 
one cotintry is receptive to economic change while another is not. 
An examination of social factors, on the other hand, can help to 
provide plausible explanations of the different responses which Britain 
and France made to industrialization. Both British and French societies 
were organized on class lines, but, in Britain, centuries of cooperation 
between the bourgeoisie and the landed aristocracy had made the class 
hierarchy acceptable and had fostered harmonious relations between these 
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classes, where in France class relationships were marred by hostility 
and contempt. 
The differences between the social structures of France and Britain 
can be illustrated by their different definitions of the word "gentle-
man." In Britain, a gentle·man was defined as any well-educated person 
with a comfortable income; in France, the "gentilhomme" was required to 
be noble by birth and this effectively blocked upward social mobility by 
entrepreneurs. Because the highest social status in Britain could be 
earned through financial success, entrepreneurs were encouraged to in-
dustrialize and to innovate. Taking risks, even if these resulted occa-
sionally in bankruptcy, did not disqualify industrialists and business-
men from the highest positions in society. In France, on the other hand, 
aristocratic values emphasized "prowess" -- the attainment of excellence 
in style or form, preferably in an area without economic importance. 
Such a system provided little support for French entrepreneurs. 
Similarly, differences between British and French family life had 
important implications for the development of enterprise. The major dif-
ference lay in the extent to which family life in the two countries was 
directed towards promoting independence in children. In Britain children 
were equipped to play a constructive role in an industrial society. In 
the upper class the system of primogeniture, whereby only the eldest 
child inherited the family estate, had the effect of requiring younger 
sons of noble families to seek their own fortunes, which they frequently 
did in trade or manufacturing. In the middle class, patterns of child-
rearing were developed which stressed mastery of problems and self-
reliance. This was especially true of non-conformist families, where 
Quakers counselled freedom of choice and thought for children. Metho-
dists whipped their children to excellence, and Congregationalists 
stressed the importance of achievement through enlightened but firm par-
ental guidance. 
In France, by contrast, children were not oriented to education and 
achievement in the wider society; they were confined to home and family. 
Child-rearing practices protected children from the world and had the 
effect of fostering artificial and extended incompetence in children, 
thus prolonging their dependence on their families. This isolated and 
dependent world of the French family is symbolized by the high walls 
which peasants were required to build around their houses within four 
years of their construction to separate their families from outside con-
tact. 
Success in the period of early industrialization at the beginning 
of the 19th century required willingness to take risks and to adopt new 
techniques in machinery, in production, and in marketing. It was neces-
sary to look beyond the immediate confines of family and class for in-
formation, markets, and also capital. British society was organized in 
such a way that these activities were both possible and desirable; 
French society, on the other hand, was permeated by an atmosphere of 
mistrust and non-cooperation which held back industrial progress. 
BRITAIN AND THE U.S. 
By the end of the 19th century , however, the rate of growth of the 
British economy had begun to fall sharply and she was being overtaken by 
the United States as the leading industrial nation. Again, economic 
reasons can be advanced for this situation, but a comparison with the 
United States reveals that important changes in social behavior had also 
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taken place. By 1900 social and family relationships in Britain were 
failing to provide a spur to enterprise, while in the United States the 
Gospel of Wealth was equating business values with moral values and also 
with social worth. 
Not only was British industry failing to invent new techniques, it 
was also failing to use those that were produced. Changes in the eco-
nomic and social behavior of the middle class provide the key to under-
standing these failures. In the late Victorian period, British middle-
class families began to consume their capital, rather than reinvest it 
in the businesses which had created their wealth. They entered a period 
of conspicuous consumption -- in the words of H. G. Wells, they "discov-
ered indulgences their moral code never foresaw ... as a class, they talk, 
think, and dream possessions. 115 Some families which had built firms sold 
them off or left them in the hands of managers, and the number of new 
firms declined. 
This retreat from active involvement in industry was caused by the 
continued dominance of the landed aristocracy at the top of the British 
social pyramid. In the first generation the upwardly mobile British 
family had committed itself to industry and commerce to acquire the nec-
essary financial means, but in the second generation the emphasis shift-
ed to acquiring the symbols of the aristocratic way of life. The first 
desire became not industrial expansion but the quiet life of the English 
country gentleman; to achieve this ~oal, esteem had to be earned through 
public service, charity, and politics, not through industry and com-
merce. An important part of the ideal was the cult of the amateur, which 
foreswore excellence and effort and required a gentleman never to strive 
too much nor to show too much skill. 
Attitudes toward family life and children showed corresponding 
changes which reinforced the trend away from enterprise and achievement. 
From the 1840s the British public schools provided the predominant edu-
cation for middle-class boys. They offered a classical curriculum gear-
ed to leisure activities -- the arts, travel, and sport. Public school 
values were those of the sports-field and emphasized respect for rules 
and team solidarity; technical education was largely rejected and the 
virtues of the market place were derided. The reputation of engineers 
and other technically qualified people was very low and the role of the 
professional man in business, industry, and politics was a subordinate 
one. By 1900 British businessmen were no longer motivated by economic 
considerations. Decisions were 1!\ade more on the basis of satisfying 
needs rather than on that of maximizing opportunities. For the aspiring 
middle-class family, business had become a matter of routine and habit, 
and enterprise and adventure were sow:rht through leisure. 
The American industrial scene at the end of the 19th century con-
trasts strongly with the British. "The old nations of the world creep 
on at a snail's pace," Carnegie wrote in 1886; "the Republic thunders 
past with the rush of the express. 116 Despite America's obvious advan-
tages in terms of land and other resources, it was her social system and 
the ch.aracter of her family life which prorroted this rate of innovation. 
There was no landed aristocracy to block the rise of successful busi-
nessmen, nor to make them despise the activities which provided their 
wealth. Family life and the educational s y stem fostered early indepen-
dence and the pursuit of material success. Compared with Britain, Ameri-
can parents felt less responsible for their children because they re-
spected their individuality more and expected them to be re.sponsible for 
their own futures. 
The openness of the American social system is illustrated by the 
fact that a man might rise from the lowest to the upper-middle class in 
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his own lifetime. In Britain this would have taken two generations and 
in France it would have taken at least three generations. Such mobility 
was possible for Americans because the highest social status was con-
ferred on those who made money and expanded business. Any contradictions 
between the power of the new captains of industry and the belief in an 
egalitarian society were resolved by presenting material success as a 
sign of moral worth and as an instrument of social prooress for the rest 
of the community, who benefited from employment or from 'charity. 
Business values were recognized as beneficial not only for the indi-
vidual but for the country as a whole. Industrialists not only created 
new techniques of production; they represented the highest social values 
and a new mental outlook. Any difficulties were seen as difficulties of 
growth to which remedies could be found, and the interests of the indi-
vidual and the nation were equated with further economic and technologi-
cal progress. Whereas in Britain industry was merely a means to an end, 
in America it was an end in itself. 
RECENT TRENDS AND CONCLUSION 
These comparisons between Britain, France, and the United States in 
the 19th century suggest that technological change by itself was not the 
determining factor in economic growth. They also show that, where val-
ues change, the rate of technological progress can also change. A number 
of recent trends in America suggest that business values no longer com-
mand the public respect which they enjoyed from the end of the 19th cen-
tury. It is said that businessmen themselves are becoming more inter-
ested in stability and order and that they prefer a predictable profit 
margin and a minimum of risk, rather than competition and expanding 
profits. Furthermore, experiences like Vietnam, Watergate, and the fail-
ure of the Great Society have shaken people's faith in the values which 
guided the American businessman and political elite in the first half 
of the 20th century. Disenchantment with technology appears to be grow-
ing and industrialists and businessmen no longer enjoy such high esteem. 
The falling esteem for technology coupled with the preference of busi-
nessmen for stability over expansion could reduce the rate of innovation 
in America and provide additional evidence that technology does not 
operate independently in society but is modified by social values. 
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CHANGING TAIWANESE PEASANTS' CONCEPT OF TIME: 
ITS IMPACT ON AGRIC ULTURAL PRODUCTION 
Shu-min Huanq* 
The Ph-Llo~oph-La peAenvU-6 of Chinese culture was an 
organic naturalism which invariably accepted the re-
ality and importance of time. This must be related 
to the fact that although metaphysical idealism is 
found in China's philosophical history .. .... it never 
really occupied more than a subsidiary place in Chi-
nese thinking. Subjective concepts of time were 
therefore uncharacteristic of Chinese thought. 
Joseph Needham 1 
ABSTRACT. This study attempts to disentangle the dialectical relation-
ship between value system and agricultural production in Taiwan's rapid-
ly changing rural society. The emphasis is on the perception and struc-
ture of time in the value system, and the ways in which they gear into 
the peasants' daily activities. The study demonstrates that the tradi-
tional way of conceptualization of time is reflective of the general 
sociocultural conditions, and follows a l ogical , rational process con-
sistent with the agricultural production. The recent industrial develop-
ment in the island, however, has brought about changes in rural societal 
time structure as the peasants have increased their involvements in out-
side, industrial labor markets. Significant changes in the peasants' 
value system, as seen in their new conceptualization of time and atti-
tude toward work, have contributed to the decline in agricultural pro-
duction in the last decade. 
INTRODUCTION 
Social scientists today seem to have shifte~ their concern from pin-
pointing the determinants of sociocultural change toward a more system-
atic analysis of the ongoing changes within a specific culture. 2 Their 
emphasis is on the interrelationship of the many facets of a cultural 
system and the consequences of change in one of the facets to the re-
maining parts of the same system. This approach appears to be promising 
for it reveals important knowledge about the nature of human culture. 
Such studies can also provide information on the practicability of de-
velopment strategies adopted by this particular culture. Given the fact 
that most of the so-called developing countries today are facing rapid 
changes unprecedented in human history, an understanding of cultural 
dynamics is urgent for both intellectual and practical concerns. 
In th~s study, the dialectical relationship between value and tech-
nology as seen in the changing Taiwanese peasant society is analyzed. A 
*Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Iowa State University, Ames, 
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close examination of this changing culture reveals that there are paral-
lel and comparable structures in the value system and the agricultural 
system, and a change in one without a compatible and corresponding 
change in the other will result in problems for the entire rural econo-
my. 
In discussing these values, the ideal, ethical, and moral components 
of Taiwanese society are not defined in abstract terms, but the concept 
of time and the peasants' daily activities are analyzed, using these as 
indicators to reveal the nature of the value system and the dynamics in-
volved in its change. Anthropologists dealing with non-Western cultures 
see the different ways in which peoples perceive time and arrange and 
conduct their activities. Sharp contrasts can be noted between Western 
and non-Western cultures with regard to conceptualization of time and 
arrangement of activities. Thus, while "people of the Western world ... 
tend to think of time as something fixed in nature, something around us 
and from which we cannot escape" (Hall, p. 20) , 3 the Nuer of the Upper 
Nile region refer to their time only in connection with specific space 
or location, and within specific kinship structures (Evans-Pritchard, p. 
94). 3 Whereas the "Americans think of time as a road or a ribbon 
stretching into the future" (Hall, p.21) ,3 peoples in South Asia, namely 
those cultures influenced by Hinduism or Buddhism, may regard the pas-
sage of time as cyclical. 4 
Despite extensive discussions regarding the ways in which time is 
perceived and conceptualized differently in non-Western cultures, few 
social scientists have made systematic efforts to understand the struc-
ture and internal logic of time in these cultures. The purpose in this 
study is to discuss and analyze the_ time structure of the Taiwanese pea-
sants' value system. It will be pointed out that the conceptualization 
of time in rural Taiwan is reflective of general sociocultural condi-
tions, and follows a logical, rational process consistent with the par-
ticular environment. 
Further, an exploration will be made of how the recent industrial 
development in Taiwan has brought about changes in rural societal time 
structure and hence generates discord in the peasants' activities. The 
goal will be to discern the extent to which the peasants' value system 
has been affected as p'easants proceeded from one type of social universe 
to another, and how these -changes affected agricultural activities. 
It will be demonstrated that it is largely because of the rapid 
change in the peasants' value system -- in their new conceptualization 
of time and attitude toward work -- that agricultural production , which 
still depends heavily on the traditional collective social institutions, 
has suffered from constant decline in the last decade. 
THE SETTING FOR THE CURRENT RESEARCH 
Taiwan is a transitional society where industrialization has made 
signifi cant progress in the last decade. Annual per capita income for 
Taiwan's population was $672 in 1974, ranking third in East Asia after 
Japan and Fiji (A~ia 7975 YeaJt. Boo ~, p . 300). While industrial develop-
ment moved steadily ahead in the decade 1968-77, the agricultural sector 
declined c onstantly , except for 1976. This can best be illustrated by 
rice production in Taiwan. Wet rice production, the mainstay of the ag-
ricultural economy, reached the all-time level of 2.5 million metric 
tons in 1968, and then fluctuated between 2.3 to 2.4 million tons from 
that year to 1975. 5 Despite tremendous capital investment and govern-
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mental efforts in the agrarian sector in t he last few years (interest-
free loans, new technologies, and extension services), imprOl!ement has 
been minimal. 
The emphasis here, contrary to what some economists have suggested, 
is that technology or economic incentive alone cannot adequately explain . 
the growth, or lack of growth, in agricultural production, and that a 
comprehensive analysis of this issue should bring other sociocultural 
factors of the agrarian society into consideration. One such factor in 
the value system to be examined here is the concept of time. 
The data used in this discussion were gathered during a year's study 
(August 1973 to July 1974) in a small, rural village in central Taiwan 
which will be called San-lin. 7 San-lin is a typical agricultural commu-
nity. It has a population of slightly over 2,000 and approximately 80% 
of the household heads depend directly on agriculture for their liveli-
hood. The main agricultural production in San-lin is wet rice cultiva-
tion, characterized by: 1) a well-leveled land in which rice is grown; 
2) a constant supply of water from irrigation channels in the early 
stage of the growth cycle; 3) intensive use of permanent fields in order 
to produce two to three crops per year; and 4) a need for cooperation 
among farmers beyond the family level to conduct labor intensive works, 
such as constructing irrigation channels and land boundaries, or har-
vesting and transplanting. These are the major features one can observe 
in San-lin as well as in all of Taiwan and, to some extent, in all of 
Monsoon Asia. 
CONCEPT OF TIME 
The concept of time as a gauge of human value systems and as a de-
terminant of human behavior can be seen in the scheduling, timing, and 
programing process of daily activities. For someone who lives in a mod-
ern industrial society, the necessity of time-scheduling is evident, as 
epitomized by clocks and watches. One also considers time in planning 
for the future. Saving and investment are clear signs of trading present 
considerations for the programed future. In summary, an appropriate 
attitude about the importance of time is a prerequisite for an adequate 
life style. True, flexibility is not utterly lacking, but its range is 
limited. 
Taiwanese peasants have a different attitude aJJout time. Their con-
cepts include several seemingly perplexing and contradictory factors. 
For example, they are casual about their scheduled activities. A villag-
er pulling a cart, saying that he is going tp do farm work for the day, 
may actually end up in a grocery store where others are gathered for 
chatting, gambling, or drinking for the entire day. A farmer may simply 
drop his work ·upon hearing that a next door neighbor or a kinsman has 
fallen ill or has had an accident and needs someone to attend to his 
family. Peasants are usually notorious for their lack of punctuality or 
precision in timing; e.g., when making an appointment to do something, 
the usual arrangement is "in the afternoon," "at dawn," or "after din-
ner." Any planned program for ordinary daily activities is virtually 
unacceptable to the peasants. 
Contrary to the above, the peasants in San-lin often appear to be 
very sensitive toward particular "spots" of time in their activities. 
For instance, the time for moving the ancestor's tablet to a new house, 
for holding a marriage ceremony, or for making a trip is carefully cho-
sen and executed accordingly. Sometimes people consult the almanac to 
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decide whether to do something on a particular day, and for more serious 
matters, they consult a spiritual intermediary to decide the exact time 
for the activity. Failure to act at the prescribed time is believed to 
solicit unexpected disasters, and v illagers often explain unexpected 
events by pointing out the improper time factors. 
Why, then, in some cases do the peasants lack a sense of timing 
while in others they actively pursue punctuality? What are the inner 
structures in their ideology that differentiate one type of activity 
from others? The following provides a structural analysis of the con-
cept of time. 
TIME STREAM AND TIME SPOT 
Environmentally, San-lin is little different from most other farm-
ing communities in central Taiwan. Economic activities are regulated by 
the quality of the farm land, the amount of rainfall, and the length of 
the growing season. Though a farmer may somewhat improve his lot in life 
through aggressive action, the limiting factors are primarily those of 
nature whose tempo remains the heartbeat of the agrarian life. Farmers 
know that there will be sufficient rainfall and irrigation water between 
the sixth and ninth months, less between the second and fifth, and that 
there will be little available water between the tenth month and the 
first month of the next year. 8 The winter in the latter period also pro-
hibits the growth of rice, but is suitable for some cold-resistant vege-
tables or root crops. 
Human efforts to somewhat redirect the course of nature are seen in 
the persistence of the rice paddy. Availability of water from irrigation 
guarantees the growth of the rice, providing a modest living. Disasters, 
such as typhoons, however, may wash away farm land and houses within 
seconds. There were typhoons in the village in 1953 and in 1963, and 
most villagers believed these happenings were caused by supernatural 
powers. 
The complementary concepts of time involved in the sequence of 
events can be discerned in the following manner: one is the normal, 
repetitious, and endless stream of time, just a~ the stream of water in 
the river and irrigation ditches which can be considered natural and 
permissive; the other is the abrupt, destructive, and uncontrollable 
events which occur in unpredictable time spots and are caused by super-
natural factors. The former is analogized with the time lapse from one 
day to another, one season after another, or the time span a man can 
pass in his life. The latter, however, is not a part of the natural 
sequence and can disrupt its time course. 
These contrasting kinds of events -- the repetitious and predict-
able, and the sporadic and unpredictable -- form the basis of the con-
cepts of ,t,lme ltlteam and ,t,lme lpoz. These differ only comparatively be-
cause there is no standard to determine how long a time period should be 
to be called time stream or time spot. An individual's life is consid-
ered time stream, but a particular year in his life can be a bad time 
spot for doing many things. Or, whereas the rice crop growing period of 
three months can be conside red time stream, periods of crop failure are 
considered bad time spots. These concepts, however, were not formulated 
by the villagers and there are no comparable Taiwanese terms for them. 
The term equivalent to the English concept of time in Taiwanese is lhl. 
Used in compound words, the term shi means the sequential relations of 
events, specific duration, or the measurement of passage of time. It 
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is a general term and can be used in many different contexts. However, 
no equivalent in Taiwanese idiom was found for the contrasting nature of 
time or the different qualities of time. 
These structural principles do not exhaust all the time factors in 
peasants' daily activities, nor are. they conclusive in exploring them. 
Presently, however, they are the most satisfactory concepts to analyze 
and cateqorize the time factors operating in the daily activities of 
Taiwanese peasants. 
AGRICULTURAL WORK AND THE STRUCTURE OF TIME 
Time factors in aqricultural work involve the natural process of 
growth which belongs largely to the category of time stream. The growth 
of crops is affected by natural conditions manifest in different time 
periods, such as differences of temperature, amount of rainfall, and 
growing speed of the crop in different seasons. Thus, rice has to be 
grown between the second and the eighth months, and the cold and windy 
winter allows the growth of only a limited number of crops. In addition 
to this seasonal sequence, the natural condition in the physical envi-
ronment also directly affects the work of the peasants. A rainy day is 
always a rest day unless there are urgent tasks, and the winter is also 
often a leisurely time when the farmers do not have much to do in their 
fields. 
One distinctive but rarely mentioned characteristic of farming is 
the degree to which farm work patterns are affected by the long growing 
seasons. The cyclical nature of time stream involved in crop growth 
makes farming a flexible task and provides a long time span in which to 
conduct a task which. may require only a small portion of the allotted 
span. For instance, the first season rice can be transplanted from the 
seedling beds to a flooded paddy anytime from early second month to the 
end of the third month. Much the same principle applies to the work of 
weeding or the spraying of pesticides. These tasks can be done today or 
tomorrow or a week later, depending on the farmer's decision. 
As a consequence of the fact that the independent farmer is used to 
a casual working pattern, the planning and execution of organized farm 
labor are difficult to carry through. An example is the frustration 
faced in the organization of rice transplanting or harvesting teams, of 
which there are six or seven in San-lin, which do this work for farmers 
who do not have the necessary skill or available labor. None of the 
teams has a fixed membership. The organizer takes work orders from farm-
ers and attempts to recruit workers on a daily basis. The organizer may 
have close friends or kinsmen on whom he can depend as basic members of 
the team, but otherwise he must rely on the participation of villagers 
over whom he has little control. 
The transplanting or harvest team as a whole displays the work pat-
tern characteristic of an individual farm worker. Although wages are 
paid on a daily basis, there is no requirement regardinq the number of 
hours a team should work during a day. The team may leave work in the 
early afternoon upon finishing one plot of land and decide not to begin 
another plot, or may stay in the field until quite dark to finish all 
the work in another plot of land. 
With an unstable labor force of unpredictable accomplishment, it is 
difficult for a team organizer to make plans for more than four or five 
days. Normally, he arranges work for three or four days and purposely 
leaves one or two days free, the latter being designed to complete the 
unfinished work of the previous period. 
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The organizer's inability to l!lake a firm schedule for his team is 
not caused solely by the unstable work force. For example, a farmer who 
had contracted a transplanting team to work his land on a specific day 
may suddenly cancel the contract that 1'!\orning when he inspects his seed-
ling beds and discovers that the seedlings are yet too small to be 
transplanted. Sometimes an insufficiency of water may result in abrupt 
cancellation of scheduled transplanting. Thus, natural conditions pre-
clude any long-term timetable for either individual farmers or organized 
farm labor. 
The flexible time factor is also an essential part of the village 
social life. Whenever a farmer gives a party for moving to a new house, 
or has a funeral ceremony for a deceased family member, or a wedding 
party, he can always find other farmers to provide assistance. These 
may be kinsmen, friends, or neighbors who will put aside their farm work 
and help when requested. They may cook, serve the table, or prepare 
ritual performance for the family for several days. They are not paid 
for their services, except for coffin carriers in San-lin who receive NT 
$100 (approximately U.S. $2.501 each for the task. The helpers know that 
when they face a similar situation, they can expect reciprocal services. 
This kind of mutual assistance, seen in almost all the village activi-
ties, further renders any precise timetable for farm work impossible. 
Agricultural work, though mostly involved in the natural course of 
growth and thus part of the tillle stream, also includes unpredictable bad 
time spots. A crop may be destroyed by cold temperature, pests, drought, 
or strong wind. These kinds of crop failures are called pai, literally 
meaning a "failure." A farmer will normally work hard to prevent such a 
failure but not succeeding, he will simply talk about his pai, not spec-
ifying the exact cause of the failure. Farmers who apply scientific 
knowledge to crop production also use the concept of pai to explain all 
the known or unknown causes of the failure. Pai then implies an ines-
capable part of the life, both of the crop and its grower, just like the 
flood that struck several years ago.9 
CONCEPT OF TIME AND VILLAGERS' ETHOS 
The contradiction between time stream and time spot is also crystal-
lized in the peasants' ethos. The course of an individual's life occu-
pies a definite period in the natural course of time. The time stream 
of a person's life, a replica of the natural time, displays the cyclical 
sequence so characteristic of the latter. A person's life is called a 
"life way" (mi.a-to), the lineal road through which one passes. Its pas-
sage is predetermined by two interrelated variables. 
The first variable is the designated nature of the specific compart-
ments of time. The peasant culture considers that, just as the rotating 
season subdivides a year with each season's unique character, the other 
compartments of time also have their unique characters. For instance, 
the traditional Chinese cosmology assigns an animal to represent each 
year, and twelve animals comprise a twelve year cycle. Villagers believe 
that each year, therefore, bears the character of the assigned animal. 
Not only is each year or season specifically characterized, but a so-
phisticated villager can even figure out the characters of a specific 
day or the compartments of that day. Even for ordinary activities, most 
villagers consult the almanac to find out the specific character of the 
days. For instance, the first day of the second month may be a good day 
for making a trip, or having a haircut, or giving a party. On the other 
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hand, the next day may be a bad one to visit your kinsmen, or purchase a 
household item, or open a granary. Thus, when a person passes from one 
compartment of time to another, he or she has to be ful ly aware of the 
nature of that time. 
The second variable is related to the first one. It is believed 
that a person born in a specific time period will carry its characters 
throughout his or her life; i.e., one born in the year of the pig is 
generally regarded to bear the characters of a pig. The year from Feb-
ruary 1976 to February 1977 was the year of the dragon. Since the dragon 
is regarded as a sacred animal in Chinese mythology, many parents wanted 
to have a child born in that year , their success being corroborated by 
demographers. 
The operation of these two factors, the characters of the compart-
ments of time and the individual's birth characters, lay hazards in the 
course of one's life. One must carefully relate birth characters and 
those of a specific moment. When the birth character is in an extremely 
unfavorable time period, he or she then falls into a bad time spot, 
which is called a knot or disaster Cgi ap). If unaware of the entrapment 
of one's life into such a spot, the person may encounter troubles, such 
as a crop failure, financial fai lure in business, illness, and sometimes 
even death. Indeed, many villagers use this concept to explain unex-
plainable events. A village gambler colTII!litted suicide after he lost some 
money the night before and had a fight with his wife. Most vill agers 
maintained that this gambler killed hll!ISelf, not because he lost the 
money or had the fight with his wife, but because he was in a giap and 
was not aware of it. Rad he not killed hilnself th.en, he would have been 
killed in another way, such. as in an automobile accident. 
In order to avoid trouble, villagers generally make special arrange-
ments for important events. When a family has a wedding for one of the 
family members, sets up a new house, or buries a deceased family member, 
the responsible person must consult a fortune teller who, by calculating 
both the invol ve.d person's birth character and the character of time 
compartment, can figure out the best moment for conducting these events. 
Once the time is selected, it has to be observed carefully. If not, the 
involved person(s) may be entrapped in a giap. By calculating these two 
sets of variables, the fortune teller can also detect the forthcoming 
time spots when this client may fall into a giap. 
CHANGING CONCEPT OF TIME 
This time structure has somewhat changed as the industrial society 
and its accompanying values have permeated the rural areas . The changes 
seem to have derived mainly from the presence of an industrial labor 
market. In the traditional agricultural system, peasants figure their 
time in a different way than that of an industrial market system. For 
instance, peasants work their land for more than three months with out 
any immediate reward, which, however, comes when the rice crop is har-
vested. When the reward is calculated, the farmers cannot accurately 
determine which portion of the yield is attributable to which portion of 
the labor or time they have invested. 1 0 In addition, in the traditional 
rice cultivation, a farmer does not need to work all his time in the 
rice paddy. After the second weeding, for instance, he may have very 
little to do in his field. He may tend his cattle, if he has any, or 
repair the land bunds or tools. These tasks take only a small portion 
of his day during the entire slack season. In this sense, during the 
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slack season at least, time is not considered a scarce resource, nor do 
farmers figure it in a monetary manner. Peasants, when hired to work on 
others' farms, do not object to working for longer hours than originally 
anticipated. 
By contrast, in the industrial society, a day's labor means a day's 
wage. The reward is immediate and direct. Thus, time becomes a direct 
resource and a marketable item. 
This does not imply that all peasants can immediately find a tempo-
rary job in the labor market during their slack season. They may have 
to ask around for a few days before they finally spot a temporary job. 
The point, hCMever, is that the farmers now have an objective standard 
in the monetary sense against which they can figure out the value of 
their time and work. One day a farmer was using his spare time to cut up 
some firewood which he had collected from his land bunds. Another farm-
er saw this and told him: ''Why do you cut the wood? You work for the 
whole day on the wood which can perhaps supply you three days' fire-
wood. If you take the day to work in a construction job, you can earn 
NT $150. With this arrount of money, you can buy a tank of gas which can 
supply you a whole man th' s fuel! " Thus, farmers now often notice that 
many of their tasks are unprofitable and thus perhaps not worth doing. 
They must choose how to utilize their spare time during the slack sea-
son. They may do something which is not economical in terms of the re-
wards they receive for their time and labor, they may wait for higher 
paying industrial employment, or they may reserve the spare time for 
recreation. Since work with low return payment further confirms their 
descending social status, most peasants now prefer to find a high reward 
job for their spare time or to use it for leisure. 
Another factor deriving from the industrial labor market which has 
a significant impact on the peasants' conceptualization of time is the 
fixed-hour working pattern of the industrial society. Many farmers in 
recent years used their slack season to work temporarily in factories or 
on construction as manual workers. They quickly learned the system of 
regular working hours, i.e., beginning work at seven or eight in the 
morning and finishing at five in the afternoon. Once or twice a month 
the worker has a Sunday off. There is no involvement with work before 
or after working hours or on holidays. Peasants have grasped the concept 
of fixed working hours as seen in industrial society. 
At the time of this study (1973-74) the peasants in San-lin, while 
agreeing that agricultural work is different in nature from factory 
work, would only accept work on another farm for a maximum of nine hours 
per day. rt is quite usual nCM to see harvest or transplanting teams 
begin their work late after daybreak and return home before dusk. In the 
summer, when the day is long, the work team may take an afternoon nap 
for about two hours before resuming work. A transplanting team organizer 
explained this as follows: "We purposely take a long nap. Since the day 
is long, if we take off from work while the sun is still high over our 
head, other villagers would laugh at us. With a long break in the after-
noon, we return home in the evening as we have done before. As long as 
we work nine hours a day, we feel no shame in taking such a long rest 
since we are still outworking the factory workers by one extra hour but 
receive the same amount of payment." This kind of reasoning and the 
consequent attitude toward work has undoubtedly given the older farmers 
sufficient reason to accuse the younger farmers of being lazy and irre-
sponsible. It also explains why the peasants now, with more efficient 
machinery, have become less efficient with regard to their work speed. 
SYMPOSIUM: TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN VALUES 199 
CONCLUSION 
Two basic conclusions are presented. First, as the peasants now use 
the wage level of the industrial labor market to evaluate their time and 
work, they begin to question much of their commitment to agriculture as 
uneconomical. Many have reserved more of their time for leisure, and 
the prevalence of tourism, gambling, and temple-going in recent years 
seems to indicate the peasants' decreasing commitment to agriculture. 
Second, the adoption by the peasants of fixed hour working patterns 
like those of the factory workers has curtailed the amount of work being 
accomplished in a day. In a busy period of the crop growth cycle, the 
work often requires long hours and complete dedication. But with pea-
sants now insisting on the fixed hour working pattern, there is an ac-
tual decline in the amount of work accomplished. 
These two changing factors have a negative effect on agricultural 
production. Changing values in rural Taiwan, as seen in the peasants' 
concept of time and their activities based on this concept, have not 
been accompanied by congruent changes in the technological dimensions of 
agricultural production. The combination of the traditional technology 
and the modern, industrial market value system has probably been the 
major factor contributing to the decline in agricultural production in 
recent years. 
The conclusions presented are not in accord with the opinion of many 
sociologists who say that changes in people's values, attitudes, or per-
sonality structure are the prerequisites for achievement of modernity in 
the developing countries. 11 This study suggests that value change alone 
neither sufficiently explains nor necessarily brings about further mod-
ernization in Taiwan's peasant society. It is suggested that both the 
society's values and technology should be examined in order to under-
stand better the society's development and the problems it may encounter 
during this process. 
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THE PRIMACY OF STRUCTURE OVER EVENT: 
THE CASE OF THE TALLENSI OF NORTHERN GHANA 
Sonia E. Patten* 
ABSTRACT. Cultural conceptions may affect interpretations of noncapi-
talist societies. . This paper contrasts the views of Fortes and Worsley 
who differ in interpretation of the dynamics of cultural structure of 
the Tallensi of Northern Ghana . Fortes believed tha t significant social 
activity among the Tallensi derives from the patrilineage s ys tem. Wors -
ley felt that Fortes underestimated economic relations and consequently 
misinterpreted the significance of the kinship system. The author sug-
gests that the Fortes interpretation is most fruitful, and feels that 
the controversy has implications beyo nd an understanding of the Tallensi 
society. 
INTRODUCTION 
The dominant cultural conception in Western society seems to call 
for the maximization of practical, economic action mediated by a highly 
sophisticated technology. This idea has influenced the methods of obser-
vation and categories of measurement used by social scientists in defin-
ing and measuring social process in non- Western societies, and has per-
haps hindered the attempt to understand the dynamic properties of these 
social systems as they evolve . It is possible that this cultural con-
ception may have a profound effect on the interpretation of the produc-
tion and distribution of goods and services in noncapitalist systems or 
of the repercussions from the introduction of a new technology. Tech-
nology gives significance to resources on the basis of cultural defini-
tion, or ideology. When techno logy and ensuing economic relationships 
are themselves the focal point of a culture 's ideology, as would seem t o 
be the case in American society, o ther possible relationships may be 
difficult to conceptualize. 
In anthropology a controversy exists regarding the role of technol-
ogy and economics, on the one hand, and of ideology, on the other, in 
determining the form that rel a tionships between people will take. The 
case of the Tallensi people of Northern Ghana provides a basis for con-
sidering the social process in general . ~ 
THE FORTES STUDIES 
Th e Tallensi people were traditionally hoe horticulturalists with a 
well -developed patrilineal segmentary lineage system, a system of uni-
lineal descent in which geneological ties are traced thr ough males only 
and kin groups function corporately in landholding, the settlement of 
*Department of Sociology and Anthropology, University of Minnesota, Min-
neapolis, Minnesota. 
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disputes, the performance of religious rites, and other social tasks. 
Meyer Fortes did anthropological fieldwork among the Tallensi from 1934 
until 1937 and has subsequently revisited them many times. In his des-
cription and analysis of the culture, he has maintained that the moral-
ity of long-term relationships based on kinship is culturally perceived 
and defined as the most significant aspect of Tallensi values, and that 
it has had a profound effect on Tallensi social structure . 
Fortes conceives of social structure as the entire culture of a 
given people handled in a special theoretical frame. 1 A social structure 
is an inductive model which the social scientist constructs by: (1) re-
garding his observations as expressions of social relations, i.e., the 
ties and cleavages that exist among people and groups in the ongoing 
activities of social life; (2) categorizing these social relations; and 
(3) viewing the categories of social relations as the constant elements 
in all social activities. Within this framework, Fortes interprets his 
field observations on the basis of the assumption that every significant 
social activity among the Tallensi is linked to the patrilineal lineage 
system. He feels that the distinguishing feature of the Tallensi lineage 
system is its tendency toward equilibrium and stability. Because of the 
dominance of the lineage system in the field of social relations, the 
entire society is characterized by this tendency. It is the economic 
system which makes this equilibrium possible: because everyone is di-
rectly involved in subsistence activities and all have access to the 
basic resources of land and technology, there is almost no economic dif-
ferentiation among individuals or groups. This makes the technological 
and economic systems neutral rather than dynamic factors in the society. 
Fortes writes: "The almost complete absence of economic differentiation, 
by occupation or by ownership of resources, and, in particular, the ab-
sence of both material and institutional possibilities for capital accu-
mulation or for technical advance, mean that economic interests do not 
play the part of dynamic factors in the social structure . " 2 
Dynamic equilibrium implies polarity, and Fortes sees polarity play-
ing an important part in all Tallensi institutions. This is reflected 
in some of the structural principles which he uses to analyze the con-
sistencies found in Tale society. The principle of patricentrality (re-
latedness to father's kin) and matricentrality (relatedness to mo t her's 
kin) emerges from the distinction between Li_neage bond6, from which an 
individual derives social personality (jural status and ritual privi-
leges) and u;tvU_ne bond6, where the individual finds close affectional 
relationships of mutual interest and concern. What would appear to be a 
divisive force on the level of the individual resolves itself into a co-
hesive force on the level of the lineage . Since social relations among 
kin are governed by a general rule of amity among Tallensi, this polar-
ity works to maintain peace. 3 
Later in his career, Fortes developed the principle of pat ricen-
trality and matricentrality into a concept of complementary filiation. 
Filiation - - relatedness - - is almost universally bilateral, extending 
to both mother's kin and father's kin, but there is frequently not the 
same social weighting on both sides of the kin connection. The two sides 
are not equal but, rather, complement each other . It is complementary 
filiation that provides the link between a sibling group and the kin of 
the parent who does not determine descent. In Fortes's view, complemen-
tary filiation is the principal mechanism by which segmentation in the 
lineage is brought about. 4 In ,Tpllensi society, where polygyny is the 
ideal marriage form, a single patrilineage will be divided into segments 
along the lines of differentiation between cowives. The model here is 
the existence of "matricentral" houses within a polygynous family, and 
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economic or other pressures may cause the segments to become structural-
ly distinct and leave the compound, or homestead, to farm bush land, 
which is at least initially much less productive than compound land. 5 
It is complementary filiation within the extended polygynous family 
that makes the principle of fission and reintegration function on the 
level of the lineage. Major lineage segments are continually expanding 
through the fission of their minor segments. But although fission occurs 
on one segmentary level, reintegration will occur on the next, because 
both of the new segments will be part of a larger, more encompassing 
patrilineal descent group. This process stops at the level of the maxi -
mal lineage, because this is the largest corporate group to be governed 
by the rule of exogamy, or out-marriage, and no branch of it can con-
tract out of this bond. 6 
The equilibrium which he sees between ties and cleavages on all 
levels of kinship relationships leads Fortes to conclude that these are 
essentially moral relationships, binding in their own right. 7 It is the 
mo~al. nature of the relationships that binds up the cleavages and keeps 
the system from flying apart at the seams. The supreme sanction for the 
resolution of cleavages comes from the ancestor cult, which is "the ob -
jective, cultural embodiment of the social conscious." 8 
Fortes sees Tallensi society as a unity made up of parts and pro -
cesses that are linked by a number of structural principles, none of 
which rest on technology or economics. The overriding effect of these 
principles is maintenance of the society in a state of balance or dynam-
ic equilibrium. In fact, these principles are so strong, Fortes be-
lieves, that they have succeeded in maintaining the general form of Tal-
lensi society in the face of increasing influences from the outside 
world. 9 
THE WORSLEY RESPONSE 
In 1956 Peter Worsley published a Marxist critique of Fortes's work 
in which he took Fortes to task for underestimating the significance of 
economic relations in Tallensi social life and, consequently, a misin-
terpretation of the significance of the kinship system. Rather than 
finding technology and the economic system to be a neutral factor in the 
society, Worsley says that they are the source of dynamic movement and 
the determiner of the particular forms that kinship relations will 
take. 10 Good agricultural land, the compound land on which the system 
subsists, is a limited resource. It is controlled by the heads of line-
ages. All men have the right to inherit from this land; the lineage 
head has the right to control the use of the land as well as the dispo -
sition of its products . This compound land, which is manured so it will 
retain its fertility, is the most important part of a lineage patri -
mony. 
Worsley maintains that land pressure is the crucial factor in pro-
ducing fission of the lineage (p. 47), rather than conflict between the 
structural principles of matricentrality and patricentrality, as Fortes 
would have it. The locus of fission, then, is b~otheJL6, rather than 
women who have married members of the patrilineage. When an extended 
household reaches a maximum size, which is set by the amount of compound 
land controlled by the household, junior men will begin to move out, 
migrating to an area where bush land is available to be worked by slash-
and-burn techniques. Sibling solidarity can be maintained only in the 
absence of technological and economic stress. So, in the absence of 
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stress, father and son will cooperate in working 
well as intermediate land and possibly some bush 
of stress this cooperation will be diminished 
leave the extended family. 
the patrimonial land as 
land. In the presence 
and younger sons will 
When the head of the extended family dies, the compound land becomes 
available for inheritance. At this time some of t he sons may return with 
their families to share in the inheritance. Fortes interprets this r e -
turn in terms of sentiment for the patrimonial land generated by the 
ceremonialism associated with the reverence for ancestors; Worsley sees 
it as sons returning to the most fertile land available ; i.e., land 
which produces high yields because of heavy manuring and which can be 
worked with a hoe rather than slash-and-burn techniques. 
For Fortes, the ancestor cult provides the ideology around which 
lineage relations are organized . 11 For Worsley, the ancestral cult is 
responsive to the forces of technology and economics; it focuses strong 
sentiments on the land and dictates that the production unit which works 
on the patrimonial lands (father and sons, brother and brother) should 
also be the key to the concept and prac tice of lineage solidarity. 12 
Worsley emphasizes that it is not just land that generates economic 
differences among Tallensi men, but also cattle, wages, profit in trade, 
and especially number of wives. 13 Fortes, however, sees this competition 
within the framework of lineage ideology and explains it this way: "The 
reason for this competitive atti tude about wives in a society almost de-
void of durable goods of great productive or prestige value ... [is that] 
.... Wives are the sole means of attaining the supreme end of life ... the 
perpetuation and increase of a man's lineage." 14 
DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
Two different views of Tallensi history are generat ed by Worsley's 
and Fortes's divergent interpretations. Worsley accuses Fortes of hav-
ing neglected history -- "what actually is happening, 111 5 -- a nd having 
settled for Tallensi concepts of their own society as adequate analysis. 
His own concept of history is history as stream-of-events, a nd he feels 
that Tallensi notions of their own society relate to an idealized past 
and obscure a view of recent changes . The introduc tion of a cash econo-
my, wage labor, and some aspects of Western technology have increased 
social differentiation among the Tallensi, he points out, and is under-
mining the kinship system (p . 72). No hint of this is given in Fortes's 
picture of Tallensi society as homogenous, segmentary , and cyclical. The 
kind of history that Fortes's view generates is not stream-of-events, 
not cumulative change, but, rather, cycles of events embedded directly 
in the social structure, which itself undergoes repetitive , cyclical 
change. In fact, Fortes reports that a visit to the Tallensi in 1963 
gave evidence of the stability and continuity of the lineage, family, 
and residence patterns : "'The demographic, economic, political and cul -
tural changes of the past thirty years had mark ed and obvious influences 
but had brought about no radical changes in the social structure or the 
religious system." 1 6 
What are the basic points at issue here? Fortes and Worsley see 
kinship as expressing, in a sense, separate realities. For Fortes, kin-
ship expresses basic moral axioms or values; for Worsley, it expresses 
basic economic relationships and patterns of work that derive from the 
tools and resources to which they are applied . Worsley's view is "on the 
ground," while Fortes's has to do with the symbolic organization of ex-
perience. 
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There is some parallelism within the controversy. Both men are 
working within the same tradition of British structural anthropology, 
which had been markedly influenced by the search for the general prin-
ciples of specific social practices. Worsley has elevated technology and 
economics to the status of such an underlying principle, while Fortes's 
most significant principle is perhaps that of complementary filiation . 
There is a danger in such procedures as noted by the American anthro-
pologist Sahlins: "If in a single instance 'principle 1 is the abstract 
version of form, the generalization of principle to accommodate a number 
of distinct forms becomes an exercise in classification. 1117 
Worsley's economic principle, which appears to be the maximization 
of material gain, has its origin, in Tallensi society, in certain objec-
tive conditions -- the limits set on minimal lineage size and density by 
the amount o f fertile compound available for working, the available 
technology, the cooperation of extended family members in working the, 
land, the necessity for the sharing of food, and land shortage causing 
younger sons to leave the compound. If this principle expresses, in es-
sence, a lawful relationship between economic system and kinship system, 
then, given the structure of the economic system, one should be able to 
predict the structure of the kinship system. But Worsley cannot. And 
this is the main criticism that both Fortes and Sahlins level against 
him. 
Fortes says, "Marriage, parenthood, filiation, siblingship and other 
relations of kinship occur in similar arrangements in societies very 
different from the Tallensi in their modes of production of food, shel-
ter, and services, in their proper rela tions, and in the other items 
cited by Worsley as 'economic '." 1 8 Sahlins states the objection more 
succinctly: "Fortes is quite prepared to concede that it may be in the 
nature of agricultural production that father and son ~oopeAa;te, but it 
is not in the nature of agricultural production that fia;the~ and ~on co -
operate -- as opposed to mother and daughter, mother's brother and sis-
ter's son, or Don Quixote and Sancho Panza .... Hence the effect of the 
material necessity is determined by the kinship property of the rela-
tions -- even as the definition of human existence in lineage terms spe-
cifies the economic necessities in the first place . 19 
If Worsley's principle of economic primacy does not express a law-
ful relationship, then perhaps it is simply a classificatory category. 
This is suggested by Fortes, stating that Worsley's concept of the eco-
nomic is so sweeping and so nebulous that every social activity imagi-
nable could be included. 20 If all kinship relationships are simply so 
many instances of economic primacy, then the principle has decreasing 
power to explain any one of the kin relationships. 
The Fortes-Worsley controversy has broader implications than a the-
oretical interpretation of Tallensi society. Worsley's analysis is a n 
a ttempt to determine whether historical materialism is an appropriate 
tool for the analysis of tribal, or traditional sta te cultures . Whereas 
Marx had t o synthesize economics, law, and the state into the institu-
tional unity which they comprise in capitalist society, such institu-
tional unity exists and is experienced as the kinship system in a non-
state society. Political, moral, educational, religious, and economic 
ties are all expressed and experienced as kinship ties. Worsley broke 
this unity into analytic parts; he assigned to the economic system the 
designation of "base" in the Marxian scheme, and he conceptualized kin-
ship as "superstructure." Yet in non-state societies kinship is both 
base and superstructure: it orders relations of production, juro-politi-
cal relations, and ritual relations. 21 In order for historical material-
ism to be useful in the analysis of tribal societies, it must come to 
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terms with this aspect of tribal life. Kinship structures may function 
both as relations of production and as ideologies . The structure of a 
given society is the unifica tion of base and supers truc ture in a histor-
ically specific way. 2 2 Among the Tallensi, the production unit is the 
extended family, and the relations of production are the relations that 
exist between the members of that family . Worsley seems to be making a 
case for lineage fission among the Tallensi as a negative feedback mech-
anism: when the population within a compound is approac hing the carrying 
capacity of the land, fission occurs . This possibility is something that 
could be measured among the Tallensi, but this has not been done. If it 
were to be found that fission is triggered below the carrying capacity, 
this would point to the kinship structure as determining the nature and 
limits of labor input. 
One of the most significant aspects of the controversy is illus-
trated by the differing views the two men hold of history in Tallensi. 
Worsley predicts that historic changes, occurring within the context of 
the introduction of a cash economy and Western technology, will have re-
percussions throughout the kinship system and will result in weakened 
lineage allegiance. Fortes says that the prediction is not borne out, 
that the kinship structure has changed little in thirty years, even in 
the face of some major changes in the technological and economic scene. 
If, then, economic relatio ns have been disturbed and new technology 
has been introduced among the Tallensi, and if this disturbance has noz 
been reflected in disturbed kinship relations, then perhaps it is not so 
much that technology and the economic system are neutral factors in Tal-
lensi society but that the structure of the kinship s ys tem ac;ti._vely neu-
:tfta.L{.ze.J.i the economic and technological systems. For the time being, at 
least, the kinship structure may be dominating the evolution of Tallensi 
society because it is seemingly functioning t o maintain the invariance 
of the relations between lineage elements and tec hnological and economic 
elements. 
There are ways in which further research could illuminate this ques-
tion. When a young man leaves the compound to participate in migrant 
labor, is this conceptualized as another case of lineage fission, as the 
founding of yet another minimal lineage? When cash is brought into the 
compound, how is it absorbed and distributed internally? Is there an 
attempt to use new resources and new technology to build bush- and imme-
diate-land up to the fertility level of compound land? The internal pos-
sibilities of the Tallensi social structure for absorbing and neutraliz-
ing externally imposed changes may be greater than Worsley imagined. 
No doubt, however, this process of absorption and neutralization has 
its limits. As Godelier says: "The hypothesis can be advanced that, 
beyond a certain point, variation in the variables of a system dictates 
variation in the fundamental r e lation between thes e variables . The sys-
tem must then evolve towards a new structure . 11 2 3 The comparative study 
of such limit conditions is one important question social science re-
search should be examining . It is altogether possible that the existing 
social order in tribal and traditional state societies does grant a de-
gree of immunit y t o historical contingency, does allow for "stereotypic 
reproduction" in Godelier ' s phrase . In such societies, practical action 
may be dominated b y cultural conception . In Western society, cultural 
conception maximizes practical action. Worsley's analysis is an example 
of how this has influenced our definition of the categories and concepts 
we use in analyzing social pro cess in non-Western societies . Fortes 
stays at least partially clear of this influence by attempting analysis 
on the level of "native discussion about probabilities"24 -- preferences, 
norms, values. But neither has solved the problem of understanding the 
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dynamic properties of the social system, nor delineated the fundamental 
structural properties of social reproduction. This is the level of anal-
ysis that Ardener refers to as the level of "paradigmatic structures" 
(p. 456). It involves a moving away from the chain- of-events approach 
preferred by Worsley and the functional interrelationships of Fortes. 
The level of paradigmatic structures constitutes a new frontier for an-
thropology as well as for other social sciences. There is a need for a 
body of theory which can generate an understanding of the processes and 
limit conditions of social reproduction. 
Of the two parties to the controversy, Fortes's analysis offers the 
greater potential for eventually arriving at statements about social 
process and social reproduction. There is considerable analytic strength 
in his principle of complementary filiation. It may even be approaching 
the level of a paradigm . This is the case because there is good evidence 
that helping-behavior has been phylogenetically selected on the basis of 
kinship. 25 That portion of social structure which maintains affilia-
tion is likely to be closely tied to structure of a paradigmatic, un-
conscious nature and so should exhibit great strength and persistence. 
As Western societies export their sophisticated technology, it is 
well to remember that, although we have come to place a high positive 
value on technology and to view it as a most important part of our cul -
ture, there are other cultural systems, which have at their centers val -
ues that may appear at first to be less rational than ours; that is, 
which are not tied to a process of maximization of practical action, but 
which may provide for a continuity and a generality that permit adapta-
tion to long-term social change. 
NOTES 
1 . M. Fortes, "Kinship a nd Marriage Among the Ashanti," in A6!U.c.an Sy.o-
tem.o 06 Kin.ohA_p and McuuU.age, ed . A . R. Radcliffe-Brown and D. Forde 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1950), p . 168. 
2. M. Fortes, The Vynamic..o 06 Ctan.ohA_p Among the Tillen.oi (London: Ox-
ford University Press , 1945), p. x . 
3. M. Fortes, Web 06 Kin.ohA_p Among the Tillen.oi (London: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1949), p. 293. 
4 . Fortes, "Kinship and Marriage," p. 180 . 
5. Fortes, Web 06 Kin.ohA_p, p. 226. 
6. Fortes, Vyn.amic..o 06 ctan.ohA_p, p. 33 . 
7. Fortes, Web 06 Kin.ohA_p, p. 346. 
8. Fortes, Vyn.amic..o 06 Ctan.ohA_p , p. 249 . 
9. M. Fortes, Kin..ohA_p an.d the Soc.iat O~dvi (Chicago: Aldine, 1969), p. 
220. 
10. P. M. Worsley, "The Kinship System of the Tallensi: A Revaluation," 
JouJLnat 06 the Royal An.t~opologic.al In.otitute 86 (1956): 37-76; see 
especially p. 62; 
11. Fortes, Vyn.amic..o 06 C,lan.ohA_p , p. 227. 
12 . Worsley, p. 45. 
13 . Worsley, p. 54. 
14 . Fortes, Web 06 Kin.ohip, p . 83. 
15. Worsley, p. 64. 
16. Fortes, Kin.ohA_p and the Soc.ial O~dvi, p. 221. 
17. M. Sahlins, "Culture and Practical Reason," paper prepared for the 
IXt h International Congress of Anthropological and Ethnological Sci-
ences, Chicago, 1973 . 
208 PATTEN: TALLENSI OF NORTHERN GHANA 
18. Fortes, Kin.1.ifU.p and ~he Soc_.,i_a,f O~dVl, p . 221. 
19. M. Sahlins, Cui..tWte and P~ac;tA_cal Reci6on (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1976), pp. 9- 10. 
20. Fortes, KinofU.p and ~he Social O~dVl, p . 221. 
21. Sahlins, p. 23. 
22. J. Friedman, "Marxism, Structuralism and Vulgar Materialism," Man 9 
(1974): 445. 
23. M. Godelier, R~on~y and I~~on~y in Economic.J.i (London: 
NLB, 1972), p. 310 . 
24. E. Ardener, "The New Anthropology and Its Critics," Man 6 (1971): 
456. 
25. D. G. Freedman, Human In6ancy, An Evolu;tA_on~y App~oach (Hillsdale, 
N. J.: Lawrence Eilbaum Associates/John Wiley and Sons, 1974), p . 
54. 
IOWA STATE JOURNAL OF RESEARCH/ NOVEMBER, 1979 
Vol. 54, No. 2 
209-216 
"THE SUPREME CONSIDERATION IS MAN": 
GANDHI'S CRITIQUE OF MODERN TECHNOLOGY 
Ted J. Solomon* 
ABSTRACT. Some of the most severe criticisms of the heavy technology 
associated with the modern industrial state were made by Mahatma Gandhi, 
the Father of the Republic of India. Gandhi rejected the "value-neutral" 
theory, which views technology as purely instrumental or as a set of 
means to be judged according to its use. Gandhi held that the social 
costs of larqe scale technology outweiqh its advantages; it is not pos-
sible to hav~ both an ever-ri~ing standard of living based on efficient 
technology and social equality. Moreover, the establishment of a tech-
nological-industrial society involves choices that weaken traditional 
values, such as the realization of Truth as the aim of life. As an al-
ternative to heavy technology, Gandhi proposed developing India's vil-
laae life which would incorporate medium-level technology in cottage in-
dustries. The latter form of technology would serve to maintain employ-
ment, enhance local autonomy, and make possible moral conduct and spiri-
tual endeavor. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mahatma Gandhi (1869-1948), the architect of Indian independence, 
saw in India with its 700,000 villages opportunity to establish a new 
kind of village democracy as a viable alternative to a technological-
industrial soci ety. Gandhi's vision of a future India was that of a de-
centralized society structured into a federation of village republics 
based primarily on agriculture and on cottage industry. He was enamoured 
not only by the se.lf-sufficiency of the traditional village communities 
but also by their egalitarianism and mutual aid as a way of life. 
The building blocks of a viable village society would be the pan-
chayat system (rule by the village council along democratic lines), com-
munal ownership of land as well as of the implements of production, and 
cooperative forms of labor with proper adjustmehts to suit the require-
ments of modernity. Village republics would be completely free to manage 
their own affai rs and united by mutual assistance. Gandhi affirmed that 
"every village will be a republic or pa11c.hayat havinq full powers. It 
follows, therefore, that every village has ·to be self~sustained and cap-
able of managing its own affairs. 111 He wanted the control of the villaae 
to rest with villagers who used the land collectively after the pattern 
of ancient Indian villages with their automatic balance between produc-
tion, distribution, exchange, and consumption. In many parts of India 
the village pa11chayat (the council of elders) owned irrigation canals, 
common conveniences like the tank, the wind-mill, and oven, and either 
distributed communal land holdings or permitted individuals to use part 
of the ;Land of the community. 
Gandhi's vision of India as a federation of village republics must 
not be construed as a nostalgic flioht to the past, for his views were a 
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departure from the patriarchal and authoritarian familial tradition of 
social life, and he repudiated the tyranny of panQhaya):).i which subordi-
nated the individual to the will of an oligarchy. The fact that Gandhi 
treated pancbaya..t and republic as interchangeable terms shows clearly 
that his vision was that of a republican democracy. 
VHARMA: MORAL VALUES AND SPIRITUAL WISDOM 
Decentralized village democracy presupposes a society of spiritual 
citizens who adhere to Vlicur.ma, a high level of morality based upon a 
spiritual ethos. Some of the basic principles of Gandhi's understanding 
of Vlicuuna include (1) ,c,a..tyam: the invisible ultimate reality or Truth 
which expresses itself on the moral plane as the law of the universe and 
on the spiritual plane as the goal of life. As the reality-value premise 
of society, ~a..tyam specifies what is real and valuable. This view of 
reality differs from the Western sensate reality-premise in affirming 
mofuiha. (spiritual liberation), the highest aoal of life; (2) ahim-6a: 
non-injury to all living things, a cardinal value of Sa..tyaghaha, non-
violent, direct action as a way to solve conflicts; (3) apaJt.ighaha: non-
covetousness which Gandhi reinterpreted to mean non-possession and the 
progressive minimization of wants; (4) bhahmaQhahya: sense-control which 
includes the practice of celibacy which Gandhi held would enhance a per-
son's potency in all areas of life. "Without Bhah.maQhahya," according to 
Gandhi, "the Sa..tyaghafU (disciple of non-violent direct action) will 
have no lustre, no inner strength · to stand unarmed against the whole 
world. 112 
Gandhi endorsed a social system whose actual functionina offered the 
example of dfuvr..rna to its citizens, a life centered on moral concern and 
wisdom culminating in spiritual liberation. He prized the value of free-
dom which enabled every person to develop himself to the fullest extent. 
Consequently, Gandhi wanted to give man a spiritual identity so that he 
might understand himself as a spiritual seeker aimina at wholeness of 
life. Gandhi expressed his cardinal concern in a succinct way: 11 I want 
the ... millions of our land to be healthy and hapP,y, and I want them to 
grow spiritually. 11 3 . 
CONFLICT BETWEEN HEAVY TECHNOLOGY AND VHARMA 
Gandhi's chief charge against the heavy technoloCfY associated with 
an industrial society is that it conflicts with dhahma, hindering men 
from pursuing a life of moral conduct and spiritual realization. A tech-
nological-industrial society is in tension with dhaJr.ma in its commitment 
to the materialistic values of ever-increasing prosperity and sense-
pleasures as the major goals of life. Every industrial society that is 
engrossed in endless material growth is a production-centered collection 
of sub-humans rather than a society functioning to improve conduct and 
to heighten wisdom so that spiritual liberation may be its uniting 
ideal. Gandhi opposed ever-increasing standards of living and proposed 
instead an optimum standard of living sufficient to make possible moral 
conduct and spiritual growth. Gandhi admitted that 11 a certain degree of 
physical harmony and comfort is necessary, but above a certain level it 
becomes a hindrance. 114 A technological-industrial society that legiti-
mates sensate pleasure runs counter to the principles of apcvUghaha 
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(non-covetousness} and bJtahmac.ha.Juja (sense control). "The ideal of cre-
ating an tmlimited number of wants and the satisfaction of one's physi-
cal needs, even the intellectual needs of one's narrow self, must meet 
at a certain point a dead-stop, before it degenerates into physical and 
intellectual voluptuousness. 114 Physical and intellectual voluptuousness 
was a serious ethical question for Gandhi. "I do not believe that mul-
tiplication of wants and machinery contrived to supply them is taking 
the world a single step nearer its goal .... I wholeheartedly detest this 
mad desire to destroy distance and time, to increase animal appetites 
and go to the ends of the earth in search of their satisfaction. If 
modern civilization stands for all this, I call it Satanic" (p. 309). 
Gandhi held that modern civilization leads to social inequality, the 
exploitation of other nations, and militarism, thus negating the prin-
ciple of non-violence. A nation that produces industrial commodities 
cannot be non-violent because it must be prepared to compete and to de-
fend what it amasses. Gandhi's conception of an ideal social order 
crystallized around his basic value of a non-violent society which would 
be non-exploitive and equalitarian. Instead of allowing exploitation and 
class differences to develop and become deeply entrenched until they as-
sume such serious proportions that there is a cataclysmic transition to 
communism, Gandhi favored stemming the problem at its source and fash-
ioning a non-violent egalitarian society. 
Gandhi also opposed technology that replaced human limbs and caused 
unemployment and concentrated power in a few hands at remote distances. 
Concerning machinery in the villaaes, Gandhi stated: "I can have no con-
sideration for the machinery which is meant either to enrich the few at 
the expense of the many, or, without cause, to displace the useful labor 
of many" (p. 545J. What went against Gandhi's moral grain was the prob-
lem of the loss of freedom resulting from the processes of modern tech-
nological civilization. He was deeply concerned about the broader ques-
tion of the enslavement of the individual to the vast efficiency-ridden 
technological structure and to a mass society that follows in its wake. 
The full application of heavy technology under Indian conditions would 
turn the society into an instrument of worse enslavement. "In modern 
times," said Gandhi, "it is beneath human dignity to lose individuality 
and become a mere cog in the machine. I want every individual to become 
a full-blooded, fully developed member of society" (p. 313). 
The compulsions of modern technology and of a mass consumption so-
ciety created the twin problems of concentration and centralization of 
power. Gandhi was opposed to a stratified society that required the 
concentration of economic and political power operating through remote 
control. What threatened the social structure of village republics was 
the extreme pull of centripetal forces operating from beyond the village 
communities owing to the increasing centralization of economic and 
political power. This is a violent process, which undermines freedom and 
the quality of man's higher life. The material and spiritual viability 
of small communities is a value which cannot be sacrificed to the opera-
tion of economic and political forces which tend to exploit an agricul-
tural society. 
ACCEPTANCE OF INTERMEDIATE TECHNOLOGY SUBORDI-
NATED TO MORAL VALUES AND SPIRITUAL WISOOM 
Gandhi's contention that technology is detrimental to dhaJtma was 
chiefly restricted to heavy technology. He favored intermediate tech-
nology or tools that were extensions, not replacements, of men's limbs. 
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Gandhi remarked: "Mechanization is good when the hands are too few for 
the work intended to be accomplished. It is an evil when there are more 
hands than are required for the work, as is the case in India. Every 
machine that helps every individual h .as a place .... Machinery must not be 
allowed to displace necessary human labor .... It is criminal to displace 
hand labor by the introduction of power-driven spindles unless one is 
ready at the same time to give millions of farmers some other occupation 
in their homes .... The supreme consideration is man. The machine should 
not tend to make the limbs of man atrophied. For instance, I would make 
intelligent exceptions. Take the case of the Singer sewing machine. It 
is one of the few useful things ever invented. My machinery must be of 
the elementary type which I can put in the homes of millions. 115 
The reason Gandhi regarded the spinning wheel (chak!ta) and the hand-
loom as a counterpoise against heavy technology was that he considered 
the former as the means to mass employment. In contrast to mass produc-
tion by the fewest number through the aid of highly complicated tech-
nology, Gandhi said that "the message of the spinning wheel was that of 
mass production in people's homes (Ganguli, p. 319). Since industriali-
zation on the mass scale tended to create pockets of prosperity that ac-
centuated the surrounding poverty and privation, intermediate technology 
in the village would be chiefly for immediate needs. Gandhi had no 
objection to villagers employing modern machines and tools they made and 
could afford to use, but there was one stipulation: they should not be 
employed as means of exploitation. In fact, Gandhi welcomed rural elec-
trification and was in favor of a network of cooperative organizations 
linking villages into a viable.rural sector of production. Gandhi de-
clared in 1935: "If we could have electricity in every village, I should 
not mind villagers plying their implements and tools with electricity. 
Electricity and machinery will save labor, but they will save labor for 
all and will not be a means of enriching the few and concentrating power 
in a few hands (Ganguli, p. 154) . The goal of carrying electricity to 
every home is not, however, consistent with his objection to the cen-
tralization of production, and would create a serious problem for this 
goal. 
Gandhi was not opposed to technology or machinery per se, but with 
the industrial system, with its greed motive, exploitation of labor, 
labor-saving for the few and not for the many, and the abuse of scien-
tific discoveries. Gandhi wanted "to save time and labor, not for a 
fraction of mankind, but for all. I want the concentration of wealth not 
in the hands of a few, but in the hands of all. Today machinery helps 
to ride on the backs of millions. The impetus behind it is not the phi-
lanthropy to save labor but greed. It is against this constitution of 
things that I am fighting with all my might. Scientific truths and dis-
coveries should, first, cease to be mere instruments of greed. Then 
laborers will not be overworked, and machinery, instead of being a hin-
drance will be a help. I am aiming not at eradication of all machinery, 
but its limitation. What I am against is large-scale production of 
things that villagers can produce without difficulty" (Fischer, p. 
292). 
CRITICISM OF THE INSTRUMENTAL AND 
AUTOTELIC CONCEPTS OF TECHNOLOGY 
Unlike many western social theorists, Gandhi did not regard tech-
nology as value-neutral or purely instrumental, a set of means to be 
judged according to its use. He was aware of the argument of the 
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Englishman, Burns, who contended that any mechanism may be misused, but 
if it is, that the moral evil is in the man who misuses it, not in the 
mechanism (Ganguli, p. 3071. Gandhi argued that the fault lay in the 
system of society, particularly the technological-industrial society in 
which the interconnected systems of production and distribution conspire 
to create moral evils. At one point Gandhi was willing to accept the 
idea that, under a state-controlled and regulated system of production 
and distribution, a technological-industrial society could create an 
economy of abundance. But in 1940, he returned to his basic position 
that a certain type of system was inseparable from a technological-
industrial society. "My own view is that the evils are inherent in in-
dustrialism and no amount of socialization can eradicate them" (Fischer, 
p. 292). 
However, Gandhi's basic objection to a technological-industrial so-
ciety was that the latter had accepted an autotelic conception of tech-
nology. The concept "autotelic" is Gandhi's but the terminology is that 
of a later Gandhian, A. K. Saran. 6 The autotelic concept is that tech-
nology should be increased endlessly for its own sake; the full func-
tioning and intended destiny of technology are self-determined. Gandhi 
was opposed to undirected activity unchecked by any principle external 
to itself, because it violated the axiom of a traditional society that 
man's knowledge must never exceed his goodness and wisdom; that is, must 
never exceed the dimensions of his spiritual consciousness. Man can 
safely have that knowledge and technology which he knows how to use. 
There may be a limit beyond which the technical efficiency of human 
labor cannot go, but this limitation does not apply to technology. There 
appears to be no limit to its growth or evolution; it seems to be pos-
sessed by a boundless will of its own. Autotelic technology is fre-
quently antagonistic to man's highest values; the ideals of egalitari-
anism and brotherhood are smothered in a technological-industrial soci-
ety. Gandhi declared that the Indian Congress "seems to stand for the 
projects of industrialism in which I can see no deliverance of the mass-
es from their grinding poverty .... The onward march of machinery repels 
me. It is my belief that the machine has not added to man's stature and 
it will not serve the world, unless it is put in its place" (Ganguli, p. 
324). 
Gandhi further felt that the uncontrolled operation of unchecked 
forces released by technological society not only undermines the moral-
spiri tual foundations of society in overt and insidious ways, but also 
leads to disastrous economic consequences. Industrial societies are fre-
quently subject to the vicious circle of large-scale production: over-
production, unemployrrent, and under-consumption. Moreover, Gandhi was 
appal l ed by the social consequences of autotelic technology; social 
costs involve not only burdens of industrial accident, occupational dis-
eases, woman labor, poverty in the midst of plenty, etc., but also the 
loss of personal satisfaction arising from the happiness of creative 
work. Even though ameliorative action is possible, Gandhi raised the 
vexing question, why create the mess in the first instance. Since Gand-
hian social theory calls for a conscious attitude to the systems of pro-
duction and distribution on the part of the entire society, the control 
and mastery of social forces for the benefit of the masses should be 
instituted. Gandhi was an implacable enemy of any type of technology 
that did not liberate the productive and creative powers of the peas-
antry. 
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PARALLELOGRAM OF SOCIAL FORCES 
Gandhi should not be viewed as an unreconstructed traditionalist or 
an unrelenting opponent of modern industrialization. He was not aiming 
at some kind of utopian civilization that would be the polar opposite of 
Western industrial civilization. Instead he accepted the reality of a 
technological-industrial society and sought a creative encounter between 
the former and a decentralized handicraft civilization. 
Gandhi's object in challenging modern industrialization was to seek 
a "parallelogram of (social] forces," a balance of economic and social 
forces that would try to change the direction of a technological-indus-
trial society. "Parallelo~iram of. forces" is a metaphor Gandhi borrowed 
from mechanics to suggest the notion of a middle position represented by 
the resultant of opposing forces. Speaking of the parallelogram of 
forces in mechanics, Gandhi said: "There the forces do not neutralize 
each. other. Each force acts fully along its own line and we get the re-
sultant which indicates the final direction of motion." Compromise was 
an ingredient of Gandhi's social thought. He remarked: "I know there 
are others who believe in industrialization. I don't know what the out-
come will be. But whatever it is, it will be to the good (on the prin-
ciple of the resultant of conflicting forces)" (Ganguli, p. 313). "I do 
visualize electricity, ship-building, iron works, machine-making and the 
like, existing side by side with village crafts .... Hereto industrializa-
tion has been so planned as to destroy the villages and village crafts. 
But the order of dependence wi·ll be reversed" (Ganguli, p. 323). It is 
evident that Gandhi believed that large-scale industry and cottage 
industry could be harmonized if they were planned to help the villages. 
CONCLUSION: THE RELEVANCE OF MORAL 
VALUES AND INTERMEDIATE TECHNOLOGY 
As Gandhi did not subscribe to the value-neutral theory of technol-
ogy, he did not regard technology solely as good if its fruits were 
fairly distributed, or bad if it created inequality. Rather he focused 
the problem of technology not at the point of distribution of goods but 
at two other points. First, he considered the value choices associated 
with the creation of a technological-industrial society, and second, he 
considered the social costs of participation in terms of the moral and 
spiritual life. Consequently, Gandhi was painfully aware of the glaring 
contradiction in the Western tenet that it was possible to have both an 
ever-r1s1ng standard of living based on heavy technology and social 
equality. Gandhi knew that the first would continually erode the second 
because the nature of the technological process cannot be value-neutral 
at the point of power relationships in a society. For India to pursue 
industrialization required value choices that weakened moral values and 
spiritual wisdom Cdha.JUna). As Gussner aptly phrased it, "Extra room in 
human life had to be made for another set of values; dhCVllna had to move 
over to make room for a fundamentally incompatible bed-fellow, and it 
seemed to Gandhi that dha.Ama was in danger of being pushed out alto-
gether. 117 
Gandhi's non-violent handicraft civilization with a modernized but 
decentralized rural sector of production is not an acceptable way of 
life to Westerners and to the Indian intelligentsia. However, the Chi-
nese tmder the leadership of Chairman Mao have combined industrialism 
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and agricultural development, including small-scale labor intensive lo-
cal industry. The emergence of a dualistic economy, termed by the Chi-
nese "Walking on Two Legs," is in harmony with Gandhian social theory. 
Vaitheswaran notes that "industrialism under Mao was not at the expense 
of [the] handicraft industry .... Both the Gandhian and Maoist social 
vision have a large place for the economic wel'fare of the common man and 
the rural masses in particular. ,,9 
The Gandhian vision of small-scale, decentralized labor-intensive 
technology is becoming increasingly relevant with the recognition that 
the problems confronting developing nations cannot be solved by the 
adoption of capital-intensive technology. The superimposition of a 
highly developed industrial technology upon a traditional society will 
only heighten the prosperity gap between the few rich and the many poor. 
Gandhi's prescription for relieving mass poverty through intermediate 
technology is currently receiving serious attention through the writings 
of the British economist, Schumacher, who coined the phrase, "Small is 
Beautiful." Uniting economics with wisdom which "demands a new orienta-
tion of science and technology towards the organic, the gentle, the non-
violent, the elegant, and the beautiful," Schumacher favors the methods 
and equipment of intermediate technology that are "cheap enough so that 
they are accessible to virtually everyone; suitable for small-scale 
application; and compatible with man's need for creativity" (Schumacher, 
p. 34). The "Small is Beautiful" concept may soon be viable if growth 
economics associated with heavy technology flounders on the energy cri-
sis and does not lead to the solution of the problem of distributory 
justice (i.e., providing a minimum standard of living for the underpriv-
ileged members of societyl. 
It would be a mistake to regard Gandhi's social thought as a spe-
cifically Indian reaction to the challenge of a technological-industrial 
society. Gandhi was dealing with a universal problem. He comprehended 
that the eclectic value system underlying technological-industrial soci -
ety had patent shortcomings and contradictions. To understand Gandhi one 
has to examine the contradictions of the technological-industrial enter-
prise in relation to man's 1'!\0ral and spiritual urges. Inspired by a 
compassionate humanism, Gandhi was gently persuading man to inaugurate 
a new era in which quantity yielded to quality, abundance to self-
sufficiency, complexity to simplicity, satiation to satisfaction, and 
mental fragmentation to spiritual wholeness. Even though Prime-Minister 
Nehru, Gandhi's political heir, held that progress in sci.ence, technol-
ogy, and production was desirable, he concluded: "We must not forget 
that the essential objective to be aimed at is the quality of the indi-
vidual and the concept of dhaJUna underlying it. 119 
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TECHNOLOGY, CULTURE AND 
DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA 
Steffen W. Schmidt* 
ABSTRACT. The interaction between technology and culture has posed many 
questions for both the scholar and for the development bureaucrat. Some 
of the questions fall into the realm of philosophical speculations and 
others address themselves to mechanistic and practical aspects of the 
topic. Technology is defined as the application of science (including 
traditional or primitive science) to societies' functions and processes. 
The paper addresses topics as relevant, "national," humanistic technol-
ogy, and explores obstacles to technology. Latin American technology is 
classified into four models. 
INTRODUCTION 
Melvin Kranzberg tells the following story: Outside the factory 
gate there is a huge log filled with nails. Most days of the week one 
can see men accompany the gatekeeper to the log and drive in a nail. 
This ritual is a skill test to determine if the applicant has the apti-
tude to be trained for factory work. It is in a larger sense an entrance 
exam into the modern world, the world of new, complex technology. 
There are many questions about technology, culture and development 
which perplex the scholar and the development bureaucrat alike. Some 
questions fall into the realm of philosophical speculations and others 
address themselves to more mechanistic and practical aspects of the top-
ic . In the following pages, using Latin America as the basis of discus-
sion, I will address certain salient questions which are pertinent to 
any consideration of the role technology plays v,W a v,W other societal 
institutions. 
I define technology as the application of science (including tradi-
tional or primitive science) to societies' functions and processes, and 
discuss relevant, "national, " and humanistic _technology, and explore ob -
stacles to technology. I conclude by classifying Latin America into four 
technology models. 
RELEVANT, "CLEAN," HARMONIOUS TECHNOLOGY 
Is there a type of technology "relevant" to the realities of Third 
World countries? Response to this question is difficult because of the 
variety of human ecological systems to be considered; e.g., traditional 
Indians living in the extensive jungles of the Amazon, or desert nomads, 
as contrasted with peopl e in technologically advanced areas in Southern 
Brazil or Argentina. Another component of the concept "technological 
relevance" involves the assumption that modern, sophisticated technology 
*Department of Political Science, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 
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has been "invented or discovered" in the developed countries, i.e., 
Western Europe, Japan, the United States, and the Soviet Union, and that 
it is not "relevant" in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 
because it is not indigenous. 1 This can be called a "Geo-Historical" 
view of technology. 
"Relevant" technology may also be defined as whatever technology 
exists at a given place in a given time. In Latin America, for example, 
the technological conditions in the Amazon jungle areas are relevant to 
the people who are living in that particular area. The technological 
conditions existing in the Brazilian industrial south are relevant to 
the needs and to the process of the industrial south. This roughly cor-
responds t o a fo.J..--6~ez -fia,Ur_e theory of technology . 2 
Technology may also be defined functionally; it should fulfill cer-
tain economic and social goals. Ideally it should be efficient, 'produce 
wealth, and improve long range economic prospects for the society. It 
should also contribute to the general welfare by improving social mobil-
ity and opportunities, increas e employment, o r rel a t e to health, educa-
tional, transportation and housing needs of the people. Viewed from this 
perspective, it would seem possible to analyze the existing technology 
to evaluate its strengths and shortcomings, and t o develop policies to 
rechannel it towards desired goals . This is the current, predominant 
conception of technology in Latin America. Technology thus takes on po-
litical significance the domestic regime must be or become the type 
that can de,l{,bVLa;te£y engage in socioeconomic engineering. Its rela-
tionship with other political systems should be such that its goals can 
be fostered. Thus new forms of inter-nation rela tionships must be de-
veloped.3 
The analysis of the relationship of technology with the human and 
national interest remains a problem. What are the indicators either of 
breakdowns or the successful integration of changing technology and 
human and national interest? Since the technol ogy in developed countries 
is indigenous, it has been assumed that a harmonious condition has en-
sued, i.e., that Americans a nd Western Europeans are satisfied with 
their technology. That this may not be true is suggested by current 
vigorous debates regarding the harmful impac t of certain technological 
developments. It is in the areas of advanced technology that terms such 
as smog, nuclear waste, and pollution have been coined . It is in the 
United States and Western Europe where the consequences of the ubiqui-
tous use of the automobile, perhaps the most evident feature of modern 
western technology, are debated. The question of harmony and disconti-
nuity between human objectives and technology in developed countries, 
indeed, is not resolved. It is not only in the developing countries that 
serious problems arise as technology is introduced. 4 
It is necessary to relate technology t o social priorities, but this 
is difficult because, aside from general goals, they are rarely defined, 
and may be competitive. For example, "ecology " -- c lean water, air, and 
the protection of wildlife, soil, e t c . -- does not necessarily represent 
a first order societal priority because it can easily threaten more 
immediately compelling considerations, as evidenced by the recent energy 
crisis. In this case, concern for the environment has been demoted in 
favor of energy production and self-sufficiency. In Latin America, the 
costs of " clean" industry may be so expensive that their implementation 
would remove Latin American industry from world competition. Thus, in-
deed, if societies must choose between industrialization and environ-
mental integrity, the decisions' probably will be made in favor of the 
first, even if this is the wrong choice in the long run. 
SYMPOSIUM: TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN VALUES 219 
The problems of "harmony" are compounded by the fact that two dis-
tinct dimensions of societal concern need to be considered. First, we 
need to know if the technology coexists satisfactorily with the e:xJ./.i,t,,{_ng 
society. Second, we must ask if the technology adequately helps to 
achieve nl.ltuJte go~. Students of the process loosely called Moderniza-
tion quickly say that future goals necessitate change. The impact of 
change will be most dramatically felt in traditional societies. Thus, 
technological change (modernization) evidently ~annot be accomplished 
painlessly (harmoniously) because fundamental change is by definition 
disruptive and painful . 
Nevertheless, we must ask if technology can be exorcised of those 
elements that are irrelevant or harmful without destroying the function 
and utility of that technology. Similarly, one must ask whether we have 
sufficient foresight to anticipate the consequences of transforming the 
existing technological condition. We may, after all, be giving up one 
thing for something even more undesirable (sulphuric acid emitted by 
cars using the new catalytic converters for exhaust, as an example). 
LATIN AMERICA AND TECHNOLOGY 
These questions, in conjunction, are of direct interest to those 
studying Latin America and its place in the community of nations. Some 
of us believe that the technology of Western Europe and the United 
States, which has had such a profound impact in Latin America, may be 
exogenous and harmful. Because it is not "Latin American," we feel it 
is creating irrelevancies and discontinuities which are undesirable. In 
essence, the technology which the North American people have developed 
and promote may not be compatible with the human and national interests 
of the Latin American societies. There seems to be a vision in some 
sectors, expecially on the political left in Latin America, of a tech-
nology that, purged of its nefarious aspects and so purified, can then 
be applied in a way which will neither destroy the technology nor bring 
with it the "foreignness." 5 
Assuming it is possible to "domesticate" technology, can one prevent 
"national" technology with its innovations from being as destructive as 
"foreign" or transferred technology? For instance, chemicals (insecti-
cides or drugs) domestically developed often do not have sufficient 
testing. I remember a case when a "local" painkiller poisoned a great 
number of people in one Latin American city. I think the crucial ques -
tion regarding national technological initiatives is whether destructive 
outcomes can be attributed to the misuse of technology rather than to 
political or other extra-technological reasons. 
It is difficult, if not impossible, to differentiate between "na-
tional," "foreign" transferred, and "adapted" and transformed tec hnolo-
gies. Is there a Latin American technology? Certain traditional or 
indigenous technologies can be identified, of course, such as the con-
struction of the impressive aqueducts by the Incas, the recording of as -
tronomical phenomena by Mayan scientists and astronomers, and the agri-
cultural cultures with the antecedent development of cultivated crops. 
These constitute elements of an impressive traditional technology . Then 
followed the Spanish Colonial subjugation of the peoples, bringing Euro -
pean ideas, implements, and methods of organization. The Spanish and 
indigenous technologies transformed each other. It becomes difficult to 
distinguish between what is indigenous, wha t is imported, and what is 
domestically adapted, which, except for heuristic reasons, may not be a 
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high priority concern. To compound matters even further, we lack a sat-
isfac tory understanding of the historical antecedents of the original 
peoples of the American hemisphere. Some have said that the "domestic" 
technology of the Aztec, Maya, or Inca may have been imported technology 
either from Asia, across the Pacific, o r even from the Euphrates and 
Nile valley civilizations, as Ver ill has argued. 6 It is not impossible, 
therefore, to argue that the notion of a "domestic " technology is a use-
less one, because it is not based on any reality that we find in any 
civilization today. 
Why did not the introduc tion of new Spanish technolog ies improve the 
condition of human existence in the New World? Obviously, Spanish tech-
nology did not come to improve, for instance, irrigation and food pro-
duction , but it came as a self-seeking military technology . New and 
modern weapons produced bo th psychological and physical advantages for 
the Spaniards over the Indians and, therefore, it was a destructive 
tec hnology. If we use the Inca Empire as the point of reference, we find 
that the traditional technology , which was bas ed on a ver y fragile rela-
tionship between man, environment and resources, was not able to with-
stand the military technology of the Spaniard, the smallpox which they 
brought, nor the reorientation of human resour ces toward mining. There-
fore, the technology , which was one of human survival based on agricul-
tural prosperity , was replaced by an extractive mining technology with 
tremendously brutalizing human effects. 7 The breakdown of the tradi-
tional technology in much of Latin America, historically easy to identi-
fy, is related to the subjugation of the people and their level of tech-
nology b y conquerers who brought a different technology used fo r differ-
ent purposes. 
HUMANISM AND TECHNOLOGY 
The imperialist, mining- or iented Spanish mil itary technology pushed 
people int o the bowels of the earth to extract minerals and, in many 
cases, kept them there until they died and then simply replaced them 
with more people. This surely was not a very happy human development in 
terms of the application of new technology . What humanis tic conditions 
and goals then are likely to be violated or destroyed by technology? 
Does new, "modern," "sophisticated" technology destroy more humanistic 
conditions and goals than traditional technology? On the other hand, 
what human goals are better achieved by "modern," "sophisticated" tech-
nology than by the traditional one? For the scholar interested in ad -
dressing the question of technol ogy and society, it becomes important to 
def ine the human conditions and objectives of a given people. 8 
There do seem to be several universal imperatives which can be ap-
plied in Latin America and elsewhere. Technology should improve the 
huma n condition for the masses; that is t o say , more and more people 
should enjoy a decent life. Technolo gy ough t t o accelerate artistic and 
intellectual processes. It should expand the human mind, enlarge oppor-
tunities, and offer universal access t o knowledge and enlightenment. It 
should contribute t o developing the infrastructures which will allow 
people (and nations) to deal with pres ent needs and future contingen-
cies. It should build peace, not war. It should increasingly guarantee 
security and diminish pain, fear, and anxiety. In time, technology 
should have humanistic means and humanistic goals . "Development" (agri-
cultural or industrial) is not a goal, but a means. 
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Since humanistic considerations are usually the base of most dis -
cussions regarding politics , economi c and technical development, it is 
pertinent to ask whether technology is a source or a destroyer of cul -
ture . True, technology can facilitate involvement in the creative as -
pects of life, and it can save work and produce the leisure which is 
necessary for the continuation and advancement of creative efforts. It 
can enlarge areas of human enjoyment by transporting goods, ideas , and 
procedures. A greater varie ty of cultural opportunities can exist in 
all sectors of society. 
Technology ,(;U,e.1..6 affects cultural developments . In the arts, for 
example, the appearance of machines has caused concern over the brutali-
zation of life. Technological developments which appear to threaten a 
more humanistic, a more humane way of life, have had an impact on liter-
ature, painting, etc . Therefore, ironically , perhaps the threats which 
technology poses to the fulfillment of human needs also provides the 
pressures and symbols which inspire art, culture, criticism and thought. 
Simultaneously, t echnology threatens to destroy the existence of 
pa.Jr;t,i,Qu,lcuUf.,.t,{,Q culture . The media, transpor tation s ys tems, new indus-
try, new aspirations all change the nature of family and village life . 
Mass production alters li fe styles; the consequences of marketing tech-
niques and international trade penetrate into the core of most socie-
ties. In Latin America , there has long been a fear of the so- called 
CoQaQoLa,,lza:U_on of that cont inent. The key issue in Latin America is 
what role technology will play as a source of new opportunities for an 
invigorated "native" domestic culture. 
The assumption that technology is something apolitical and mechani-
cal is naive. Technology is part of the total human structure and is 
used for people for va.JU.ouJ.i ends. In this respect, it is germane to 
inquire whether there are technological and cultural conditions under 
which development, change, and so-called improvement do not occur . Or 
are there circumstances under which technology is a stabilizing o r pre -
serving influence, or capable even of inducing a regression to previous 
conditions? Can technology be misused to prevent change from taking 
place where change might have occurred without the introduction of cer-
tain "modern" elements? It is not inconceivable that traditional elites, 
which often are opposed to change, will introduce military and surveil-
lance techniques from other s ys tems or will develop their own to repress 
people, to control them, to prevent change from taking place . They can 
prevent people from organizing in order to preserve their traditional 
privileges. In such cases, technology certainly produces negative ef-
fects. On the other hand, one might argue that those aga,,ln~t whom tech-
nology is being unjustly used, may also have access to technology to 
combat the abuses to which they are being subjected. A modern military 
and police force used by a traditional elite to control social and po -
litical mobilization can potentially be captured and turned against that 
elite by those elements who wish to bring about change. That is a tactic 
which guerrillas have long used and long understood, especially in the 
form of capturing arms and equipment. Therefore, perhaps the introduc-
tion of technology in t hat respect is neutral. It is the application of 
it by various groups which is politically charged -- not the t echnology 
itself. 
If we are seeking humanistic goals fo r technology to fulfill we 
should accept the fact that there may be parts of a given culture which 
muht be deJ.J:tAoyed or Qh.anged before technology will bring about develop-
ment, social changes, or before the technolo gy is accepted and put to 
productive use. 9 Can we identify pieces of human society which are ob -
stacles t o technical progress and can they be helec;t{,vely extirpated 
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without effecting comple t e and revolutionary change? This proposition 
assumes that we might b e able to isola te those cultural char ac teristics 
which are obstacles, for example , to agri cult ural development . In some 
instances, people are l oath t o abandon traditional techniques which, if 
replaced, would increase the produc tion of c r ops or other goods , making 
possible a n improvement in the standard of living of those people. It 
is not clear, however, that one small obstacle to the implementa tion of 
more modern agricultural t echniques, say in a Gua t emalan vill age , is not 
integrally tied int o all of the other social, organizational, and struc-
tural realities of that village . By forcing change in one area (an agri-
cultural technique), we alter other characteristics of the community, 
the family, economic processes, and political structures. Therefore, by 
changing the agricultural techniques, we are really transforming the so-
ciety and forcing it t o r eadjus t to new conditions. Social scientists 
have observed developments in several parts of the world, where the in-
troduction of " green revolution" crops apparently i s creating serious 
problems of socioeconomic differentiation. Some farmers who have gained 
access to the new miracle seeds are suddenly becoming weal thy a nd power-
ful indiv iduals where there has generally been an evenness of income and 
standard of living, resulting in problems of dominance a nd subjection as 
a result of but a single technical "advance. 111 0 
Thes e considerations have been premised on the notion that "tech-
nology" is easily identified , 1 1 but this is not so. Technology is not 
labeled a nd marked. A person visit ing a fore i gn city may be a "carrier" 
of technology . If, in his or her society, a Latin American country in 
this context, an effort is being made t o prevent some of the aspirations 
of people in that foreign c ity (e . g ., Miami) from becoming the Latin 
American aspirations, people conveying information about it may be 
guilty of a technologically subversive act. It is no t uncommon to find 
political systems, which having reached the conclusion that certa in do-
mestic imperatives exist, shut themselves off f r om the outside to seal 
out the introduction of ideas and aspirations which would divert tech-
nological efforts away from those goals that a r e cons idered to be of 
primary importance. 12 
We do not presently know the opt i ons nor the limitations of world 
resour ces . We do not know what t echnological limitations will ensue as 
we exhaust minerals, air, water, a nd populate the world in a manner in 
which it has neve r been populated before. Perhaps we are handicapped by 
our lack of imagination. Thus, planning to solve technological problems 
may be fruitless because we have little idea of the consequences. Our 
planning can, therefo re, be b ased only on retrospection and on an aware-
ness of the present condition. It is very unlikely tha t most societies 
in the world will t ake the conclusions of the L~m~ 06 G~owth study 
sponsored by the club of Rome seriousl y . They would have to decide that 
there is a limit to how much people can consume , and they would need to 
establish their community expectations on the basis of a subsistence 
future: a kind of "low calorie diet" of technology and of consuming 
patterns, a retrenchment to a very low standard of living, low level of 
development and perhaps even a zero growth economy . Of the models for 
technological change and progess which exist, the U.S ., Western Euro-
pean, Japanese, or Russians still sugges t themselves as the most con-
vincing and a ttractive t o the developing countries. All of these are 
obviously "growth" models. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
Latin American societies are committed to some sort of growth model . 
We can identify at least four models in Latin America. 
1 . The Puerto Rican case which can be called an ab~o!Lp~ovt model 
of "institutionalized dependency," fully integrated with an outside na -
tion (the U.S.). 
2. The Brazilian ~a4u.JL~OVl model involving a full commitment to 
domestic and imported technology . 
3. The Cuban pe!U6ovt~t-Sta4e-~ oc,,i_~m model centered around the 
strategic commitment of technology to pre- planned goals. 
4. The Haitian ~u.b~,Ute11c..e model which displays marginal disaggre-
gated applications of technology, with some isolated modern sec tors co-
existing with a traditional system. 
These four models and their hybrids are largely contrivances of the 
social, political, and economic elites of the respective countries. The 
management of technology, the setting of goals, the monitoring of prog-
ress toward these goals are thus in a very real sense pof.),c..y dec..,Lo~o~. 
We must conclude tha t any systematic management of technology , if indeed 
management is a key issue, should become the focus of intensive fu ture 
research . Managerial skills, systems analysis techniques, and communi-
cations feedback necessar y t o con sider fully the positive and negative 
results of technology changes grow with the overall modernity of soci-
eties. 13 It could thus be argued that as systems break away from their 
traditional moorings a nd begin to drift toward a n ew destination, their 
course and destination will be uncertain. It should thus not be surpris -
ing that areas like Latin America sometimes appear to be vessels in a 
sea of technology, exposed and vulnerable to the elements. The cr u cial 
need in the final analysis is fo r the crew and skipper to assume con-
trol, chart a course and begin to steer toward a specific port. 
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POURING NEW TECHNOLOGY INTO OLD COTTAGES 
Sidney K. Robinson~ 
ABSTRACT. Technology lifts the burdens of natural forces from our lives. 
For some people this release is a mixed blessing. The value of subject-
ing oneself only to selected effects of nature is called pastoralism. 
Its invention guided subsequent technology to provide the benefits of 
contact with nature while sifting out the more disagreeable drawbacks. 
Building technology has been directed to provide comfort even in the 
open countryside. Architects of the past such as Frank Lloyd Wright and 
architects of the present responding to the effects of an energy crisis 
have employed the newest technologies to make living in nature the pleas-
ure that pastoralism says it should be. 
* * * 
Pastoralism is a name ?iven to the value of living with nature, but 
not subject to it. What distin?uishes pastoralism from the struggle to 
survive is technology. In fact, pastoralism is a value which was created 
only after advances in the technology of food production freed some peo-
ple from the land. Residents of the Hellenistic metropolises placed 
value in returning to the land, presumably to recover the rewards of 
living in the nature from which they were separated. They did not need 
direct contact with the land to survive, nor did they consider a return 
to the suffering of rural life to enjoy be i ng amo ng hills and streams. 
The first substitute to returning to a hard rural life was found in the 
artifice of literature. The first pastoral poet, Theocritus, wrote about 
the least technological agrarian activity, sheep herding. 
Rather than resorting to literature or paintinq, or the drastic al-
ternative of giving up the technology that frees us from nature, other 
technology can be applied to get closer to the land without discomfort; 
technology is used to cheat necessity: to qet the desired result with-
out the undesirable consequences. What we see in the interaction of the 
value of pastoralism and technology is the desire to have one's cake and 
eat it too. As technology permits greater separation from the country-
side, it may be employed to facilitate a comfortable return trip. 
Architects have eagerly participated in this secondary application 
of technology to the value of pastoralism by buildina country houses for 
people whose survival did not depend directly on the country side. Frank 
Lloyd Wright produced some notable examples of up-to-date technology in 
the service of a very old value. 
Values direct the human mind and hand to make products such as 
buildings. Values guide an individual's choice of action for a signifi-
cant portion of a lifetime. They are not to be confused with passina 
fancies. Repeated choices produce an identifiable set of alternatives 
among .various, often conflicting, possibilities for action. Any effort 
taken to insure repetition of a particular choice is further evidence 
*college of Design, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 
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of action guided by a value. The continuity of choice is as important 
to a cultural tradition as it is to an individual. Products of all kinds 
can transmit a value from one time to another, thereby extending its ef-
fect beyond an individual consciousness. 
The value of pastoralism is not simply one of enjoyment, although 
that is an important part. Nature can be seen to have a moral as well 
as an aesthetic component. A personal relation to the unconditioned 
state of freedom associated with the natural world is part of the moral 
component. Such a state permits the individual to choose behavior ex-
pressing an independence from tradition. Being among trees, hills and 
streams is valuable for all these reasons. A building, too, can more 
completely express its internal forces in a free and open setting. 
Advances in technology, which have facilitated the value of pas-
toralism, have also produced negative effects. Advances in transporta-
tion, heatino and lightino have allowed people to escape from the city, 
but they have also created sprawling suburbs and crowded campsites. 
Initially only the wealthy enjoyed the benefits of pastoralism. Tech-
nology has spread the enjoyment to vast numbers of people whose actions 
have smothered the nature they set out to enjoy . 
* * * * 
Let us now turn to specific products that the pastoral value has 
generated using new technolooies. The Willitts house designed by Frank 
Lloyd Wright in 1902 is located in a suburb of Chicago. The means for 
survival were acquired in the city, not in the land around the house. A 
transportation technology was necessary to overcome the unproductive 
distance, and to provide the means for social contact expected by these 
inhabitants. 
The pastoral value is pursued with the least physical strain in 
pleasant weather, when being in the midst of nature is most comfortable. 
To extend the pursuit of pastoralism beyond benign conditions requires 
technology to supply energy for heat which is usually centralized for 
efficiency. In the Will~tts house, the spreadino wings would be unin-
habitable durino a good portion of the year if the fireplace 
only heat source. Distance from the .. central hearth must be counteracted 
by distributing the heat throuoh hot water in pipes. This overlapping 
of an original technological form, retained for its emotional effect, by 
the newer technological substitute is typical of the anomalies present 
in the artifice of pastoralism. If the pastoral value arises from com-
fortable contact with the out-of-doors, one does not achieve this value 
by huddling inside a windowless box. The technology of large panes of 
glass and distributed heat create the illusion of a pavilion erected for 
ideal weather. Wrioht explicitly described this effect: 
By this means of hot water heatino the forms of buildings may 
be more completely articulated, with light and air on several 
sides. By keeping the ceilings low, the walls may be opened 
with series of windows to the outer air, and one may live as 
comfortably as formerly, less shut in .... It is also possible 
to spread the buildings, which once in our climate of extremes 
were a compact box cut into compartments, into a more organic 
expression, making a house in a garden or in the country the 
delightful thing ... that imagination would have. 1 
And one might add, "and which technology will support." 
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The Edgar Kaufmann house by Wright built near Pittsburgh some thir-
ty years after the Willitts house can be compared to a Japanese scroll 
of the 15th century which depicts a tea house in a stream. To be in the 
water and yet remain firm and dry is another pastoral image of being 
with nature but not subject to it. In the example of the wooden tea 
house, this image is not a permanent one since spring floods would sweep 
the delicate pavilion away each year. Through the modern structural 
technology of reinforced concrete, Wright has given permanence to the 
enjoyment of a stream by cantilevering the retreat over the falls. Re-
inforced concrete is not a material picked directly from nature and it 
is not transformed into a natural material sim~ly because it is used to 
create a p astoral imaqe. But supported by its permanence, the occupants 
may see seasons come and go -- in comfort. The merchant who built this 
"cottage" is able to enjoy the location only because he has at his com-
mand transportation and energy supplies to support this image. 
Wright was in touch with the value of pastoralism in so direct and 
natural a way that he overlooked the increasina artifice of the whole 
notion. He eagerly looked forward to " ... lives lived in greater inde-
pendence and seclusion ... toward which an English nobleman aspires, but 
with absolute unwillingness to p ay the price in paternalism and patron-
age asked of him for the privilege. 11 2 In this case he willingly replaced 
what he saw as a social artifice by what is, in fact, a technological 
one. That he used for his model the English country house, an outstand-
ing embodiment of the pastoral value, is an indication of the continuity 
of this value through various technological conditions. 
Wright also applied h is vision of pastoralism to aroups of his 
houses. In 1934 he proposed a large scale pattern of habitation called 
Broadacre City. Each family was to live on its own acre of land. It 
was not rural living, however, in the sense that his square mile plan 
was bounded on the west side first by a major rail line, and in later 
plans by a major highway. This pastoral existence was a prophetic vision 
of contemporary suburbs supported by technol0117 lurking behind the trees 
and inside the cottages. Wright accurately foresaw electronic informa-
tion media overcoming social and cultural isolation. Radio, phonographs, 
and films would provide the culture usually associated with the intense 
exchanges of urban life. 
Extending pastoralism to the work place is a modern version of that 
value requiring considerable technology to achieve an apparent isolation 
inconsistent with the needs of g l obal corporations. Gathering office 
staff, information, and the energy needed to sustain a headquarters fa-
cility in the country is an artifice which only a large corporation can 
afford. John Deere, Weyerhauser and other firms, however, have pursued 
the p astoral value with an impressive completeness. 
An easier and more complete realization of the value of pastoralism 
is achieved with. each advance in technology. The comfortable enjoyment 
of the world of nature that is possible in literature or in art can only 
be approximated in physical reality through technology's intervention. 
Pastoralism, then, gives us a value which was first uncovered by a spe-
cific technological situation, but which survives that situation to di-
rect the application of subsequent technoloqies. This value both condi-
tions technology and is conditioned by it. 
The most recent stage in this interaction of pastoralism and tech-
nology arises from the energy distribution crisis in technology. Even 
when we seem not to be able to have our cake and eat it too, we salvage 
what we can by a more sophisticated application of technology. Since 
overcoming the effects of distance is the p rimary task of technology in 
the service of pastoralism, problems of energy distribution threaten the 
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value at its very heart. Localism, one of the ancient drawbacks of un-
modified rural life, is now seen as a positive virtue supported by new 
refinements in technology. Energy is to be produced where it is con-
sumed. Waste is to be treated and reused where it is produced. All this 
requires a closed system whose success depends on isolation from other 
closed systems. The processes that sustain these closed systems require 
a buffer of the natural world to carry out their tasks. 
A student project designed at Iowa State University is recognizable 
as an embodiment of the aesthetics characteristic of pastoralism. Its 
man-made forms echo and abstract the rhythms and shapes of nature. It 
embodies the perfect object-background relationship which accompanies 
man's attempt to be part of, yet distinct from, nature's necessary com-
position. Here technology can conveniently be said to require this aes-
thetic relationship. Architects who sense this formal opportunity eager-
ly embrace the application of new energy systems. The artifice of this 
value is, nevertheless, part of the composition. The fact that an even 
more sophisticated technology is producing this form does not obscure 
the delight of being back in nature as a comfortable and nearly invul-
nerable observer. The core of this value-motivated action remains the 
pleasant view from this ten family structure into a carefully maintained 
countryside. The fact that the pastoral view still depends on a well 
masked and complex support system, identifies this new form as one more 
stage of the interaction of technology and value. 
Whether direct electronic stimulation of our senses will provide 
the ultimate embodiment of the pastoral value remains to be seen. Surely 
each new form of technology wiil be appropriated to make "livinq natu-
rally" as painless as possible. 
NOTES 
1. Frank Lloyd Wright, Aw.ige6uhJLte Balden und En;twlUlne vo11 FJtan.k. Lloyd 
W)U[gfit., (Berlin: E. Wasmuth, 1910; reprint ed., New York: Horizon 
Press, 1963), Introduction. 
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TOW~RD A PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY 
Peter Caws* 
ABSTRACT. The philosophy of technology is addressed as a problem of an-
alytic philosophy rather than as a problem in the philosophy of values. 
Technology is not necessarily identified with modern industry, or as a 
handmaiden, a moral issue, or a juggernaut. The philosophy of technology 
should deal with the analysis of the articulation of things in the world 
rather than with the articulation of words. If technology runs away with 
society, that is a condemnation of society and not of technology. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is not an attempt to present a full-fledged philosophy of tech-
nology, but rather seeks to point out a certain direction. The tLtle, in 
fact, is at once an implicit promise and an implicit criticism. With 
respect to the latter, a disclaimer must be entered at once: the field 
of the philosophy of technology, while a relatively recent one, is ex-
tremely active; I am not acquainted with everything that has been writ-
ten about it; further, this paper will not even mention some of the 
giants of the field, such as Veblen, Spengler, Mumford, Ellul, or Giedi-
on. But the activity of the discipline means that special care must be 
taken to understand where it is going, and the implicit criticism of the 
title is a criticism not so much of the incompleteness of the philosophy 
of technology as of the direction it has tended to take. 
Historical, psychological, and sociological generalizations about 
the problems of technology abound, but the necessary grounding in philo-
sophical analysis has often been lacking. This is no doubt the fault of 
philosophers themselves, and perhaps we should be grateful for having 
our attention so forcefully drawn to the problem. In speaking of a 
grounding in philosophical analysis, I do not necessarily mean the phi-
losophy of technology should be considered a part of what has been tra-
ditionally been called "analytic philosophy," not at any· rate if this is 
regarded as a special branch of philosophy in the wider sense. In fact, 
the expression "analytic philosophy" is a tautoloqy, since any philoso-
phy which is not in some sense analytic is probably not worth the name. 
As the philosophy of technolooy develops, it takes its place among 
a number of disciplines each known as the "philosophy of X" -- including 
the philosophy of science, the philosophy of law, the philosophy of art, 
etc. The philosophy of X, whatever X may be, provides a way of particu-
larizing philosophy in general (although one could think of philosophy 
in general as the philosophy of X, where Xis everything there is). 
Philosophy in general has a number of standard subdivisions, such 
as logic, epistemology, and ethics, and questions deriving from each of 
these subdivisions are likely to be posed about the x. So we might ask 
what are the principles of articulation of discourse about x, or in the 
*Hunter Colleoe and the Graduate School, City University of New York, 
New York. 
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field of X, 
what values 
what criteria are there 
govern the activities in 
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for the acceptance of assertions, 
the domain and the analysis of 
these activities, and what are the moral imports of such activities. But 
in some fields there comes to be a stress on one of these subdivisions 
of philosophy -- rather than another: for example, the philosophy of 
science has been almost exclusively the logic and epistemology of sci-
ence. Courses in the ethics of science are not taught as part of the 
philosophy of science as it has traditionally been conceived, although 
we have recently become highly aware of the ethical implications of sci-
ence. Similarly, the philosophy of art has, by and large, dealt with 
values of one sort or another, but not much with logic or epistemology. 
Thus when there is a new instantiation of the expression "the phi-
losophy of X." -- when, for example, the philosophy of technology begins 
to take shape, and to be recognized by departments of philosophy as a 
reputable part of the field -- we have to be on our guard against the 
ambiguities that may be generated by the tendency to stress unequally 
the different parts of philosophy. The philosophy of technology might 
be one of two quite different thinqs: it might deal with value-laden 
questions, about industrial alienation, urban squalor, pollution, one-
dimensional man, moral decline, and other supposed undesirable conse-
quences of technology; or it might deal with analy tic questions, about 
men and machines and the relations between them, algorithmic computabil-
ity, the relation of collective means to individual ends, and the dia-
lectics of theory and practice. 
A present danger is too narrow an assumption of the direction or 
form that the philosophy of technology ought to take. It is evident that 
the philosophy of technology, in the minds of many people, is a set of 
questions about values which are challenged, modified, or denied by the 
advance of science and technology. This may obscure both sets of is-
sues -- those that concern values and those that concern technology. No 
doubt some questions of value, which have arisen in contemporary so-
ciety, are responsible for drawing technology to popular attention, but 
this attention is often, as it turns out, accompanied by some ignorance 
about technology and its sister discipline, science, as well as about 
the relations between them. Also, focusing on the supposed origins in 
technology of the crisis in values may lead to a neglect of developments 
in social and political philosophy which miqht be capable of dealing 
with the value issues directly, independently of the question of what 
it was that precipitated the crisis -- which may after all have been, 
not technology, but something else that technology made possible. 
FOUR MISUNDERSTANDINGS 
Before discussing what direction a philosophy of technology should 
seek to follow, it is important to deal with a set of misunderstandings 
called here the industrial, handmaiden, moral, and juggernaut views of 
technology. The first of these identifies technology with industry, and 
with what has happened since the industrial revolution; the second holds 
that technology is to be understood as the application of science to 
practical problems; the third, already alluded to, contends that the 
principal philosophical questions about technology are questions of val-
ue; and the fourth sees technology an an impersonal and autonomous force 
into whose clutches the world has fallen. 
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Technology and Industrialization 
If one chooses to understand by "technolo~" exploitative and large-
scale industrialization on the capitalist model without regard to man, 
nature, or future generations, then of course· the pressing questions 
would be value questions and concern is reasonable. But this seems to 
me a rather uninterestina use of the term, and the concept I have just 
sketched is more perspicuously defined by c.alLtng it exploitative and 
large-scale industrialization on the capitalist model without regard for 
man, nature, or future generations. It is true one is bound to have 
sympathy for people into whose awareness technology has come by that 
route. A case in point is the editor of a recent book called The. Sc,{,-
e.nc.e.J.i, ;th.e. HumanA_tie.1.i, and ;the. Te.c.hno.logic.al Tfvr.e.a.t, 1 for whom, given 
the use of the definite article in the last part of his title, technol-
ogy is obviously a rather fearsome thing. (In fact what the book seems 
to fear is less technology itself than lapses in the conventional moral 
order which reached its height in Victorian England.) 
A more straiqhtforward and less rhetorical interpretation of the 
term would rely mo~e heavily on its linguistic origins: the .logo-O of the 
;te.c.hne., or the .logo-0 in the ;te.c.hne., these terms having their usual mean-
ings in Greek -- "word" or "reason" and "art" or "skill." In the Iliad, 
;te.c.hne. is used to mean "shipbuilding;" in the Odtj-0-0 e.tj, it is used to 
mean "metalworking" (an association of production and prediction which I 
will refer to laterI. In fact, the term belongs to a cluster of terms, 
the interrelations among which are worth attention: ;the.o!U_a, p!Laxi-0 , 
poie.J.iM, on the one hand, ;te.c.hne. and e.pM;teme. on the other; a set of ac-
tivities and a pair of acquirements. 
The term ;the.o!U_a is of special interest, 
the verb ;th.e.ofLe.in, "to observe," which denoted 
fL0-0, the official observer sent to the games 
oracles; this last allusion yields the primary 
derived from ;the.0-0, "God," and o!La , "care." 
priate, given the value we correctly attach 
deriving as it does from 
the activity of the ;the.o-
ar to the consultation of 
meaning, since ;the.o!Lo-0 is 
It is not wholly inappro-
to theoretical knowledge, 
that our name for it should evoke, however indirectly, a concern for the 
divine. This remark has no tincture of reliqion -- it alludes rather to 
an immediate relation between v ulnerable humans and the phys ical world, 
by turns beautiful and awesome, that is still preserved in the spirit of 
modern science. 
Th.e.o!U_a is often contrasted to p!Laxi-0 , rather as spectators of a 
sport are contrasted with participants in it. P!La~ is a doinq of some-
thing, the carrying out of some practical strategy. Poie.J.iM, on the 
other hand, is a making. There is a close relati~n between poie.J.iM and 
;te.c.hne. , since poie.J.iM also was originally used to mean the making of 
ships (and perfumes}. Later on, of course , it came to mean making things 
with words, i.e., the activity we now call poetic. 
More significant for us, however, is the opposition between e.pM;teme. 
and ;te.c.hne. . EpM;teme., trans lated into its Latin equivalent -0 cJ.,e.n.t.{_a , 
gives us our word science; ;te.c.hne., standing for the kind of knowledge 
involved in art or skill, is something men have in their hands rather 
than, as in the case of e.pM;te.me., in their heads. Sometimes these two 
terms are themselves related; for example, in Herodotus the expression 
e.pM;te.1.i;th.ai ;te.n ;te.c.hne. occurs, meaning "to know one's craft," that is, 
to know it, not casually but in t he special way that e.pM;te.me. repre-
sents. All these interconnections seem to me provocative; one should 
not place more weight than is justified on etymology, but language is a 
rich source of suggestion in the clarification of ideas. The full-
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fledged term te~h~ologeo occurs in Aristotle, where it means bringing 
something under the rules of art, systematizing those rules; here we 
have not just the skill, nor even the special or precise knowledge of 
the skill, but th.e possibility of articulating and formulating what is 
done when the skill is employed. It is worth maintaining this set of 
classical connections and connotations in the contemporary use of the 
word "technology," if it is not too late to rescue it. 
Technology ~ Handmaiden 
The second misunderstanding with which we must deal is the i ,denti-
fication of technology entirely with the application of science to prac-
tical problems . Technology and science, of course, are closely related. 
But it is possible to think of an independent history of technology, one 
which frequently an,;t;,c,ipa;tv.i scientific results. We know tha;t things 
work without knowing how they work. 
The notions of "knowino that" and "knowing how" correspond nicely 
to the terms epi!.iteme and - te~h~e , respectively, although there is a 
crossing-over of sense: to say that one knows something works without 
knowing how is equivalent to an assertion t hat one knows how to use a 
certain device or information without having the "knowledge that," which 
corresponds to the principles of its operation. This has happened in 
many cases, a cogent example being that of electricity. While hypotheses 
existed (e.g., Ohm's lawl, the theoretical understanding of electricity 
followed the time technology reached the commercial stage. In fact, the 
ordinary language of electricity -- terms like "current" and "conden-
ser" -- indicate a belief about its nature (that it was a fluid), which 
was discredited only after electricity had become a familiar feature of 
practical life. 
We are, of course, able to produce results in the world by manipu-
latinq thinqs without any theoretical understandinq at all, and many of 
the f~uits ~f human ingenuity have come about just this way. This is 
frequently true even of scientific research: Faraday, realizing that 
wires carrying electric current moved in magnetic fields, spent a great 
deal of time looking for the conditions under which moving a wire in a 
magnetic field would produce a current; he did this by trial and error, 
and without any clue as to the theoretical relationships between elec-
tricity and magnetism. It was a question rather of feeling something in 
the world, or seeing into it directly, than of understanding. 
The concept of "knowing" is to be taken seriously even in the con-
text of "knowing how," and not only in the context of "knowing that," 
since knowing how really counts as knowledge of the world through a de-
vice or a muscular movement; it is a mode of acquaintance leading to 
mastery even if it does not include analytic understanding. There is a 
passage in Hume which might be used to reinforce this point if read in a 
slightly unorthodox way. Hume says, in the course of his criticism of 
the principle of causality: "My practice, you say, refutes my doubts. 
But you mistake the purport of my question. As an agent I am quite sat-
isfied in the point, but as a philosopher who has some share of curios-
ity, I will not say scepticism, I want to learn the foundation of this 
inference . ... As an agent I am quite satisfied in the point. 112 Hume has 
no practical doubt about the reliability of causal relations; he is not 
really afraid that the sun will not rise tomorrow but he understands 
that, if we make claims to knowledge formulated in the mode of "knowing 
that," we run up against insuperable obstacles. It seems to me worth 
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looking at the matter afresh, from the agent's point of view, and asking 
whether there might not be a wisdom of the agent, independent of the 
philosophical problems that confront the traditional epistemologist. 
Knowing how need not follow from or depend on knowing that -- or, to put 
it in the terms of the present discussion, technology need not follow 
from or depend on science. If it is true that· much modern technology 
would not have. come into being without 1!\0dem science, it is equally 
true that most modem science would not have come into being without 
modern technology, and there has been some attempt (particularly in the 
Soviet Union) to approach the history of science, for a change, in terms 
of the history of its instruments rather than in terms of the history of 
its theories. 
Technology ~ ~ Moral Issue 
Now let us tum to the third misunderstanding, namely, that the 
philosophical problems of technology are essentially questions of value. 
There is, to be sure, a crisis of value, but to attribute this to tech-
nology is to conceal the ethical issues, in a narrower sense, that may 
be involved. The strength of our values is mediated by the magnitude of 
the strains to which they are subject, and it is probably a delusion to 
think that accepted values are c0lt1Il\only stronger than required to meet 
the usual stress encountered. The technological situation may be disas-
trous for somebody whose v alues are not strong: put a device into his 
hands which enables him, by pressing a button, to eliminate his enemies, 
he may be more likely tempte d to do that than if it had required elabo-
rate actions. 
It is likely that our technolQSY will put us in a situation where 
our values are strained, but the fact that the values break down should 
not signify that quilt attaches to technology; the fact that our values 
came into being at a time when such strains were not present means that 
they now need strengthening, not that technology is vicious. It is true 
that technology has made it possible for people to be foolish and evil 
in ways not previously possible; still, it does not seem reasonable that 
all this should be laid to technology's charge. 
Technolocry has not always had the negative connotations, even in the 
domain of values, that it has recently acquir~d. In the early days, when 
machines were made of brass and were attended by enthusiasts who kept 
them polished, there were many people who found immense aesthetic satis-
faction in the structure and power of technological devices. There has 
been a recent contribution to this tradition on t'he part of a contempo-
rary writer, Robert Pirsig, in his book Zen and the An.;t 06 Motohc.ycl.e 
Maintenanc.e, 3 i n which he shows in a convincing and often moving way how 
the technical precision of machines is a thing of beauty and also of 
great human potentiality. 
This may seem to be an argument for the value-neutrality of tech-
nology, and to some extent, this is so. Such a position may be viewed 
as naive on the grounds that technolocry is part of a complex social 
structure, that we cannot escape involvement with it, and that every ac-
tion has moral and political implications. But the whole point of phi-
losophy as an analytic device is to neu)Aa,l,lze that fU..nd 06 c.oVl..6id~a­
tion in Md~ to 6e ab.le to hUVl..6en.;t the c.onc.ep.U c.onc.~ned, in a cl.eM-
~ 6oJzm, into a mohe comp.lex Mgument .lat~ on. Philosophy does not take 
a position in questions of value ; if it did, it would become a form of 
moralizing or of the arbitration of taste. Similarly, it does not take 
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a position on what is true of the world; if if did, it would become a 
form of science. Instead, what philosophy tries to do is to clarify the 
definitions of the terms in a_uestion and the conditions of their appli-
cation, the meanings of the relevant propositions and the conditions of 
their acceptance. It is true that philosophy may establish its criteria 
in such a way that, of the various alternatives offered to us, one and 
only one is selected while the others are rejected, but this does not 
mean that philosophy has itself taken a position -- it has simply en-
abled us to take a position more intelligently than otherwise. The posi-
tion chosen might then be said to have a philosophical warrant, but it 
would not, for all that, have become a part of philosophy. 
Technology ~ Juggernaut 
In order to deal with the juggernaut view, it is necessary first to 
argue that, to some extent at least, technoloay, like science, is a dis-
tributive phenomenon. There would be no science if it were not for the 
heads of the scientists who know it; technology is similar in that it 
requires an army of humans to sustain it. The situations of technology 
and science differ in that while the head of a dead scientist ceases to 
be useful, the machine of a dead technologist may continue to function; 
technology is therefore less directly reducible to the activities of the 
involved people. Further, a technologist may feel a certain loyalty to 
the technoloaical system he has helped to create or helps to run . It is 
tempting, therefore, to regard the development of technoloay as autono-
mous, and to assume that if something is possible it will in fact be 
realized and exploited, to feel that as individuals we are powerless in 
the face of the technological system. 
But the juggernaut view underestimates the tenacious role of the 
individual and the time scale of development. There is a long run ahead, 
and voices like Schumacher's are raised to insist that the tendency to 
bigness and uncontrolled automatism needs to be reversed. 4 The SST deci -
sion in the Congress may have been a turning-point back towards a more 
rational system of control. The only way to reverse the trend towards 
unthinking and deleterious developments is by a massive campaian of edu-
cation, but it is very important not to inhibit this by counsels of des-
peration, by a readiness to believe that the whole thing is already out 
of hand and that technoloay represents an unconquerable force for evil 
in the modem world. There is no serious reason for accepting any of 
these propositions. 
A NEW DIRECTION: WORDS AND THINGS 
How ought we to regard the philosophy of technoloay, and what direc-
tion might it reasonably take? The most promising approach would appear 
to be to work out the opposition between ep,U.,teme and te~hne (which, 
when ep,U.,teme is translated into Latin and te~hne is made articulate, 
transforms into the opposition between science and technology) in a much 
more radical way than has yet been done -- to follow it down to the op-
position between two ways human beings have of dealing with the world, 
one in terms of speech and of words, the other in terms of actions and 
of things. One thinks again of Hume, satisfied as an agent, dissatisfied 
as a philosopher. There is another classical source in Spinoza, who, in 
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his essay On the Imp~ove.ment on the UndeJUitancli.ng, proposed, in a re-
markable though casual way, the opposition I now wish to exploit. (Spi-
noza is the most technological of modern philosophers, with his lens-
grinding, dependent as it was on the technology of glass manufacture and 
casting, and of geometrical measurement, and abrasives and polishes.) 
He argued that somebody might claim the need for a method of discovering 
the truth, and the need for a method to discover this .method, and so on 
into an infinite reoress. He said: 
The matter stands on the same footing as the making of material 
tools, which might be argued about in a similar way. For, in 
order to work iron, a hammer is needed, and the hammer cannot 
be forthcoming unless it has been made; but, in order to make 
it, there was need of another hammer and other tools, and so on 
to infinity. We might thus vainly endeavor to prove that men 
have no power of working iron. But as men at first made use of 
the instruments supplied by nature to accomplish very easy 
pieces of workmanship, laboriously and imperfectly, and then, 
when these were finished, wrought other things more difficult 
with less labor and greater perfection; and so gradually mount-
ed from the simplest operations to the making of tools, and 
from the making of tools to the making of more complex tools, 
and fresh feats of workmanship, till they arrived at making, 
with small expenditure of labor, the vast number of complicated 
mechanisms which they now possess. So, in like manner, the in-
tellect, by its native strength, makes for itself intellectual 
instruments, whereby it acquires strength for performing other 
intellectual operations, and from these operations gets again 
fresh instruments, or the power of pushing its investigation 
further, and thus gradually proceeds till it reaches the summit 
of wisdom. 5 
The point of citing this passage has nothing to do with reaching the 
summit of wisdom: it is to draw attention to the quite natural way in 
which Spinoza suggests that there has been an autonomous development of 
the technological, a mode of dealin~ with the complexity of the world, 
through the development of tools and ever more complex devices, having 
nothing to do with our theoretical understanding. This would be a way 
of becoming adequate to our environment or, even more importantly, be-
coming adeq uate to ourselves in that environment, reckoning with matters 
of life and death in a way quite different from the one made possible by 
intellectual instrurnents. 
On the other side of this practical relationship to the world, phi-
losophy has some extraordinary gaps, which the philosophy of technology 
might have the ambition to fill. 'TI1ere is a great gap between basic ac-
tion theory on the one hand (what happens when I raise my arm, whether 
in so doing I do one thing or many , etc.) and questions of political 
praxis on the other (how political action is best organized, how it 
leads to revolution, etc.). The former does not rise to any great level 
of complexity ; the latter begins at a level so complex as to defy lucid 
analysis. We need to pay attention to the intermediate range, to appar-
ently banal forms of everyday behavior such as buttoning buttons, writ-
ing, manipulating scientific apparatus, which are found everywhere but 
have been the object of very little philosophical scrutiny . These activ-
ities on the side of "knowing how" are surely just as significant for 
human society as activities of language in a similar range, to which 
philosophers have paid a great deal of attention. 
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The parallel between these two sides has some philosophical history 
of its own. In 1897 Espinas published a book called Leo OtU.gineo de la 
TeQYmOlogie in which he matched a hierarchy of concepts on the practical 









He also anticipated certain present concerns in speaking of "the pessi-
mistic aspect of this philosophy: the powerlessness of man." This, how-
ever, was countered by its "optimistic aspect: the Arts, gifts of the 
qods. 116 
On the practical-technological side we begin with a philosophy of 
praxis, which will become a philosophy of technoloqy only when a certain 
complexity has been reached. What has been missing in recent attempts 
to define a philosophy of technology is just this basis in praxis, and 
the development of the intermediate region which separates the simple 
from the complex. The analog of sensation may be just as rudimentary as 
it is -- muscular effort, elementary motions, and the like -- but the 
analog of perception (which, after all, involves discrimination between 
relatively complicated aspects of the world) is to be found in much more 
pointed and refined praxes which may presuppose a considerable degree of 
learning and which represent a sophisticated mode of knowing a highly 
organized world. In other words, we need a serious and developed praxi-
ology as a propaedeutic to the philosophy of technology, something more 
adequate than the rather anecdotal work of Kotarbinski. 7 Praxis stands 
to technology as elements do to systems, technology being a consciously 
articulated sequence or bundle of praxes designed to reach a consciously 
apprehended end on a relatively large scale. This distinction between 
praxis and technology seems to be a useful and necessary one, as con-
trasted with the tendency, for example, on the part of Ellul, to lump 
everything together under the term "technique." 
If we now associate the t heotU.a-ep,U.,teme side of the opposition with 
words, and the p~ax.,,Ll-te~hne side with things, the obvious suggestion 
presents itself that there might be a philosophy of things; the analysis 
of the articulation of things in the world seems just as worth pursuing 
as the analysis of the articulation of words. There are some hints of 
this too in the literature: Levi-Strauss talks in The Savage Mind of a 
"science of the concrete," which he attributes to primitive peoples, 
meaning by this a knowledge of the material resources of their world 
which is directly expressed in their relation to things and only secon-
darily in their language. 8 The science of the concrete is a science of 
natural things -- plants, animals, and the like -- but we have a similar 
relation to artifacts, with which, indeed, our lives are surrounded. 
The artifacts that populate our lives express the human mastery of 
the world as much as, if not more so than, propositions do. We might 
even be tempted to say that, if we had adequate artifacts, we could do 
without the propositions. Elsewhere I have even suggested that the prop-
ositional content of science, namely scientific theory, may be histori-
cally anomalous, and that its chief function may be to make itself un-
necessary by incorporating itself into devices. 9 It is perfectly true 
that if we have the appropriate devices from chanae-making machines 
and automatic cameras to computerized mass-spectographs -- we can get 
results quickly and unthinkingly that a more theory-dependent praxis 
would have had to labor over for a long time; and it is a sobering 
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thought that if the device had been produced magically (or naturally, 
which amounts to the same thing) it would have worked exactly as it does 
when produced to theoretical specifications. 
In a way this line of thought, too, is part of a long tradition: 
the Encyclopedists of the 18th century attached great importance to the 
plates which accompanied articles about technical or industrial proce-
dures, such as glass-making, weaving, and the like. , The plates were 
often divided into an upper and lowe.r portion, the upper a realistic 
representation of the process in question, the lower a set of engravings 
of the various parts of the machinery, broken out and separated like the 
grammatical elements of a proposition. Such illustrations provided in-
dependent access to the knowledge the various articles were meant to 
communicate, and enabled the reader to see into the structure of the 
world, and to grasp directly the spatial and temporal and causal rela-
tions involved in a non-propositional, non-verbal way. A more recent 
contribution to this general domain is Baudrillard 's book Le. Sy.o;te_me. de,o 
obje.;t.o, which in a roughly structuralist-Marxist way analyzes the system 
of representation that is constituted by objects in the daily world --
the furniture and ornamentation of houses, the apparatus of conunerce and 
transportation and industry. 10 Things as they enter into the world --
as they are produced, consumed, arranged - - constitute an intelligible 
system which has some affinities to the linguistic system but is not in 
fact a system of language. 
As we develop this parallel oetween words and things, it is to be 
remembered that the things are no longer merely the referents of the 
words, but entities in their own right, forming their own systems of ar-
ticulation and expressing the fruits of human knowledge acquired practi-
cally. Of course, to maintain a rigorous separation of the two sides 
would be quite artificial -- the progress of neither side (towards sci-
ence or towards technology) would have been possible without the other. 
But in a certain respect activities traditionally supposed to lie on the 
side of words and of scientific theory are being taken over by things 
and technological practice. Earlier in this paper an association was 
noted between production and prediction; the latter at least has usually 
been taken to be a theoretical activity, but it is now more and more 
frequently the case that instead of working out theoretically some con-
jectural state of affairs, the task is entrusted to computer simulation. 
This is a way of producing new knowledge as the end product of a process 
involving things rather than words, without any cognitive monitoring of 
the intermediate steps. It may be argued that computers in fact do make 
use of languages, and it cannot be denied that their parts are arranged 
according to the logic of a "language." But what puts the simulation 
process on the technological rather than the scientific side is the fact 
that there is no ;the.o~o.O, no spectator intelligence to attend and guide 
the process; and there is also a sense, as I have argued elsewhere, in 
which the logic of our language is a necessary reflection of a prior 
logic of things.11 
VALUES I NDEPENDENT OF TECHNOLOGY 
I return to the concept of value, to emphasize values held indepen-
dently that technology miaht or miaht not serve. The notion of indepen-
dence is important, and controversial, as a brief reference to some 
recent arguments will show. Heidegger sees in technology the spirit of 
the modern age and links it with modern metaphysics:1 2 for him this is 
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not a compliment, since he thinks that metaphy sics since Plato has been 
utilitarian and that indeed Plato represents the wrong turn in the his -
tory of philosophy. If technology is an instrumentality, so on this ac-
count is philosophy (and, Heidegger would say, just as great a threat to 
our values). I would prefer to say not that technology expresses our 
collective purpose but that, unlike philosophy, it is a means for the 
practical realization of this purpose. 
Marcuse, on the other hand, reaards technolooy as part of ideology, 
and hence believes it to have a repressive force in the contemporary 
world: 
In this universe, technology provides the great rationalization 
of the unfreedorn of man and demonstrates the 'technical' impos-
sibility of being autonomous, of determining one's own life. 
For this unfreedom appears neither as irrational nor as politi-
cal but rather as submission to the technical apparatus which 
enlarges the comforts of life and increases the productivity of 
labor. Technological rationality thus protects rather than can-
cels the legitimacy of domination and the instrumentalist hori-
zon of reason opens on a rationally totalitarian society. 13 
The real problem here seems much ·more one of technocracy than of tech-
nology; only if social and political and economic structures are allowed 
to create an irreversible dependence on technology for the very survival 
of the individual or if through education and propaganda individuals are 
conditioned to see the character of any acceptable survival in technol-
ogy-dependent terms, is the trap Marcuse describes effective. Technoc-
racy is not so much a problem for the philosophy of technology as for 
political philosophy in its more familiar sense. The challenae is to 
incorporate the technological into the pattern of our social and politi-
cal organization without allowing it to determine the essential features 
of that pattern . But even to speak of allowing it to do this, or not 
allowing it, is to fall into one of the errors I initially deplored, 
that of regarding technology as an impersonal force which has to be con-
fronted as something alien. 
Technology is in fact a human product; so is political organization. 
We need to master each conceptually before we can safely deal with their 
interaction. If a great many unthoughtful people, who have not suffi-
ciently meditated upon their own political organization or the ends they 
wish it to serve, are offered technological solutions, they are likely 
to accept them, wherever they are available, because they represent the 
easiest temporal solution. If, likewise, they have not meditated upon 
the technology, it will not be surprising if disaster and recriminations 
follow. If, of course, we wanted to claim that we were, individually or 
collectively, simply not up to coping with the advantages of technology, 
we might wish to adopt a Luddite view, but this seems a cowardly atti-
tude. What we :must do, rather, is to work on the articulation of the 
social and political values we wish to realize, so as to be able to 
adopt technological solutions intelligently without giving up other val-
ues we wish to preserve. 
To repeat a point made earlier: if technology runs away with soci-
ety, this is a condemnation of society and not of technology. There is 
a kind of futility in the attack on technology, rather like kicking a 
car after one has b acked it into a lamp-post. An old proverb, suitably 
generalized, is applicable in the present context.: "A bad work.man alway s 
blames h is tools." It is true that in this generalized case t he workman 
is collective, and that we very often have a feeling of individual_ 
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helplessness in the face of technology -- it appears to be getting away 
from us , if not from society as a whole. But the same thing is true of 
language: we do not h ave ind ividual control of the means of expression. 
We might say that we are at the mercy of language; and yet we can use 
the available language to express what we want to say, j ust as we can 
use the technology there is to do what we want to do. If larger-scale 
uses take deleterious turns, as they occasionally do -- in industry on 
the side of things or in literature on the side of words remedies in 
action become, as one migh t expect, political. 
Habermas contrasted institutional frameworks characterized by sym-
bolic interaction, which he takes to be the mode under wh ich we are to 
be emancipated from inherited structures, with autonomous systems of 
purposive rational action, such as armies, commercial and industrial 
firms, universit ies, and t h e lik e. Under the former we can confront one 
another openly, take account of similarities and differences of ends or 
concerns, and this mode h as to be made dominant over the latter if we 
are not to be a prey to impersonal economic structures rooted in class 
inequalities. 14 Again, howe ver, it is not necessary to follow him in 
identifying technology as one of these au:tovwmo u,o structures, "autono-
mous" signifying here self-interestedly concerned and disdaining a more 
general law. rt is much more likely that we will find the deleterious 
principles in the economics or politics than in the technology. The 
demiurge of the modern world is after all the collectivity of men --
individual men, not representative Man -- a distributive collectivity of 
human beings like us (for if the event transpires it will be one of us, 
not some abstract force, who presses the fateful button). Not that it is 
impossible for the juggernaut to come into being, indeed it may already 
be grinding its way towards the end of the world, in wh ich case nothing 
any of us says can make any difference. But this is not a necessary con-
sequence of technology if we come to terms with it in full understand-
ing. It would take a considerable degree of concerted malice, of which, 
it is true, the great powers show themselv es capable, to encompass the 
technological destruction of civilization. 
Technology offers, for the first time in history , the po~~ib,{,.l{_ty of 
an almost complete command over the natural world. One is reminded of 
the passage in Hegel's PheYtomenology 06 Spif[,{,,t in which he discusses the 
relations between the Master and the Slave: in the end it is the slave 
who comes to dominate, because he is the one who deals with the world 
p ractically and not theoretically ; he serves the-master with his hands, 
but in so doing conquers the world b y work, and thus achieves his own 
emancipation not only from t h e master but also from many of the limita-
tions of the world itself. 1 5 Marx, following Hegel, was one of the first 
to perceiv e the relations between the social ·structures we unconsciously 
perpetuat e and the economic and technological forces which transform 
those structures, and he has been called by Axelos the "philosopher of 
technology . 111 6 Since technolo9y offers this command of the world, it is 
up t o us t o formulate with due care the moral and social imperati v es 
that are to b e satisfied in achiev ing it. But technology should not be 
i dentified with this task; its p h ilosophical problems are its own. 
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TECHNOLOGY AND VALUES: 
SOME PRELIMINARY CLARIFICATIONS 
William S. Robinson* 
ABSTRACT. There are several relations between technology and values, 
which differ in importance, interest and associated problems . In this 
paper, each relation is discussed briefly and the differences among them 
are clarified. Special attention is given to the question of how it is 
possible for technological developments to change values. 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper is a discussion of several relations between technology 
and values. Unfortunately , both "technology" and "value" are somewhat 
vague and their proper clarification has been controversial . However, 
for the purposes of this paper our ordinary understanding of these terms 
is nearly sufficient. Only a few remarks about each term are required. 
"Technology " includes ways of doing things which affect or may af-
fect the lives of numerous people , either direct l y or indirectly. We 
want to know how making and using things may affect values and also how 
adopting standard procedures may affect them. Technology may be applied 
science , but need not be; technological development has frequently pre -
ceded scientific understanding of it. It seems fair to say, however, 
that where we speak of technological development we could have a sci-
ence; and the usual , justified expectation is that having a science ·~e ­
hind " a technology leads to refinement and improvement of that technol-
ogy. 
Under the t e rm "values" we must consider not only what people do and 
say but also what they woul-d do under vari ous possible circumstances . 
This is necessary because we must preserve a fundamental distinction be-
tween what people value and what they are forced to accept. For examp le, 
if people do not have beautiful cities it may be because they no longer 
care about the aesthetics of their surroundings ; but it may also be that 
they cannot agree on what to build, or t ha t they ~egard attention to the 
aesthetic character of public buildings as prohibitively expensive. To 
decide between these possibilities we must know what people would do if 
agreement could be achieved or if good des i gn could be provided without 
extra cost . 
RELATIONS BETWEEN VALUES AND TECHNOLOGY 
One obvious way in which 
there are some things we ~oul-d 
means, but which we do not do 
believed likely to choose) to 
values and technology are related is that 
do , in the sense of having the available 
because not enough of us choose (or are 
do it. To be sure , there are those who 
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write as if there were a sort of intrinsic power in technology which 
forces what is technologi cally possible to be actually done . l Yet three-
wheeled passenger cars, efficient rail service, steel dishes , and neigh-
borhood protective associations are almost non-existent. Perhaps some 
such writers are really proposing that what is technologically nea).)~bie 
becomes actual . Feasibility , however , involves considerations of cost 
and estimates of what individuals or groups will be wi lling to pay for 
services or products. Thus, what is not feasible is, in part, that which 
is not sufficiently valued . 2 
This consideration , while important, does not meet more typical is -
sues, which have to do with the effects of technologies once they are 
actually adopted, or with predictions as to the effects of technologies 
which are likely to be adopted. These further issue s will be taken up 
roughly in order of increasing interest . 
Galbraith has argued along lines which can be summed up as follows: 
Power accrues to those controlling that factor of p roduction which it is 
most difficult to increase . At present this factor is technological ex -
pertise . Thus we may expect our time to be one of increasi ng power for 
those possessed of such expertise . 3 If we add to this the view that the 
values of those i n power tend to be reflected more wide l y in societ y , we 
may suppose that there will be a noticeable change in val ues , in the 
d irection of those of technologists. 
Galbraith's view i s persuasive , t hough perhaps most o f the ind i cated 
deve l opment has already taken place . Certainly , there is a kind of 
heroism attributed to individuals whose names are associated with tech-
nological development -- Edison, for example ; and Henry Ford i s remem-
bered not only for entrepreneurship but also for the development of the 
technique of mass production . We must bear in mind, however , that what 
Galbraith ' s thesis tells us depends on what we know about t he values of 
those who have technological expertise . Reflection suggests t hat the 
values of technologists are, for the most part, as various as those of 
any segment of society . It is even plausible to suppose that since 
technologists are usually not students of history or values, they will 
tend to be rather conventi onal in their outlook . 
Galbraith ' s argument i s a general one which appeals to no particular 
t echnology . One might expect to find more noti cepble results by consid-
ering the application of particular technological development s . In pur -
suing this idea it is important to ~learly distinguish between (a) the 
effects on values of technological developments which are expl icitly 
directed at influencing values; and (b) effects of techno l ogies which 
are not consc iously direc t ed at values . 
TECHNOLOGY OF VALUE 
This term includes any technology which is intentional l y designed 
to bring about the holding o f any value by any group of people . The most 
obvious form of this is Skinner ' s "technology of behavior ." 4 The po i nt 
of thi s technology is precisely to get people to make certain kinds of 
choices in certain situations. We should also include such things as 
(1) c l oning in order to produce a homogeneous group which can be in-
fluenced to have the same kinds of reactions to some (or all) situations 
and (2) widespread use of mind - affecting drugs to produce such charac -
teristics as docility or eagerness for work. 5 We might add advert i sing 
and propaganda to our list if (or when) we believe that the methods in 
these areas are sufficiently definite and ordered to be called a tech-
nology rather than an art . 
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Technologies of value face "internal " probl ems which might be called 
"dia l ectical;" for example , the tendency of advertising to breed cyni-
cism, which requires new techniques. The prevalence of the "hard sell" 
makes a " soft sell " approach attractive; but when the "soft sell" is 
fashionable, the "hard sell" may become more effective . Chang ing fash-
ions may be thought of as illustrating a "dialectical" development in 
skirt lengths, lape l widths, etc . 
Let us make the plausible assumption , however , that some success in 
value technology can be achieved.6 It then becomes necessary to ask what 
values this technology ought to be used to further. One response to this 
question is that, whatever the answer , it is not a technological one . 
That is, the proper attitude toward a technology of values is that it i s 
only a means to instill values whose justification must lie outside the 
technology itse lf. The fear frequently associated with the p r ospect of 
a technology of values is that this proper role will not be maintained . 
It is feared that ordinary political processes will be bypassed and that 
the ends will be determined by a narrow group who wield the means. Such 
a concern would naturally be augmented by recognition of increasing pow-
er of technolog ists. This anxiety ought to be reduced, however , by 
recognition of the facts that technologists reflect the values of t he ir 
upbringing , that they are diverse in their views , and that any signifi -
cant application of value technology will require the involvement of a 
great many people. 
Technologists of value sometimes disagree with the above view of 
the relation between value questions and technological questions . Some , 
like Skinner and Toffler, do recognize that the question of what values 
shoul d be served differs from the typical technological ques tion. Each 
of these authors tries, nonetheless , to answer the value question in a 
way which is alleged to derive from technological considerations . 
Skinner, in Beyond F~eedom and V~gn)A:y , says that the end t o be 
served by his technological application of psychology is freedom from 
exploitative arrangements . An arrangement is exploitative if, over the 
l ong run, it results in people giving up more goods than they receive. 
His criticism of some traditional views is that they call choices free 
when they are so ordered as to l ead to exploitation. He believes that 
his technology can e liminate exploitation . 
The e limination of expl oitation is certainly a worthy goal. But 
does this value judgment spring from technological considerations? 
Skinner labors to have it so , but he fails . 7 It i s in fact obvious that 
he is appealing to familiar ideas of justice and freedom which have de -
veloped quite independentl y of technology. In traditiona l terms, the 
point Skinner is making is that if a person is offered inducement to 
make choices which are detrimental in the long run, then that person is 
not being treated justly and is free only in a hollow sense. 
Toffler ' s view , which can also be found here and there in Skinner, 
is that the proper end of technology is to produce a situation in which 
what is valued is what can be achieved . The technologist 's task is con-
ce ived as that of predicting future developments and then acting on 
peopl e 's va lues so that they will be happy with those developments . 
It is true that such adjusting of values becomes poss ible only if a 
technology of values is available . This should not, however , obscure the 
fact that a preference for future harmony of values and deve lopments 
does not arise out of technological discovery itself . Consider these 
possibi lities: (1) One way of enabling people to cope with their world 
might be to reduce their demands on it. But an attempt to make this re-
duction might be regarded as giving in to slothfulness . We might think 
it better that people be dissatisfied with some future condition , in the 
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belief that t hey will then do something to correct it. Such a judgment 
is not a technological one and the contrary judgment, being of the same 
t ype , is not technological either. (2) There may be more than one way 
of rearranging values so that people are not distressed by future de -
velopments . Clearly the choice between rearrangements cannot be decided 
on technological grounds alone . 
"NON -VALUE" TECHNOLOGY 
Turning to the relation between values and those technologies which 
are not explicitly intended to change or preserve values, we immediately 
face the question: How could such a technology affec t values? It is 
easily understood that technology may make it easier or harder to get 
food, clean air, unbiased information, privacy , etc. But how should it 
affect whether we want such things or do not care about them, or whether 
we will choose to act to obtain them, given an opportunity to do so? One 
might even believe it to be obvious that technology is essentially a 
means and that it cannot affect what we s trive for, or would strive for 
under some set of conditions . Such a view, I shall argue , is partl y 
correct and partly misleading . What we need is an understanding of the 
mechanism by which non - value - directed technologies can influence values . 
To accomplish this we need to distinguish three kinds of values : 
(1) Some things or states of aftairs are desired as ends . (They may or 
may not also be desired as means.) A good indication of having come upon 
something valued as an end is this: The question as to why someone is 
p ursuing something valued as an end begins to lose sense . Thus , for 
example , if you ask me why I am eating an apple , this is a perfectly in-
telligent questi on. It may be that my doctor has told me to gain 
weight ; or I may be hungry ; or I may think apples have some health-
giving vitamin . I may give you one of these answers and if I do, you 
will know what I am eating the apple fio~ . But if you ask me why I want 
to be healthy , or free from hunger, I may well begin to wonder if you 
understand what you are saying. The peculiar nature of these questions 
suggests that we are dealing with ends. (2) Some things or states of 
affairs may be desired purely as means . Such things would cease to be 
valued the moment people came to believe that they do not produce some-
thing e lse or that there is some easier way of producing the same re -
sults or that there are extraneous bad consequences of greater disvalue 
than the benefits to be obtained. For example , medicines (i.e ., those 
which have no mood affecting properties) are a means to relief from 
disease and are purely so. When it is discovered that one is ineffective 
or more expensive than equivalents or has sufficiently deleterious side 
effects , it is given up . (3) Some things would never have been valued 
unless the y had been (or been believed to be) means to some end ; but , 
they would not be given up even if discovered to be inefficaci ous or 
less than optimally so. Let us call these items things valued as means, 
but not purely as means. Many kinds of skills belong here. For example, 
horsemanship probably would never have been valued if it had not been 
clearly useful. But it did not cease to be valued immediately upon the 
introduction of motorized vehicles which made the ability to contro l a 
horse inessential. 
Several matters may be clarified by reference to this classifica-
tion. It is obvious that technology will change these things we value 
purely as means , by rendering them no longer the quickest or cheapest 
means. More interestingly, some of the things we value as means , but 
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not purely so , will cease to be valued not irrunediately, but over a 
period of time in which inefficiency as a means will gradually become 
more obvious and the expenditure of effort in preserving the old means 
will come to be regarded as less and less justi fiable. A special case 
of this is of particular interest. There are degrees in our third group 
listed above. The attachment to a thing or way of doing things above its 
value purely as a means may be slight (perhaps it is never entirely ab-
sent there is always a comfortable feeling that goes with familiar 
tools). But this attachment can be so strong as to approach valuation 
as an end. Something may in fact be believed to be valued as an end un-
til technological development removes its efficiency as a means. Once 
this happens, the field becomes open for the cessation of valuing the 
thing or way of doing things - - although there is no necessity that this 
change will occur. What I am suggesting is that technological develop-
ment can sometimes reveal to us that we really value something in a less 
fundamental way than we might have thought and that this may be the 
first step to changing that value, especially if it is one which is dif-
ficult to maintain. Since this pattern is exhibited in an important 
class of cases of value change, let us illustrate it with an example. 
The refinement and widespread availability of contraceptives has 
certainly changed behavior; but it has changed and is in the process of 
continuing to change values as well . We can understand this because 
prior to the availabi l ity of reliable contraceptive techniques , sexual 
activity in young women was likely to lead to pregnancy and the economic 
burden of a child. In Western society , thi s burden, taken on out of 
wedlock, could and did lead to miserable lives . So it was quite natural 
for parents interested in their female children ' s welfare to value the 
restric tion of sexual behavior to marriage and to value whatever tended 
to reinforce this restriction. Now, contraceptives reduce the connection 
between sexual activity and pregnancy, and thus the restriction of sex -
ual activity becomes far less focal in the promotion of a young person ' s 
welfare. Some, of course, continue to value abstinence outside of mar -
riage very highly . Many others, however, now regard restrictions on 
sexual activity as a means that is no longer required to serve its end. 
If this is correct, what consequences follow for the view that tech-
nology can change only what is valued as a means? The mechanism we have 
discussed applies only to what is valued , purely or impurely, as a 
means. If there is no deeper mechanism -- and I have been unable to find 
one - - the view of technology as changing only means is strictly speak-
ing correct. But it is important to remember that some means are not 
me!l..e means and that changing means may be a ccompanied with varying de -
grees of distress. 
This conclusion is not changed by the fact that there is an alterna-
tive mechanism through which non - value - directed technologies might be 
cons i dered to bring about change s in values. It is natural to think of 
a person as expressing his or her values by the choice of an action in a 
given set of conditions. It is also natural to think of change of value 
as change of action in the same circumstances. But it can also happen 
that the circumstances themselves change . Technology can offer us -- or 
force upon us -- new choices by providing circumstances which could not 
readily have been envi sioned or taken seriously prior to a technological 
development. As a trivial example, the preference for detachable tele-
phones could not be an expression of a person's valuing privacy until 
the telephone had been invented. More significantly, let us imagine a 
person who is now fifty or older and who c laims and has always claimed 
to value "life." Such a person has had nonetheless to do something new; 
namely, decide what constitutes valuing life when there is a real 
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possibility of machines which sustain some bod ily functions but not 
those required for personal i nt eraction. As before, however, we should 
note that these new choices wil l be made on t he basis of our familiar 
fundamental ends. 
For simplicity, we have been treating values one at a time and we 
have considered particular cases. Actual choices are more complex in at 
least two ways: they take account of our several different ends and they 
often concern styles, strategies, or compromises . This complexity may 
account for some of the feeling that technology causes upheavals in our 
value system. However, if our argument is sound, we need not agree with 
such a view. It would seem more accurate to say that in serving a rather 
stable set of ends, t echnology will lead us to adopt new strategies t o 
meet new situations, often with newly available means. 
TESTING-BEFORE-INTRODUCING 
The attraction of n ovelty , the profit motive , or fears for national 
security can all provide pressure for the immedia t e distribution of a 
technological development. Yet we may suffer from hasty design ; it may 
be unsightly, unsafe, or have side effects rang ing from the undesirable 
to the disastrous. How t hese pressures and concerns are balanced may be 
of critical importance for our future. We may expect some help from the 
development of the technology of testing. In large part , however, it 
will require the continuing exe~cise of our best judgment to ensure that 
t esting-before-introducing is valued sufficiently, but not so much as to 
become fear of change. 
SUMMARY: CRITICAL QUESTIONS 
The view presented here is that technology is unlikely to have the 
kind of effect on values that some authors suggest . Whether one agrees 
with this assessment or not, some of t he distinctions made here should 
be helpful in further dis c ussions of technology and values. These dis -
tinctions are reflected in the following questions that one should ask 
of any p roposed technology . 
1. Does a particular development increase the power of those identifi-
able as technologists? If so, what are the values of these technol-
ogists and what is the p r obable consequence of their increase in 
power? 
2. Is a particular development an application of a technology of value? 
If so, is it a beneficial application? 
3. Does a parti cular development change what it is reasonable to value 
as a means? If so, in wha t way? 
4. Does a particular development offer us (or, force us to make) new 
kinds of choices? 
5. Is a particular deve lopment being introduced without adequate test-
ing? 
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NOTES 
1. J . Ellul is the most notable proponent of this view. See his The 
Te~hnologi~Cll So~ety, J. Wilkinson, tr., (New York: Knopf, 1964). 
2. When we consider values expressed in dec~s ions made by and for 
groups we are really cons i dering politics. Unfortunately , the polit -
i cal aspects of applying technology cannot be developed in this 
paper. 
3. J. K. Galbraith, "Technology, Planning and Organization," in K. 
Baier and N. Rescher, eds., VCllueo and the Fu..t.u.!Le (New York: Free 
Press, 1969), pp. 353 - 367. 
4. B. F. Skinner, Beyond Fneedom and Vig~y (New York: Knopf , 1971). 
Page references below are to the Bantam/ Vintage edition, 1972. 
5. It is possible to describe this case in two ways: (a) peopl e have 
the same values they used to have but are prevented from acting on 
them by being drugged; or (b) people have new values, although they 
would have the values they used to have (or , possibly, just ones 
other than the ones they have while drugged) if the use of drugs 
were discontinued. To consider case (2) as an example of technology 
of value is tantamount to assuming that, if the use of drugs became 
sufficiently widespread, (b) would be on the whole a simpler des -
cri ption. 
6. By "success" here , I mean that a value technologist gets in a posi -
tion to make reliable clai ms of this form: if we adopt strategy ~ 
then a higher proporti on of group ~ will make choices of kind X in 
circumstances S'._ than would do so if we do not adopt S. 
7. A full exposition of this failure would require an interpretive es -
say on the whole of Beyo nd Fneedom and Vig~y. However, a good 
idea of Skinner's d ifficulty can be gained from the following two 
observations. (1) On page 97 Skinner says that "It is usually im-
p lied that the answers to what people oug~ to do are out of reach 
of science. " His response to this (also on page 97) is: "It would 
be a mistake for the behavioral sci entist to agree. How people feel 
about facts, or what it means to feel anything, is a question for 
which a science of behavior should have an answer." Now, the second 
sentence of this reply does not support the intention of the first, 
since a judgment about how people feel about facts (and even a judg-
ment about what t hey believe they ought to do about them) is not a 
judgment about what they ought to do . (2) One of the values Skinner 
discusses is that of survival. But if we ask how this value is to 
be supported, we will ultimately come upon the following remarks. 
"The simp le fact i s that a culture which noJt a,.ny Jtea-Oon induces its 
members to work for its survival ... is more likely to survive . Sur-
vival is the only value according to which a culture is eventually 
to be judged, and any practice that furthers survival has survival 
value by definition" (p. 130). "But what is its answer to the 
question: 'Why should I be concerned about the survival of a parti -
cular kind of economic system? ' The only honest answer to that kind 
of question seems to be this : ' There is no good reason why you 
should be concerned , but if your culture has not convinced you that 
there is, so much the worse for your culture'" (page 131). But these 
remarks are not a grounding of the value of survival; they are a 
declaration that no grounding of the v a lue can be had. 
8 . A. Toffler, "Value Impact Forecaster--A Profession of the Future, " 
in VCllueo and the FutU!Le, pp. 1-30, e specially pp. 2 and 11; and 
Skinner, pp. 144 and 156. 
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MAN, MACHI NES AND MORAL ORDER: 
TECHNOL 03Y AND VAL UES IN FRENCH ROMANTICISM 
Frans C. Amelinckx* 
ABSTRACT . At the same time the Industrial Revolution was transforming 
the social and econanic fabric of French society, the Romantic movement 
was developing the concept of social awareness. Confronted with an in-
c rease of social evils brought about by industrialization, the Romanti-
cists felt compelled to speak out against the deplorable working and 
living conditions of the masses. Influen ced by the idea of perfectibil-
ity of man and the progress of society, the Romantics never considered 
technology alien to their vision of a new world order . Consequently, 
they were impervious to the consequences of uncontrolled technology . 
Only a few conservative voices questioned the basic premises of material 
and technological progress; the majority clung to the hope that technol-
ogy would usher in a Utopian society. 
With the development of steam power and its use in machines during 
the early nineteenth century, long- familiar patterns in the production 
of goods were suddenly shattered, and drastic sociological changes re-
sulted . As the Industrial Revolution swept across Europe, the creation 
of heavy industries, transportation systems a nd the accumulation of cap-
ital took a heavy toll in terms of human suffering. In France, as Evans 
noted, "the immediate result of the introduction of spinning loans, 
steam machinery, and machine t ools was that rural craftsmen were thrown 
out of work. So many left the poverty- stricken countryside for the 
towns, attracted by the prospects held out to them of work and wages, 
and little suspecting the periods of unemployment, depression, and wage 
reductions th at awaited them, that an unprecedented housing shortage 
developed at industrial centres such as Lille and Rouen . The solution 
found was the slums." 1 
The July Monarchy of King Louis - Philippe (1830-1848) coincided with 
the Industrial Revolution in France . The dramatic industrial- technologi -
cal changes of this period deeply affected sOc.iety and its value systems 
a nd are, of course , reflected in the literature of the period. Most of 
the writers of the Romantic School in France at this time were enthusi-
astic about technology . They sought t o celebrate~it, to attack its mis -
use by societ y and to look forward t o the realization of the Revolution-
ary Dream. A few, like Gautier and the JeuneJ.i F~ance , a group of young 
writers, chose to r e trea t from the ugliness and confusion of a mecha-
nized world they could not understand, and to seek refug e in a realm of 
imaginary beauty, the safety of " Art for Art ' s sake . " 
Some scholars feel th a t the Romantic writers did not realize all the 
implicatims of the Industrial Revolution . Evans implied this in h i s 
remark : "Writers like George Sand and Victor Hugo saw the fi rst great 
factories, the first railroads t ake shape before their eyes; and they 
looked at these innovations, and the social consequen ces of industrial-
ism, with the simplicity and sincerity of which Michelet speaks so well: 
*Department of Modern Languages, University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb-
raska. 
250 AMELINCKX: MAN, MACHINES , AND MORAL ORDER 
'that divine innocence we sometimes glimpse in young things, only for a 
brief moment like a lightning- flash in the sky '" (p . 77) . Albert George, 
on the other hand, felt that the rise of technology was simply used as a 
means for renewal within the Romantic Movement . He wrote : "It was the 
Industrial Revolution which, in part, furnished the new school with the 
material it was seeking : new plots, new characters, new images, even a 
new purpose for writing, came from this great age of major social 
change . " 2 
My contention, however, is that the French Romantics were neither 
innocent nor simply seeking new literary material, but that they saw in 
technology the means for ushering in a new age -- an age in which Liber-
t y , Equality , and Fraternity would reign. The Romantic School had in-
herited many eighteenth- centu r y ideas regarding the perfectibility of 
man and society, as well as a fascination with the mechanical arts . Most 
writers af ter 1830 saw themselves as direct heirs of the Revolution of 
1789 and looked upon literature, stemming from the revolutionary tradi-
tion, as a civilizing and transforming force . Because of their deep-
seated commi tment to humanism and social progress, and because they saw 
in technology the potential for achieving this progress, they felt com-
pelled to ac t as Society ' s conscience, confronting the evils of the In-
dustrial Revolution . And these evils were real. 
The gov ernment of Louis-Philippe, dominated by the "laissez - faire " 
doctrine, did little to alleviate the workers' horrendous condition. The 
first child-lab or law in France was not passed until 1841 and th en was 
rather weak; it forbade the employment of children under eight years of 
age, and permitted eight hours of work daily for children between eight 
and twelve, and twelve hours for children between twelve and sixteen. 
Moreover, the law was not very well enforced, evidenced by an arti cle in 
1844 in the Revue dv.i Veux. Mondeo , which described the horrible working 
conditions to which children were still being subjected . 3 Thus the 
Romantics used their writings as an expression of social and humanitari-
an concern . Hugo, for example, in his poem "Melancholia ," vividly cas-
tigated child labor in the na me of free labor : 
Ou vont tous ces enfants dont pas un seul ne rit? 
Ces doux etres pensifs que la fievre maigrit? 
Ces filles de huit ans qu ' on voit cheminer seules? 
Ils s ' en vont travailler quinze heures sous des meules ; 
Ils vont de l'aube au soir, faire eternellement 
Dans la meme prison le meme mouvement . ... 
Travail mauvais ... qu'il soit maudit au nom du travail meme, 
Au nom du vrai travail, sain, fecond, genereux , 
Qui fai t le peuple libre et qui rend l ' homme heureux . 4 
Where are they going -- all these children, of whom not 
a single one laughs? These sweet beings so thoughtful 
and wasted by fevers? These eight- year-old girls walk-
ing alone? They are going t o work for fifteen hours 
under grindstones; making from dawn t o sunset the same 
movement, in th e same prison, eternally the same move-
ment . Evil work, may it be cursed in the name of work 
itself, in the name of true labor, healthy, generous, 
frui t ful, which f rees people and makes man happy . 
The last part of the poem very cl€arly expresses the Romantic position, 
for while chas tising the evils of industrial work, it nevertheless ex-
tols the virtues of honest labor and productivity . 
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Another example of social concern in poetry is Hugo's "Joyeuse vie " 
which attacks the housing conditions in the slums of Lille : 
Un jour je descendis clans les caves de Lille; 
Je vis ce morne enf er 
Des fantomes sont la sous terre clans des chambres . 
. . . Jamais de feu; la pluie inonde la lucarne . ' . 
La, frissonnent plus bas que les egouts des rues, 
Familles de la vie et du jour disparues . 
Des groupes grelottants; . . 
Une petite fille a figure de vieille 
Me <lit : j'ai dix- huits ans! . 
Caves de Lille! on meurt sous vos plafonds de pierre! 5 
One day, I went down into the cellars of Lille. I saw this 
dismal hell; spectres are living under the ground in cham-
bers . .. never any fire; rain floods in; there, they 
shiver, lower than the sewers, families disappeared from 
life and light; a little girl with an old woman ' s face 
told me: "I am eighteen! " Cellars of Lille, people die 
under your stone roofs ! 
The Romantic view of social involvement and of the inherent value 
of technology was based on the doctrines of social reform movements such 
as Saint-Simonism and the Utopian Fourierists . The Count of Saint-Simon, 
in his numerous treatises, saw in technology a promise for mankind . The 
problem was how to organize and control it in order to avoid the mis -
takes of the past and the continued exploitation of men, i.e . , economic, 
rather than political feudalism : "Man has until now exploited man . Mas -
ter, slave; patrician, plebeian; lord, serf; proprietor, share- cropper; 
idler, worker; this is the progressive history up to our day .... 11 6 
According to Saint-Simon, this exploitation had to be replaced by a new 
process - association, in which everyone worked for the connnon good : "Uni-
versal Assocation, this is our future; to each according to his capabil -
ity, to each capability according to its activities ; this is the new law 
which replaces the law of conquest and of birth : man does not exploit 
man any longer, but man associated with man exploits the world open to 
his power . . . " (p. 118) . In the new world order, the means of production 
would be controlled not by the wealthy, but by those who possessed 
knowledge, a concept which attracted many students of the celebrated 
E~ole Poly~e~hYU_que, who were among the most enthusiastic followers of 
Saint - Simon. A special appeal was made to the intelligentsia by Saint -
Simon ' s disciples to bring in this new order . The leading Romantic news -
paper, Le Globe, fell under their influence and in 1831 wrote the fol-
lowing : "We understand by artist the man who unites, who orders , who 
brings together other men .... His mission is to link the scholar and the 
industrialist, the theoretician, and the practitioner, to combine intel-
lectual and material works; the needs of the mind and those of the body: 
it is he who makes everyone love family, city, state, humanity, world 
and God . ... 117 
Saint - Simonism spread rapidly throughout France and all of Europe 
with the publishing of its doctrines in journals like Le P~odu~euJl 
(1825- 26), l ' O~ga.YL{).)a;teuJl (1829- 31) and Le Globe (1831- 32). It exerted 
a tremendous influence upon French writers because it addressed itself 
to intellectuals and their function in society . 
The second movement which influenced the social thinking of the time 
was the utopian socialism of Fourier . He based his theories on the 
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cooperative principle rather than on that of the state. He proposed the 
establishment of profit-sharing groups called phalan/.)~Vce/.i , each com-
plete with a library, recreation rooms, community kitchen , and compris -
ing not less than 1,620 members since , according to Fourier, humani t y 
offers 810 species of temperament, male and female . Within each phalan-
~~Vte, smaller groups called ~Vule/.J devoted themselves to a specific 
task; every member of the phalan/.)~Vte could also be involved in twenty 
or thirty ~Vule/.J and during the day devote himself to as many as eight 
or ten different types of work, thus being spared the problem of bore-
dom. 
Technology and work were considered to be good if they were not im-
posed by unnatural forces . "What are the means to put man to work?" 
asked Laverdant, a leading journalist of the Fourier Movement . "The 
methods employed by developing societies , by evil, anti-Christian soci -
et i es are slavery , serfdom, and harsh reality which submit, und er the 
threat of death, the proletarian to the capi t alist . Under these condi-
tions, luxury is the privilege of few men, and the pleasure of a few is 
the result of harsh labor and enslavement of the masses."8 Laverdant 
also stressed the role of the artis t and the writer in bringing about 
the new social order -- they were to be the prophetic and critical voice 
of society. It was a call for social realism: " ... two scopes in ar t: 
nex t t o the hymn of happiness, the sad and desperate song . Artists in-
spire in us disgust for our wasted countrysides, for filthy housing, 
narrow a nd smoky, where the family of the poor wastes away and becomes 
brutish. Spread with a strong brush all the ugliness, all the infami es 
hidden in our society. Protest against all miseries, all violen ce , a ll 
enslavements . Stand always with the good ones against the selfish ones, 
the weak against the oppressor, with the v i c tims against the torturers " 
(p. 151) . 
This exhortation was faithful ly heard by the novelists of th e day, 
and was put into practice in social novels like those of Sand, Sue , a nd 
Hugo, who directed the ir wrath against society rather than against ma-
chines . In his drama, Ch~e.JL;ton , de Vigny did not directly c riticize 
technology , but rather the proprietor of the machines, John Bull , who 
appeared as one of the many evils of English society . He was portrayed 
as a heartless man, insensitive to his own family, and concerned only 
with production and money . On the other hand, Hugo, in Lv.i M,{AeJ!..abfv.i, 
transformed the redeemed c riminal, Jean Valjean, into M. Madeleine, the 
industrialist who, in his factory, provided just and decent work for the 
poor of the city . Clearly, it is not the machines and technology which 
are responsible for human sufferings , but those who own them . 
Perhaps one of the most crucial reasons for exonerat ing technology 
was the underlying assumption which supported the Romant i c con cept of 
the world , an assumption which had its roots in the eighteenth-century 
Enlightenment concept of the perfectibility of man and society : "the 
world was af t er all neither a completed drama nor a perfec t machine, but 
r ather something as yet unfini shed, something still in the making~" 9 For 
all its r eactions against the eighteenth century, the Romantic Movement 
carried in its bosom the cherished idea of progress and the possibility 
of atta ining a Utopia . Technology had a role to play in the progression 
of mankind toward Liberty , Equality and Fraternity . Thus Hu go exclaimed: 
Tout travaille, l'aimant, le bitume, le fer , 
Le charbon; pour change r en eden notre enfer , 
Les forces a ta voix sortent du fond des gouf fres 
La science, pareille a ux antiqu es pontifes, 
Attelle aux chars t onnant s d ' effrayants hippogriffes; 
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Le feu soufle aux naseasux de la bete d ' airain . 
Le globe esclave cede a l'esprit souverain ... 
Par degres, lentement, on voit sous ton haleine 
La Liberte sortir de l'herbe de la plaine 
Le bien ge rme a toute heure et la joie en tout lieu. 
"La Force des c hoses," ChCi;ti.men;U 
pp . 208- 209 
Everything is working , loadstone, bitum, iron, coal ; to 
change our hell into an Eden . Forces are called forth 
f r om the depths of the abyss . Science, like the ponti ffs 
of old, yokes frightful hippogryphs; fire pours from the 
nostrils of the brazen beasts . The whole world, enslaved , 
yields to the sovereign spirit .... By degrees, slowly, one 
perceives under y oor inspiration Liberty springing up in 
the plain .... Goodness is always in bloom and joy is every-
where. 
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Even a writer and poet like de Vigny, who had a rather ambivalent 
attitude toward technology and who disliked the steam engine , had a 
premoniticm th at science and technology would usher in a new era . In his 
poem "Paris " (1831), contemplating the city and all its industries blow-
ing f ir e and smoke, he was impressed by th e spectacle and concluded : 
Je ne sais si c ' est mal, tout ce la : mais c ' est beau! 
Mais c'est grand ! mais on sent jusqu ' au fond de son ame 
Qu ' un monde tout nouveau se forge a cette flarnme. 10 
I do not know if it is evil; but it is beautiful! It is 
wonderful! One feels deeply in his soul that a canpletely 
new world is being forged in this flame . 
Thus technology was not viewed as an alien force, but rather as a 
key for unlocking the universe and opening up a new world. The vision 
of a new age for mankind, heralded by the eighteenth-century philoso-
phers , was shared by a majority of the Romantic writers. The Romantic 
vision of the future was t o achieve revolutionary ends through the use 
of technology. Thus Hugo, the most representative writer of the new 
spirit, could write : 
Ce siecle est grand et fort . Un noble ins tinct le mene 
0 poetes! le fer et la vapeur ardente 
Effacent de la t erre, a l 'heure OU vous revez, 
L'antique pesanteur, a tout objet pendante , 
Qui sous les lourds essieux broyait les dur s paves. 
L ' homme se fai t servir par l ' aveugle mati~re. 
Il pense, il cherche , il cree l 11 
This century is great and forceful . A noble ins tinct 
guides it . 0 poets ! Iron and fiery steam efface from the 
earth at this hoor of your dreaming, the ancient weight 
attached to every object, which under the heavy axles was 
crushing the cobblestones. Man makes for himself a ser -
vant of blind matter. He thinks, seeks , creates! ... 
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Blinded by their enthusiasm for a new era, the Romantics were obliv-
ious to the ultimate consequences of the Machine Age. Criticism, not 
only of society but also of machines, came from a conservative voice --
that of Chateaubriand. Unwilling to accept the prevailing utopian con-
cepts, he indi cted the new age with prophetic force. In 1834, he pre-
sented, in the Revue dv.i Veux Mondeo , an excerpt from his masterpiece, 
Me.mo!Uv.i 6~om Beyond the G~ave . In it he foresaw many problems subse-
quently attributed to te chnology and its industrial use: the inequality 
of wealth, and the leisure socie t y, class conflicts, and conflict be-
tween material and intellectual development . 
In Chateaubriand's view the unequal distribution of wealth, a pro-
cess accelerat ed by the Industrial Revolution, would bring class warfare 
or oppression : " The too-great disproportion of condi tions and fortunes 
was endurable as long as it remained con cealed; but, as soon as this 
disproportion was generally perceived, it r eceived its death- blow .... Try 
to persuade the poor man, when he shall be as well-informed as yourself ; 
try to persuade him that he must submit to every sort of privation while 
his neighbor possesses superfluity a thousand times told : as a last 
resource, you will have to kill him. 11 12 
Concerned with the intrinsic value of man, Chateaubriand v iewed with 
great skepticism the progress of technology without a corresponding 
moral progress: "If the moral sense were devel oped in propor tion to the 
development of t he intellect, there would be a counterpoise and humanity 
would grow up without danger; but the exact opposite is happening : our 
perception of good and evil becomes dimmer as our intellect becomes more 
enlightened; our conscience shrinks as our ideas expand " (p . 208) . The 
result is a dehumanization of man : " ... observe a phenomenal contradic -
tion: material conditions are improving, int ellectual progress inc r eases 
and nations, inst ead of profiting , are diminishing . Whence comes the 
contradiction? It is because we have lost in the moral order of t hings . 
There have been crimes at all periods; but they were never committed in 
co ld blood , as they are nowadays .... They no longer revolt us, they seem 
the consequence of the march of time ; if formerly we judged them in a 
different manner, it was because we were not ye t ... sufficiently advanced 
in the knowledge of men; we analyze them ... we test them in the crucible 
in order t o see what useful thing we can obtain from them ... " (p. 208) . 
Chat eaubr i and feared that man would be reduced to a mere object for 
science , a t t he same time losing his moral value : " .. . it is to be fear-
ed that the individual man may decline, certain eminent faculties of 
genius b e los t, and imag ination, poetry and the a rt s perish in the cells 
of a hive- society in which each individual will be nothing more than a 
bee, a cog in a machine, an atom in organized ma t ter ... " (p . 211). 
As for the theories of Saint - Simonism, Fourierism and other social 
movements, Chateaubriand dismissed them , for he perceived under their 
rhetoric of progress the inherent danger of a controlled socie t y -- the 
t yranny over man's mind. The ultimate threat to man by technology and 
material progress was his reduction to the least common denominator . 
Chateaubriand was not t he only voice crying in the Romantic wilder-
ness . Michelet, the great French historian, also perceived the inherent 
threat posed by technology -- the dehumani zing effects of machines . In 
his book, Le Peupfe, he expressed his anguish in seeing man reduced to a 
slave of the machine: "Havin g in machines created c r eators , powerful 
workers which pursue their tas k imp osed once and for always, truly it is 
a great temptation of pride . But next to it, what humiliation to see in 
front of the machine, man fallen so low! . .. The head spins and the heart 
is lightened, when for the first time, one enters these wonder houses 
where dazzling steel and copper, so shiny, seem to have their own life, 
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to think, to want, while man, pale and weak, is the humble servant of 
these steel giants ... . It is impossible not to see at the same time these 
lamentable faces of men, withered young girls, twisted and bloated chil-
dren . "13 
For Michelet, machines bring only spiritual and moral loss: "Ma-
chines have given to man among many advantages, one unhappy faculty, 
that of uniting strength without uniting hearts, of cooperating without 
love, of acting and living together without knowing each other" (p.172). 
Nevertheless, Michelet, unlike Chateaubriand, believed in the strength 
of humanity and expressed confidence in man's ability to bring about a 
new society. 
In an age of dramatic change, the Romantics took their differing 
stands glorifying or tolerating technology, condemning it or trying 
to pretend that it did not exist. The issues persist today. 
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MAGIC AND TECHNOLOGY AS OPPOSING 
VALUES IN SCIENCE FICTION 
James K. Folsom* 
ABSTRACT. This paper presents an assessment of the metaphorical rela-
tionship between technology and magic in science fiction. It argues that 
while.magic and science are conventionally assumed to be opposed whereas 
science and technology are thought to be related, the reverse is common-
ly true in science fiction. Magic, as a metaphor for control of the un-
known, is then presented as a type of scientific endeavor; technology, 
contrariwise, often becomes a metaphor for the denial of scientific val-
ues, for the refusal to look beyond what is known to what is unknown. 
The scene is in the best tradition of melodramatic witchcraft. The 
hero, gazing into a pool of water, is taken by surprise when it suddenly 
darkens and then clears, revealing a scene from his past life faithfully 
recreated complete to the smallest detail. Astounded, the hero, Holly, 
cries out, "Magic," to which the enchantress Ayesah, who has cast this 
miraculous spell upon the waters and whose name "She-Who-Must-Be-Obeyed" 
gives the title to Haggard's 1887 thriller, She, somewhat petulantly re-
plies: "Nay, nay ... it is no magic -- that is a dream of ignorance. 
There is no such thing as magic, though there is such a thing as knowl-
edge of the hidden ways of nature." Later, when Ayesha brews a potion 
(again the scene has overtones of the occult) which will restore her 
lover's health, she reassures Holly that she "shall use no magic." "Have 
I not told thee," she continues in t h e tone one uses when lecturing a 
recalcitrant child, "that there is no such thing as magic, though there 
is such a thing as mastering and commanding the forces which are in 
Nature?" , Evidently Holly is a slow learner, and Ayesha a pedant, for she 
makes the point yet again when she strikes her rival Ustane, and her 
finaermarks inexplicably turn the unfortunate girl's hair white. Holly, 
naturally enough, is a bit uneasy, but Ayesha reassures him. "Look not 
so frightened," she say s, "I tell t hee I deal not in maaic -- there is 
no magi c . 'Tis only a force that t hou does not ~nderstand. nl 
A decade later the learned Dutch physician, Dr. Abraham Van Helsing, 
gave a remarkably similar lecture to an equally imperceptive pupil, Dr. 
John Seward. "Do you not think," Dr. Van Helsing asks, "that there are 
things whi ch y ou cannot un derstand, an d y et which are?" He answers his 
own rhetorical question in a manner reminiscent of Ayesha: "Ah, it is 
the fault of our science t h at it wants to explain all; and if it explain 
not, then it say s there is nothing to explain. 11 2 The things which Dr. 
Seward cannot understand, an d yet which are, include v ampi res, notably 
the infamous Count Dracula, whose dread p resence in England Van Helsing 
is about to reveal. 
The substance of these quotations is not in accord with conven tional 
interp retations of science fiction. But b oth novels, though apparently 
totally unscientifi c "supernatural" stories, plead as their intellectual 
justification the v alues of science. Whatever t h e reader may think, both 
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Haggard and Stoker (the authors)_ state in nearly so many words that 
these two occult novels are really types of scientific fiction . 
The idea that the values of these occult novels are overtly scien-
tific gives us pause, it may be suggested, primarily because we conven-
tionally assume that science and magic are essentially different, and 
that the values of science have relatively little in common with the 
values of magic. Science is instead related to technology, which is 
applied science and must, therefore, depend upon scientific values. In 
the following discussion it will be argued instead that in much science 
fiction, technology is presented as essentially opposed to scientific 
values, which are themselves often interpreted as closely allied to mag-
ical ones. Further, in these cases, technology is often presented as a 
denial of the scientific values which inform the story and many times, 
by extension, as emblematic of the denial of all values beyond itself . 
The technologist, then, is presented not like the scientist and the ma-
gician as a searcher after ~cien;t,{_a (knowledge) but as a slave to tech-
ne, to "art" in the negative sense of "artificial," that is, untrue. He 
is, as the Greek teflt.on reminds us, a carpenter rather than an archi-
tect, a worker in techf'UC6, a master of technique. 
The distinction is presented in another m~gical novel, Beagle's The 
L~t Unlcohn. There the magician Schmendrick, whose developing control 
of his art is one central preoccupation of the story , answers a skeptic 
who doubts that there are spells which can make a skull speak. "There 
are spells to make everything speak," Schmendrick says. "The mas t er wiz-
ards were great listeners, and they devised ways to charm all things of 
the world, living and dead, into talking to them. That is most of it, 
being a wizard -- seeing and listening .... The rest is technique." 3 Like 
the magician, the scientist in much. science fiction is constantly seeing 
and listening, forcing the world to speak not of things he understands 
but of the unknown. Like the magician as well, he hopes by listening to 
extend his control over what he does not know through discovery of the 
principles upon which it depends. Consequently, both scientist and ma-
gician must constantly work with logical concepts which, however strange 
they may seem to a superficial view, will explain data that to ordinary 
apprehension are inexplicable. 
From this perspective, magic, as Ayesha pointed out to Holly, is 
representative · primarily of science which we do not understand. The 
point becomes obvious when we consi§er examples of how much parapherna-
lia of modern life -- cameras, automob iles, and the like -- appear magi -
cal to cultures without the scientific tradition to explain them. Even 
to our own Western European culture, the science of today would have ap-
peared magical when Haggard and Stoker were writing. Would Holly's re-
action have been siqnificantly different if Ayesha had snapped his por-
trait with one of the new Polaroid or Kodak cameras and then allowed him 
to watch. the blank film develop in full color under his eyes? 
Magic differs from science, Sir James Frazer p oints out in The Gold-
en Bough, 4 not because it is irrational or illogical but because it as-
sumes certain notions of cause and effect which conventional science 
denies. According to Frazer, magic ultimately depends upon the doctrine 
of sympathies, and expresses itself in two not totally distinguishable 
ways. The first is the "doctrine of affinities" -- the idea, roughly, 
that things which look alike are alike. The once widely dreaded man-
drake, a poisonous relative of the deadly nightshade, possessed a root 
which, to the horror of the beholder, not only looked like a human being 
but was wont to shriek if handled roughly. In this case the mandrake's 
malign nature is stressed by the plant's ominous appearance; for is it 
not, as its name suggests, an , unholy hybrid of man and c/Jtagon? The 
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second is the "law of contact" -- the notion that things which were once 
in physical contact are still in spiritual contact. Hence, a disappoint-
ed Bushman, whose wounced enemy has qotten away before he was able to 
apply the coup de g.tta.ce, can console himself by pluckinq from time to 
time on his bowstring, which will cause the arrow wound given his adver-
sary to ache unbearably. The two notions are combined in the familiar 
voodoo doll, which is at once a conventionalized model of the victim of 
the sorcery and a container for bits of his hair or fingernails. 
However bizarre and laughable these examples may seem, they are not, 
it must be emphasized, illogical, criven different ideas of cause and ef-
fect from our own. Indeed, our own ideas of cause and effect are no 
longer so tenaciously opposed to these magical beliefs as was once the 
case. Jung's notion of the collective unconscious, for instance, pro-
vides a supposedly scientific rationale for something very like the mag-
ical idea of sympathy. 
* * * * 
V~acula, to return to an earlier example, may be interpreted satis-
factorily from one perspective as a scientific text. If we look beyond 
the bizarre metaphor of vampirism, and if we also ignore the exploration 
of human sexuality which clearly gives the story most of its interest 
(and which is probably the most blatant example of Dr. Van Helsing' s 
"things ... which are" that contemporary scientific thought was both un-
able and unwilling to explain) , we can read V.ttacula as an eccentric 
study in epidemiology: for Dracula himself is the personification of a 
virulent disease which must be controlled lest it totally destro"y man-
kind. 5 
The scientific trackers of Dracula have only the possession of cer-
tain facts to guide them, facts which, to put as favorable an interpre-
tation upon them as possible, seem to have little to be said for them. 
That the Count has an aversion to garlic seems reasonable enough, per-
haps. But that he may not cross running water except at ebb or flood 
tide; that he may not enter a house unbidden but, being asked, may come 
or go as he wishes; that he has an affinity for wolves; that he can con-
trol the weather; that he cannot be seen in a mirror; and the like, 
seems only poppycock. What reasonable man would assume that one tracks 
down a vampire by smearing garlic around the window frames? Dracula is 
finally eliminated in an almost classic statement of the scientific 
method. His adversaries assume only one premise: that Dracula, as all 
life, must obey some law. His behavior must be logical, even though we 
do not understand the nature of the logic. 
Some 70 years later a group of scientists grapples in an underground 
laboratory with an equally baffling problem. Something mysteriously re-
turned to earth by an orbiting space capsule has killed all the inhabi-
tants of a small Arizona town -- all, that is, save an old derelict and 
an infant. What this mysterious killer is, and how two such unlikely 
potential victims have been spared, is the two-fold problem which faces 
the scientific investigators of Michael Crichton's The An~omeda S.tJr.a)_n. 
Though superficially unlike Dr. Van Helsing's doughty band of Victorian 
adventurers and Crichton's searchers for the mysterious organism from 
outer space are in fact far more similar than they seem at first. Both 
Count Dracula and the mysterious Andromeda Strain represent something 
previously unknown, and the oroblem facinq both groups of humans is ul-
timately the same: how to understand and control something which is by 
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definition incomprehensible. The scientists investigating the Andromeda 
Strain, like Dr. Van Helsing, have only one assumption to go on: the 
basic act of faith of the scientific metho d , that everything obeys some 
law; that there is "seeing and listenincr" and the rest is only "tech-
nique." The pursuit of the Andromeda Strain nearly ends disastrously on 
the few occasions when the scientists fail in their logic, when they as-
sume that the unknown entity must conform not to the inexorable laws of 
its own being but to common sense. In the same way, Dr. Van Helsing's 
carefully laid plans to save a v ampire's victim are t hwarted through the 
stupidity of a well-meaning relative who p lay s into Count Dracula's 
hands by removing the magical garlic and opening the sickroom window be-
cause the air within had become stuffy . Keeping garlic in a sickroom 
simply makes no sense unless one is aware that the plant possesses prop-
erties beyond the ken of common sense criteria. 
* * * * 
Antarctica has never been noted for its balmy climate, and the mem-
bers of the 1938 expedition to the South Pole have resigned themselves 
to a life spent mostly indoors. Their problems are complicated, however, 
because they must share their cramped quarters with an accidentally dis-
covered deep-frozen visitor from outer space. Unprepossessing in appear-
ance, at least by earthly standards, it has three red eyes, crawling 
blue hair, and an unpleasant odor, and, worse, seems potentially malevo-
lent. One of the expedition members perceptively notes that "it was an-
noyed when it froze,"6 and the inference that it may still remember its 
pique if it is ever removed from cold storage proves justified when the 
alien escapes. Able to counterfeit the appearance of earthly life ex-
actly, it takes over the dogs belonc:ring to the expedition. The earthmen 
thwart it by killing all their dogs, since they are unable to tell which 
ones have or have not been overcome by the "monster," as they unequi vo-
cally name the alien.7 
Things grow more serious still when the expedition members discover 
that the monster has infiltrated at least one of their number, and that 
it is thus impossible to tell the aliens from the humans. To discover a 
foolproof method for distinguishing between the t wo becomes the central 
concern of "Who Goes There?" and it is not a matter of only academic in-
terest for the aliens, if uncheck e d , will continue to spread among the 
human population at large, finally taking over t he earth in precisely 
the same fashion that Dr. Van Helsing had gloomily prophesied Count Dra-
cula's "undead" would use if they remained unch ecked . 
"Who Goes The re?" like the later The AncfJwmeda SbtcUn is at its best 
when it details the failure of one method after another for identifying 
the alien. Finally, one expedition member comes up with the hypothesis 
that since the monster can divide itself and so invade the bodies of 
other life forms, that the basic unit of life for the monster, rather 
than a complete being, is a cell. If this is so, since the expedition 
members have already discovered that the monsters may be killed by elec-
tricity, will not monster blood recoil from the threat of electrocution 
while human blood remains inert? And indeed, when this test is applied 
it proves infallible, and the humans are thus enabled to eliminate the 
monsters among the·m. 
* * * * 
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All the works discussed so far hold several assumptions in common. 
First, central to every one is the idea that, however it is defined, 
~cJ.e.n.t,,[a (knowledge) bestows the power of control. Each story is really 
the metaphorical statement of a scientific problem which, when correctly 
solved, will enable the successful interpreter to bring some kind of 
benefit to the world at large. Second, the solution to each problem in 
all these very different stories depends upon the ability to think be-
yond known categories of knowledge in order to develop hypotheses, which 
from a conventional perspective seem inappropriate, if not downright 
ridiculous. 
* * * * 
Nothing in these stories is necessarily anti-technological and, in 
fact, there is little technology in any of them with the exception of 
The Anc/Jr..omeda S:tJta.i..n in which technology functions precisely as our con-
ventional definition -- "applied science" -- would have it. Where Van 
Helsing uses the library, the scientists in Crichton's novel plug into 
the computer. Expert diagnosticians all, they differ primarily in their 
tools. Just as, to an earlier age, science was the handmaid of theology, 
so in The Anc/Jr..omeda S:Uta.i..n technology becomes the handmaid of science. 
Yet, as science proved a restive servant to a former time, so has tech-
nology to a later; it appears to many science fiction writers not total-
ly trustworthy when the master is away from home. Such science fiction 
often records the failure of technology in a world ungoverned by scien-
tific values. 
* * * * 
At about the time Ayesha was lecturing Holly on the limitations of 
his scientific education another embattled earthling calmly awaited the 
onslaught of 30,000 armor-clad strangers. Though his own band contains 
but 53 untried warriors beside himself, he was not dismayed. Why should 
he be? Is he not, as he tells us, "a Yankee of the Yankees -- and prac-
tical; yes, and nearly barren of sentiment"? "Moreover," he continued, 
"I could make anything a body wanted -- anything in the world, it didn't 
make any difference what; and if there wasn't any quick new-fangled way 
to make a thing I could invent one -- and do it as easy as rolling off a 
log. " 8 
This is not idle boasting. Our Yankee has already bestowed upon his 
armor-clad adversaries all the benefits of 19th century civilized tech-
nology. He has presented them with the telegraph, telephone, phonograph, 
typewriter, sewing machine, and other amenities of life. He has estab-
lished a newspaper and a patent office, both of which are, he feels, in-
dispensable to civilization; and to those who do not agree he is about 
to offer the final technological blessinqs of his own society -- the 
Gatling gun and the electrified wire fence. 
To the prospective illustrator of A Connect<.~uX. Yankee in King A~­
-thu.Jt '~ Cowit, Twain once remarked: "You know, this Yankee of mine ... is 
a perfect ignoramus; he is boss of a machine shop; he can build a loco-
motive or a Colt's revolver, he can put up and run a telegraph line, but 
he's an ignoramus, nevertheless." 9 He is a "perfect ignoramus," I sub-
mit, because he cannot see beyond the technological appurtenances of his 
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world to the scientific values upon which they deoend. His ideals are 
not of knowledge, but efficiency. While awaiting the onslaught of the 
30,000 knights who have unaccountably turned their backs upon his tech-
nological utopia he does not once consider that he is about to send a 
multitude of "children," as he contemptuously calls them, to certain 
death. Instead, he improves the day by lecturing his assistant, Clar-
ence, on the proper way to install an electrified fence. This grisly 
exchange, with all its black humor, is quoted following: 
The wires have no ground connection outside of the cave. They 
go out from the positive brush of the dynamo; there is a ground 
connection through the negative brush; the other ends of the 
wire return to the cave, and each is grounded independently. 
No-no, that won't do! 
Why? 
It'~ too expen6ive uses up force for nothing. You don't want 
any ground connection except the one through the negative brush . 
... Now, then, observe the economy of it. A cavalry charge hurls 
itself against the fence; you are using no power, you CULe ~pend­
ing no money, for there is only one ground connection till those 
horses come against the wire; the moment they touch it they form 
a connection with the negative brush tM.ough the g!Lound, and 
drop dead. Don't you see -- you are using no energy until it is 
needed; your lightning is there, and ready , like the load in a 
gun; but it ~n't co~ting you a cent till you touch it off. 1 0 
This is the morality of megadeaths, the mathematics of body counts. 
The Yankee's technological expertise is successful. His opponents are 
slaughtered to a man. Yet this last apocalyptic battle does not totally 
go his own way. For his technology is defeated by the scientific values 
of an unlikely opponent -- Merlin, the wizard for whose magic the Yankee 
throughout the novel expresses nothing but contempt. Yet it is Merlin's 
magic that is real, while the Yankee's is but parlor tricks, for Merlin 
controls a dimension of reality the Yankee does not comprehend. The 
Yankee can send current through an electric wire; Merlin sends the Yank-
ee 13 centuries through time, back to the age from whence he came, where 
his gifts are more highly prized. 
* * * * 
Like ·Twain's Yankee, Captain Davidson, engineer in charge of civil-
izing the colony of New Tahiti, some 27 light years from earth, also has 
a vision of civilization. For New Tahiti is "literally made for man." 
Once it is "cleaned up and cleaned out, the dark forests cut down for 
open fields of grain, the primeval murk and savagery and ignorance wiped 
out," it will be "a paradise, a real Eden." As Davidson has no do ubt of 
the Divine plan, neither is he troubled with suspicions of his own wor-
thiness as a Providential agent. "He wasn't a boastful man, but he knew 
his own size. II He is a "world-tamer. rrl l 
The major obstacle to civilization on New Tahiti is the native popu-
l a ce, whom the Earthmen contemptuously call "creechies" (creatures), and 
whose humanity they deny even while sleeping with their women. The 
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creechies would prefer New Tahiti as it is, with its rain forests and 
abundant game, but their wishes can safely be d isregarded. Not only are 
they inferior beings, they have been certified as non-violent. 
As in Twain's earlier Conne.c;U_c.ut Yanf<.e.e. , LeGuin 's "The Word for 
World is Forest" chronicles the deterioration of Captain Davidson's er-
rand into the wilderness. Like the Yankee's Utopia, Davidson's civiliza-
tion does not work even in its own terms. Surrounded by crop failures 
caused by his own inability to understand the totally different nature 
of this alien planet, he can only reflect that "it wasn't like that in 
Ohio" (p. 36}. Indeed it wasn't, and it never will be, but Davidson 
makes the essential mistake of attempting to tame this world into the 
ima~e of Ohio rather than understanding it in the light of its own 
unique character. "I like to see things in perspective," he expands to 
a subordinate in a moment of rare philosophical insight, "from the top 
down .... We ' re happy now; and so this world's going to go our way. Like 
it or not, it's a fact you have to face; it h appens to be the way thin?S 
are" (p. 38). Once more he is mistaken . This is not at all the way 
things are. The creechies, whose non-violence has been greatly exagger-
ated, revolt, forcing the humans to leave the planet alone. Captain 
Davidson is killed in the uprising, a fitting exemplification of the 
fact that what one does not know w<11. hurt him. 
Clearly the basic thrust of LeGuin's story is a plea for ecological 
awareness, as she herself states in the "Afterword." Yet, it is not be-
side the point to note that the convention within which she works is 
precisely the one we have been discussing. Captain Davidson is not an 
evil man in any positive sense of that term. He is, contrariwise, dedi-
cated to the improvement of the world about him . But like Twain's 
Yankee he is a technologist, an "ignoramus," incapable of insight beyond 
the world he knows. He does not understand that New Tahiti can never be 
turned into Ohio, and that attempts to do so will inevitably lead only 
to failure. His techniques are failures because they are divorced from 
knowledge. 
* * * * 
Let one final example, Kate Wilhelm 's The. Ki.ltlng Thing, stand for 
all. This remarkable story tells of a duel to the death between man and 
robot on a nameless planet. The robot , presumably the killing thing of 
the novel's title, has been programmed in a manner reminiscent of Cap-
tain Davidson. It, too, sees things "from the top down," although the 
top for it, un derstandably enough, is robot, not man. Its inventor pom-
pously tells us that "its primary, over-riding concern is self-preserva-
tion in order to function and achieve goal satisfaction, 111 2 in other 
words, surv i val at all costs. The robot's human opponent, one Captain 
Tracy , h as been sent by his superiors, the World Group, to track down 
and destroy the renegade robot which has escaped from its masters and 
poses a threat to the order which the World Group wishes to impose upon 
everyone. 
The ironic dimension to the story lies in the fact that Tracy him-
self, like the robot, is a "killing thing." One of the World Group's 
storm troopers, he prides himself on obeying orders and on his unques-
tioning role in extending the hegemony of his superiors over various 
lesser breeds without the law. He faces no moral crisis in his present 
mission, for his robot opponent is not even human . 
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Nevertheless, the robot has an advantage Tracy does not. To aid in 
achieving its first-order purpose of self-preservation, it has been pro-
grammed to learn from experience, while Tracy is limited in his weapons 
to those he has been able to bring with him on his space ship. Thus the 
robot's technological expertise is potentially superior to his own, and 
Tracy's only hope of winning the duel is through the use of some "human" 
quality which the robot, as a machine, does not possess. 
In fact the battle is a stand-off, and the robot, although crippled, 
is still a formidable adversary when reinforcements from the World Group 
arrive to aid Tracy . Rather than joining with Tracy , however, the rein-
forcements, acting on orders from home, make a treaty with the robot by 
which, in exchange for self-preservation, it will work for them. The 
World Group has now attained possession of the ultimate weapon, against 
which any resistance will be futile. But by this time Tracy has realized 
that there is little d ifference between him and the robot other than 
that the robot is a more powerful weapon. Both, though originally adver-
saries, are now allies obeying the same masters. Unde rstanding finally 
that the orders of the World Group are themselves immoral Tracy proves 
his humanity by transcending the values of se lf-preservation he and the 
robot share. In a suicide attack he destroys both it and himself. 
The melodramatic quality of Wilhelm's plot, unfortunately emphasiz-
ed in summary, disguises the fact that her concerns are very similar to 
those we have been noting. The final identification of the robot with 
Tracy, its apparent adversary, emphasizes the technological similarities 
between them. Each applies the laws of its masters, neither seeing that 
these laws do not provide an adequate e:xplanation of the world in which 
they both live. Though Tracy 's final selfless action may be interpreted 
in a religious as well as a scientific context, its significance in 
terms of value is the same in both . Tracy has discovered a new set of 
values, superior to those of the robot and the World Group, offering a 
wiser explanation of life than mere self-preservation. 
* * * * 
The distinction between magic and technology which has been empha-
sized here is at the heart of debate about the proper direction for sci-
ence fiction. The traditional view has largely been t hat science fiction 
ought to deal in technological prophesy . Did not Jules Verne anticipate 
the submarine and space travel, and should not science fiction follow 
his lead? That this view is reasonable, however, should not cause us to 
overlook the fact that science fiction may deal in other kinds of 
p rophecy as well: social prophecy, for instance , or p r ophecy relating to 
values. 
In terms of value , technology is often seen as an opponent to sci-
ence rather than as an expression of it. From this perspective science 
is interpreted generally as an attempt to extend man's knowledge over 
the unknown while technology, in contrast, is concerned with the appli-
cation of known p rinciples. It deals in technique, while science con-
cerns itself with knowledge and interpretation of those aspects of re-
ality which are not understood. Magic, then, often appears as corollary 
to science, rather than an opponent; for does not the magician, like the 
scientist, attemp t to extend the dominion of man's understanding over 
unknown dimensions of reality? 
The danger in a technological approach to life, much science fiction 
reminds us, lies in its assumption that everything is known and that all 
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problems can be solved through the application of techniques which are 
already understood. The magician, like the scientist, is not completely 
happy with this explanation . From the point of view of the technologist, 
the magician is not a realist: that is to say, he does not believe en-
tirely in the application of those tried and true courses which have 
always failed. Rather he reminds us, with Hamlet, that there are more 
things in heaven and earth than our philosophy dreams of. 
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ZEN ANV THE ART OF MOTORCYCLE MAINTENANCE: 
TEC HN OLOGY RE-VALUED 
Dona l d Ben son* 
ABSTRACT. Pirsig rejects the dualism of the Scientific Revolution in all 
its aspects, inc l uding the split between mind and its objects and the 
corresponding split between values and techno l ogy , the result of which 
has been the pervasive alienation of modern life . In its place he offers 
a " right technology" which recognizes mind and nature as expressions of 
a single prior reality . Thus man and nature are essentially re l ated , 
and technology -- the interaction of man and nature - - becomes a realm 
in which values are inevitably expressed , and discovered. 
That the state of knowledge is not prosperous or greatly advanc -
ing, and that a way must be opened for the human understanding 
entirely different from any hitherto known, and other he l ps pro-
vided, in order that the mind may exercise over the nature of 
things the authority which properly belongs to it. 
Francis Bacon, The G~ea.t InJ.itau.~a,t-{_on, 1620 
In this paper I want to discuss what I take to be a radical alterna-
tive to the conception of technology p roposed for our symposium. Robert 
M. Pirsig outlines this alternative in Zen and the A~ 06 Moto~QyQfe 
Ma,{,ntenanQe: An InquVr.y ,Lnto Vafue.,o . 
The symposium announcement suggests this conception of our subject : 
Human values and technology are separate , perhaps alien entit i es , values 
being precedent to technology . Technology comes into "tension" with 
these values and the two may undergo a "dialectical" change, possibly 
towards an accommodation . This is a characteristically modern view , with 
its roots in the Scientific Revolution itself and it is the point of de -
parture for Pirsig ' s book. The far reach of that departure is marked 
when the hero realizes that by developing an alternative holistic view 
of technology and val ues he has strayed outside the accepted "mythos " 
into that t~a ,LnQogn,Lta called "insanity. " 1 The inhabitants of the 
mythos quickly confirm this "in a technologically faultless act " of 
electrotherapy which neatly separates the hero from his former self (p . 
84) . Thus what is radically at issue in the book is the validity of the 
mythos itself , i.e. , the modern conception and practice of technology. 
Pirsig is "modern " too , in the sense that he speaks to a wide con-
temporary audience, and this in itself reflects an uneasiness within the 
mythos. But what I want to emphasize here are some ways in which Pirsig 
is "ancient," directing us back towards a mode of understanding that 
pre - dates the Scientific Revolution . He traces our disjunctive notion 
of technology and values to Plato's option for the true over the good , 
for d i alecti c over rhetoric , and declares himself for the good and for 
rhetoric. I would like to put the issue in sharper focus by locating the 
*Department of English, Iowa State University , Ames, Iowa. 
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disjunction later, in Francis Bacon ' s option for the useful over both 
the true and the good , and for experiment over both rhetoric and dia l ec-
tic. Pirsig is still found on the side of the ancients , declaring for 
the Renaissance notion of right reason which Bacon was rejecting. Cer-
tainly Bacon has a nearer claim than Plato to be father of the modern 
technological mythos. And Bacon ' s bold declaration of the new mythos is 
marked by enough uneasiness about what he is leaving behind that we --
with perfect hindsight -- may see in it wholly unintended hints of a 
Pirsig one day to come . 
The vision expressed in Bacon ' s "Great Instauration, " his "great 
renewal" of the human enterprise, is of nature potent with 6oJtc.e!.> for 
man's use and felicity . But he slips into the language of the o ld mythos 
of his age when he says his method will constitute "a true and lawful 
marriage between the empirical and rational faculty ," and " the strewing 
and decoration of the bridal chamber of the mind and the universe .. . out 
of which marriage let us hope ... there may spring helps to man and· a line 
and race of inventions that may in some degree subdue and overcome the 
necessities and miseries of humanity. 11 2 The reality for Bacon is never-
theless separation, not marriage . To the unaided "eye of the human un -
derstanding" the uni verse is like a " labyrinth" (p . 12) ; the t e_sti mony 
of the senses has reference to man, not to the universe (p . 21); the 
mind- is "strangely possessed and beset" (p. 22); man can gain power over 
nature only by b_ecoming its "servant and interpreter . .. for the chain of 
causes cannot by any force be loosed or broken , nor can nature be com -
manded except by being obeyed " (p . 29) . Bacon justifies his renewal of 
natural knowledge by divorcing it from moral knowledge : It was not "that 
pure and uncorrupted natural knowledge" by which Adam named the crea-
tures that caused the fall; "it was the ambitious and proud desire of 
moral knowledge to judge of good and evil. .. " (p. 15) . Nevertheless 
Bacon attempts to frame all this within the divine authority of the o l d 
mythos in his benediction to Th e. GJte.a;t IVI/.i:tauJLa;ti,on.. At the creation God 
looked upon the works of his hands and saw that they were good . Fallen 
man looks upon the works of his own hands and sees only "vanity and vex -
ation of spirit ." "Wherefore," Bacon prays , "i f we labor in thy works 
with the sweat of our brows, thou wilt make us partakers of thy vision 
and thy sabbath. Humbly we pray ... that through these our hands ... thou 
wilt vouchsafe to endow the human family with new mercies " (p . 29) . 
There is profound irony in Robert Pirsig ' s turning much the same 
vision · of things agcUVI/.i:t Bacon ' s new mythos three centuri es later: "The 
Godhead ... resides quite as comfortably in the circuits of a digital com-
puter or the gears of a cycle - transmission as he does at the top of a 
mountain or in the petals of a flower " (p . 18) . He also resides in the 
"hands" of those who maintain these machines , since maintenance for Pir -
sig is among other things hand- work , as its etymology indicates. 
Bacon's ambivalent attempts to frame his powerful value-free t ech-
nology with divine sanction did not succeed . As Pirsig shows, an inevi -
table consequence of such a technology has been alienati on , sometimes 
trivial, sometimes profound . His unnamed hero ' s friend Sylvia , too "rea-
sonable" to vent her anger directly at a constantly dripping faucet that 
upsets her, takes it out on her children instead; she can "re late " to 
them, after all. Her husband John stubbornly refuses to l earn e l ementary 
maintenance techniques for his expensive motorcycle because that would 
be " technology ." For both , technology is a primary expression of "it," 
" the system ," "the whole organized bit." For them "the 'it' is a kind of 
force that gives rise to technology, something undefined , but inhuman, 
mechanical, lifeless , a blind monster, a death force" (p. 16) . The 
hero's case is worse : he i s literally alienated from himself, and 
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consequently from his son, by the ultimate dispass i onate t echnology , 
electrotherapy . Pirsig obs erves that "our current mode of rationality ," 
which underli es modern technology , i s "emotionally hollow , es theti cally 
meaningless and spiritually e mpty " (p . 110) , "a ghost which calls itself 
rationality but whose appearance i s that of incoherence and meaning l ess -
ness, which causes the most normal of everyday acts to seem s light l y mad 
because of their irrelevance to anything else " (p. 78 ) . 
But Pirsig is not therefor e a reactionary anti - t echnolog i st . His 
hero- narrator castigat es the sloppy mechanics who nearly ruin his cyc l e 
not as representatives of technology but p recisely because they do not 
care about the ir technology . Like John and Sylvia they are " living with 
technology without r e ally having anything to do with it ... detached , re-
moved " (p . 26) . Nor i s he sympat hetic wi t h John and Sy l via ' s hostility 
to techno l ogy : "If they can ' t s t and physical discomfort and they can ' t 
s tand t echno l ogy , they ' ve got a little compromising to do " (p . 44). The 
hero himself is a technical writer and exemp lary motorcycle maintainer: 
he cares. 
The t rouble as Pirsig sees it with mode rn t echnology is we ll summa-
rized in an apparently trivial party conversation ab out the d iff i culties 
of assembling a backyard rotisserie according to manufacturer 's instruc-
tions . The narrator recalls a se t of assembly instruction s which b egin , 
"Assembly of Japanese bicycle require great peace of mind. " When the 
laughter subsides he insi s t s t hat peace of mind here is not superfic ial. 
" It ' s the whole thing. That which produces it is good maintenance; that 
whi ch dis turbs it is poor maintenance. What we call workability of the 
machine i s just an objectification of this peace of mind. The ultimate 
test's a lways your own serenity . I f you don ' t have t his when you s tart 
and maintain it while you ' re working you ' re likely t o build your person -
al problems right into the machine itself." He notes that the r oti sserie 
instruc tions concentrate exclusively on the machine and ignore t he as -
sembler . 
Techno l ogy presume s there 's just one right way to do things and 
there never i s . And when you p r es ume there ' s just one right way 
to do things, of course the instructions begin and e nd exclu-
sively with the rotisserie . But if you have to choose among an 
infini te numbe r of ways to put it t ogether then the relation of 
the machine to you , and . . . t o the rest of t h e world, has t o be 
cons i dered , be cause the se l ecti on from among many choices , the 
aJLt, of the work is just as dependent upon your own mind and 
spirit as it is upon the material of the machine . That ' s why you 
need the peace of mind (pp . 158- 160) . 
To refer again t o my epigraph : For Pirsig the Baconian mythos rep-
resents the lo~~ of the mind ' s authority over certain vital things that 
properly belong t o it . But he seems quite prepar ed to open a n ew way for 
the human understanding by wh i ch it may regain tha t authority without 
wholly g iving over the achievement s of p resent t echnology. 
The al t ernative Pi rs i g o ffers is what I will cal l " r i ght technol -
ogy , " based on a "new spiritual rationality " (p. 352) , in many ways akin 
t o the Renaissance notion of right reason which Bacon found so unproduc-
tive - - despite t he p lace given Zen Buddhi sm in the book ' s title . In 
Pirsig's interpretation , current t echnology i s marked by two contro lling 
features , both contributing to the human alienation I've just described . 
These are its rigid separat i on of mind and the physical universe -- di -
vorced as we know in Bacon ' s bridal chambe r -- and an exclusi ve and 
exhaustive rationali s m, u ltimate l y derived from Plato's ove rweening 
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commitment to the true. The first stage along Pirsig's way to new ra-
tionality is a reconsideration of t he claim for the exclus i ve authority 
of rationalism in any human endeavor , science and technology inc luded. 
He then argues the va lidi t y of two comp l ementary modes of understanding 
in all human endeavor , the class i cal -- objective, rational, formal, 
" square " -- and the romantic -- subjective , immediate, emot i ona l, "h i p ." 
Finally he establishes the authority of both modes as comp l ementary ex-
pressions of a single pervasive reality which he terms "Quality ." In the 
process he manages t o restore rhetori c , degraded by Plato in his attacks 
on the Sophists and again by Bacon in h i s on the Schools , to a role of 
supreme usefulness in human enterprise -- intellectual, moral, and te ch-
nolog i cal. 
The comp lementarity of these two modes is expressed in a brief alle -
gory to which Pirsig refers throughout the book . It begins with a dis-
tinction between our awareness of the totality of immediate experience 
and our limited consciousness of a few parts of it: "From all this 
awareness we must select , and what we se l ect and call consciousness is 
never the same as the awareness because t he process of selection mutates 
it. We take a handful of sand from the endless landscape of awareness 
around us and call that handful of sand the world " (p . 74 ). Then follows 
the discrimination process , wherein we divide , c lassify , arrange , and 
rearrange the san d into pile after p ile. "Classical understanding is 
concerned with the pi l es and t he basis for sorting and inte rre lating 
them. Romantic understanding is directed toward the handful of sand be -
fore the sorting begins. Both are valid ways of looking at the world 
although irreconcilable with each other " (p . 76) . What Pirsig ' s hero 
seeks i s a mode of understanding which accommodates both sand- sorting 
and contemplati on of unsorted sand , and which recognizes that " paJt;(: of 
the landscape , iiuepa.Jtable from it, which mLMt be understood, is a fig -
ure in the middle of it, sorting sand into piles . To see the landscape 
without seeing this figure is not to see the landscape a t a ll" (p . 76) . 
Motorcycle maintenance itself provides what Pirsig calls "a minia-
ture study of the art of r ationality" (p . 90) . On the classical side , 
the machine ' s structure a nd functions are laid out under a kind of ideal 
rationality . Pirsig insi s ts, "Precision instruments are des i gned to 
achieve an idea , d imensional precision, whose perfection is impossible. 
There is no perfect l y shaped part of a motorcyc le and never will be . . . " 
(p . 92) . There is also the l ogical element in maintenance procedure --
formal scientific method -- which is irresistible as far as it goes. 
Carefully applied it can assure you that "Nature hasn't misled you into 
thinking you know something you don ' t actually know" (pp . 100-101) . 
Where it does not go is into the complementary realm of imagination and 
"caring ." Wit h actual maintenance problems , these and not objecti ve 
manual - procedures are our only resources for coping with what Pi rsig 
calls " s tuckness ," "boredom ," and "gumption traps ." In gene ralizing 
from motorcycle maintenance to scientific understanding in general, Pir-
sig quotes Einstein on the vital contribution of this imaginative 
mode: "The supreme task ... is to arrive at those universal e l ementary 
laws from which t he cosmos can be built up by pure deduct i on . There i s 
no logical path to these laws; only intuition , resting on sympath e ti c 
understanding of experience , can reach them ... " (pp . 106- 107) . Here Pir-
sig also f inds a suggestion of complementarity between mind and nature . 
According to Einstein neither mind nor nature by itse l f p rovides the 
hypothesi s : "Nobody who has real l y gone into the matter will deny that 
in practi ce the world of phenomena unique l y determines the theoretical 
system , in spite of the fact that t here i s no theore tical bridge between 
phenomena and their theroetical princip les" (p . 107) . 
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Such thinking in modern science is important to Pirsig's argument, 
and perhaps comforting as against the rigid dualism of the Baconian 
mythos (he spends a whole chapter on Poincare), but in the end it does 
no more than face up t o the dilemma the followers of Plato and Bacon 
have avoided by their commitment to demonstration above all. It is just 
at this point that Pirsig takes his radical departure. Having estab-
l i shed the complementary classical and romantic modes of understanding, 
he provides them with a new basis and object: not truth but "Quality ," 
a term nearly untranslatable outside the context of the book. The nar-
rator derives it from the heroic Greek a.tLeXe, excellence. It certainly 
comprehends moral virtue, wholeness, the peace of mind necessary to as-
semble Japanese bicycles, workability -- and as a consequence of these , 
no doubt truth. Quality is not to be isolated in either subject or ob -
ject. Rather it is "the point at which subject and object meet. ... Be-
cause without objects there can be no subject - - because the objects 
create the subject's awareness of himself -- Quality is the event at 
which awareness of both subjects and objects is made possible." Thus 
"Quality is not just the JLUuJ;t of a collision between subject and ob-
ject . ... The Quality event is the Qau.J.ie of the subjects and objects, 
which are then mistakenly presumed to be the cause of the Quality" (pp. 
233-234). Recurring again to the distinction between awareness and con-
sciousness, Pirsig focuses on that instant "at the cutting edge of time, 
before an object can be distinguished," when "there must be a kind of 
nonintellectual awareness . .. . Any intellectually conceived object is 
al.way~ in the past and therefore unJLea.£. Reality is always the moment of 
vision beno!Le the intellectualization takes place. TheJLe J.-6 no otheJL 
JLeaLL:ty. This preintellectual "reality" he identifies as Quality (p. 
241) . "Quality is the continuing stimulus which our environment puts 
upon us to create the world in which we live. All of it. Every last bit 
of it" (p. 245). The hero realizes that he has moved from a duality to 
a trinity (a world composed of mind, matter, and Quality) to "an abso-
lute monism. Quality was the source and substance of everything (p. 
245). Thus understanding becomes active not passive, and necessarily 
involves both classical and romantic modes. Rea l ity becomes a matter of 
focus - - in immediate awareness - - rather than locus here or there . 
And indifference, what Pirsig calls lack of "care, " becomes a rejection 
of reality itself, a failure to respond to Quality. 
In fact, "care and Quality are internal and external aspects of the 
same thing" (p. 269), and care is the basis of Pirsig's right technol -
ogy. Care implies no contempt of scientific method; it does imply a 
recognition of the limits of that method and a way of transcending them. 
To care is to be engaged, responsive to the Quality event, therefore 
innovative. Pirsig illustrates this with a basic maintenance problem not 
covered by the manuals, by scientific method, by classical understand-
ing. You have just sheared away the slot of a screw holding down a cover 
plate, it won't give, and you are "stuck . " What you need is an hypothe -
sis, and Bacon's method is notoriously silent about the formation of 
hypotheses. It would prescribe disinterested observation of the objec-
tive facts, and reasoning from them . But, as "Poincare would have said , 
there are an infinite number of facts about the motorcycle," and the 
right ones, "the ones we really need , are not only passive, they are 
damned Uu.6,i,ve." There will have to be what Poincare construed as a 
"subliminal choice of what facts we observe." "The difference between a 
good mechanic and a bad one ... is precisely this ability to ~eleQt the 
good facts from the bad ones on the basis of quality. He has to Qafle!" 
(p. 275). 
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Pirsig generalizes this situation by another analogy, in the process 
integrating classical and romantic modes . Knowledge is like a freight 
train, neatly divided into engine and boxcars in good classical fashion; 
there is no evidence of romantic knowledge anywhere so long as the 
train remains "static and purposeless." "In the process of examining the 
train and subdividing it into parts we've inadvertently stopped it, so 
that it really isn't a train we are examining. That's why we get stuck" 
(p. 276). The real train of knowledge can't be stopped; and its leading 
edge is romantic reality, "the cutting edge of experience ." This it is 
that " contains all the infinite possibilities of the future" (p. 277). 
Once you jam the screw, the c lassical question of what it is ceases to 
be "a category of thought" and bec omes "a continuing direct experience." 
It's now out of the boxcars and "out in front and capable of change." 
You begin to ask "functional questions ," based on "a subliminal Quality 
discrimination" (p. 280). In short, right technology demands not only 
"dualistic subject-object knowledge" but something else too: 
You have to have some feeling for the quality of the work ... a 
sense of what's good. That is what carries you forward. This 
sense isn't just something you're born with, although you aJte 
born with it .... It's not just "intuition," not just unexplain-
able "skill" or "talent." It's the dire c t result of contact 
with basic ~ea.LLty, Quality, which dualistic reason has in the 
past tended to conceal (p. 278). 
Pirsig's right technology is a technology reintegrated and, as my 
title argues, re-valued. Pirsig sp~aks directly to the issue of val-
ues and technology and to the Baconian mythos. He says: "The way to 
solve the conflict between human values and technological needs is not 
to run away from technology, but to break down the barriers of dualistic 
thought that prevent a real understanding of what technology is -- not 
an exploitation of nature, but a fusion of nature and the human spirit 
into a new kind of creation that transcends both" (p . 284). This indeed 
opens a different way from Bacon's for the human understanding, and for 
human practice, for both aJte once again fully human and value-centered. 
Technology has become an a~ena -- and if construed in its broadest sense 
of human practice, ~he arena -- for expressing, a nd for discovering val-
ues. Pirsig's narrator imagines his listener asking if some scheme, some 
f?rmula for getting around the gumption traps is not really all we need. 
No, thinks the narrator: 
You've got to live right too. It's the way you live that pre-
disposes you to avoid the traps and see the right facts. You 
want to know how to paint a perfect painting? It's easy. Make 
yourself perfect and then just paint naturally .... The making of 
a painting or the fixing of a motorcycle isn't separate from 
the rest of your existence .... The real cycle you're working on 
is a cycle called yourself. The machine that appears to be "out 
there" and the person that appears to be "in here" are not two 
separate things. They grow toward Quality or fall away from 
Quality together (pp. 318-319). 
Bacon would not have found these notions strange, just unprofitable. His 
contemporary, John Milton, often considered the last great exponent of 
Renaissance right reason, believed that a right poet first "ought him-
self to be a true poem, that is, a composition and pattern of the best 
and honorablest things. 11 3 
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I conclude with a brief explanation of my statement that Pirsig has 
claimed for rhetoric a role of supreme human usefulness. According to 
the version of intellectual history laid out by Pirsig's narrator, the 
scientific subject-object mythos has grown out of Plato's dete:nnination 
to objectify reality as truth . To accomplish this he had to dis credit 
the Sophists , who were rhetoricians, and champions of the good. Before 
what Pirsig calls the fictions of "mind and matter, subject and object, 
fo:nn and substance" (p. 367) had been invented, the Sophists were teach-
ing aJte;t~, excellence, virtue (identical with Vhcuuna, with Quality , he 
thinks). Before Plato "encapsulated" Me;t~ into an Idea -- the good --
the Sophists had conceived it not as " a 60'1.m of reality" but as "reality 
itself, ever changing, ultimately unknowable in any kind of fixed , rigid 
way" (p. 373). "Their object was not any single absolute truth, but the 
improvement of men," who are after all the measure of all things (p. 
367). Man is neither the source of all things as the subjective ideal-
ists would have it, nor the mere passive observer of all things as the 
materialists would say. "He is a pcuitiupant in the creation of all 
things" (p. 368). When dialectic gave man power over the physical em-
pire, it took from him an equal empire of understanding, "an understand-
ing of what it is to be a part of the world, and not an enemy of it" (p. 
372). This, for Pirsig, is the empire of rhetoric -- an CU!..t, not simply 
of expression but of understanding, open, flexible, and above all trust-
ing of analogy. The narrator explains how we conceive and act on the 
experience of Quality, which is in itself "shapeless, formless, indes-
cribable": "The names, the shapes, and forms we give Quality depend only 
partly on the Quality . They also depend partly on the a ptU.otU. images 
we have accumulated in our memory. We constantly seek to find, in the 
Quality event, analogues to our previous experiences. If we didn't we'd 
be unable to act. We build up our language in te:nns of these analogues. 
We build up our whole culture in te:nns of these analogues" (p. 243) . 
Later he realizes, "everything is an analogy" (p. 383). Dialectic is 
necessary for analyzing experience after the fact, but only rhetoric 
enables us truly to cope with experience itself. Thus it is vital to 
right technology, as to all right human practice . 
NOTES 
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TECHNOLOGY AND ITS VALUES 
Richard Schlegel* 
A_BSTRACT. The influence of technoloqy on values may be seen as a trans-
fer of values toward the products of technolo<zy, with resultinq changes 
in ways of life and social, aesthetic and reliqious standards. Technol-
ogy thus provides new possibilities for values. Material abundance sup-
ports a widespread movement from aristocracy to eqalitarianism. A relat-
ed shift from a cosmic/supernatural to a human-centered religion is also 
evident. These developments, however, are potentially dangerous, since 
technology encourages values that often center on products and activi-
ties which are out of harmony with persons and the environment, as prob-
lems concerning pollution and nuclear armament show. Such values must 
be discredited if we are to survive. 
From the times of the earliest known human cultures man has been 
using technology to support his way of life. The methods employed for 
fashioning and firina pottery, or for making the weapons used in hunt-
ing, were applications of technoloqy. Any utilitarian construction of 
material devices constitutes a result of technology. It is evident, 
then, that man has virtually always placed a value on technology. And, 
since it has long been essential to him, there can be no question about 
the deep-rooted propriety of our giving value to technology. But tech-
nology now has the capacity for impoverishing life -- even, in fact, for 
totally destroyinq it. How are we to understand and respond to this po-
tential for both good and evil inherent in technology? 
* * * * 
I begin with a specific example of contemporary technological 
achievement: the automobile. In the early decades of this century, there 
was little reason to doubt its value. In much of the world, and notably 
in the United States, the automobile is probably the most highly valued 
p~oduct of 20th century technology. And yet, consider the disvalues that 
have come with the automobile. As far as health is concerned, the easy 
substitution of wheels for feet may well be a contributing factor to the 
heart and c irculatory illnesses from which we suffer. The decline of our 
central cities probably results chiefly from the translation of resi-
dence to suburb and country that is made possible by the automobile. The 
extravagant use of the Earth ' s precious petroleum resources for conver-
sion to motor fuel, by just a few Generations of mankind, is hardly jus-
tifiable. And, finally, the atmosphere of the Earth itself is being pol-
luted by automobile exhaust, to a deqree in some cities that not only 
leads to discomfort but is apparently a factor in the incidence of can-
cer. We have learned that the automobile, so innocently prized at first, 
*Department of Physics, Michigan State Univ ersit y, East Lansing, Michi-
qan . 
276 SCHLEGEL: TECHNOLOGY AND VALUES 
carries hazards for man, for his society, and for his natural environ-
ment. It now seems apparent that the goal, already achieved in the 
United States, of an automobile for every two or three people, is not 
one that can be feasibly maintained. 
Judaing by the particular instance of the automobile, it can be ar-
gued that the correct response to questions of technology and values is 
to treat them in an empirical manner. If technology gives us an object 
that has value for us, we produce and distribute it. When difficulties 
appear that negate the original value, we modify our program; in effect, 
we reduce or pe rhaps altogether remove the value originally assigned to 
the object. Thus now we should be retrenchinq with respect to the auto-
mobile. There should be new emphasis on public transportation, on 
healthful walking, and on the potential values of traditional urban liv-
ing. 
* * * * 
To a considerable degree we probably will always have to use in-
practice results to guide our actions with respect to technology. There 
is, it would appear, an irremovable element of trial and error in the 
determination of technological change; we move in one way , responding to 
a new discovery or invention, and then, learning that it has demerits as 
well as merits, we shift our course in another direction. But we are do-
ing less than we can if we rely only on what arises in the circumstances 
of each new development. There are principles that we should be able to 
discern and which can guard us against some false steps. Today we seem 
to be entering a period in which a new point of view has emerged with 
respect to technology and the relation of man to his natural world. Per-
haps we can find in this new outlook a rule for qeneral guidance in the 
assignment of v alue to a technology. 
* * * * 
Scientists usually achieve their successes by methods that involve 
abstracting a part from the whole . Typically, some one aspect or prop-
erty of the natural world is studied. Then, because a simple, manage-
able domain is considered apart from the whole , the exactness and power 
of science can be achieved -- but only for that domain. In consequence, 
and in view of the fact that nature does not necessarily respect the 
simplification made by the scientist, an application may turn out to be 
malevolent in ways not at all intended.1 Hence, the giving of high val-
ue to a technology must then be judged to be in part an error. 
Examples abound in physics. Electrical and magnetic phenomena are 
universal properties of nature, since all atoms are made up of positive-
l y charged nuclei and negatively charged electrons. By concentrating on 
this aspect of matter, physicists have been able to formulate a wonder-
fully accurate and predictive set of equations: these tell us how elec-
tricity can be generated, how it will flow, be made to do work, and give 
rise to electromagnetic waves that will travel in space. The enormous 
technology of electrical power and communications is now supported by 
this theoreti cal base; and, generally, this technology is regarded as a 
notably benign application of science. 
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Still, to take one example, the qrids of high voltage current flow 
that have come to be part of our world have no parallel in a nature un-
disturbed by man; and, we have recently begun to have evidence that bio-
logical harm may come from the electromagnetic fields associated with 
those currents. 2 This kind of specific danger may be found to be sub-
stantial; and, clearly, it is one that lies altogether outside the pur-
view of e.lectromagnetic theory and technolocry. 
In their development of nuclear energy and nuclear bombs, physicists 
concentrated attention on one component of nature, the atomic nucleus. 
At the present time the condi tions of temperature and matter-distribu-
tion on the surf ace of the Earth are such that the nuclear reactions 
which release energy would not occur spontaneously. Hence, life has 
evolved without intrinsic experience of nuclear reactions and the asso-
ciated radiations and radioactive residues. The abstracting by physical 
scientists of nuclear reactions, out of the total context of terrestrial 
matter, thereby gives us a host of hazards that come with nuclear energy 
production and, of course, gives us also the inhuman destructiveness of 
nuclear warfare. There is a kind of stable fitting-togetherness in na-
ture. Man has learned to intensify and isolate some natural entities f or 
his own purposes; but nature is indivisible, not a collection of inde-
pendent parts, and the intended effect also sets up a wide circle of 
other consequences. 
The chemist often works on 
on a particular process or organ 
specialization. The consequent 
medicine are manifold but , alas, 
a specific molecule , and the biologist 
in a manner similar to the physicist's 
benefits of application in industry and 
so also are the evils. Potent chemical 
substances, synthesized or extracted from natural materials, do facili-
tate the manufacture of fabrics, metals, paper , plastics, and medicines; 
but also they involve production of wastes that create the pollution of 
water and air that now plagues us. 
The use of specific chemical therapies in medicine has been replete 
wit h side effects. Blindness induced by oxygen administered to premature 
babies at birth, thalidomide and skeletal defects, and stilbesterol and 
vaginal cancer are well - known examples. Even the useful pain - kil ling 
aspirin may i nduce stomach bleeding . The isolation and explication of 
inheritance-controlling DNA possibly brings us to the verge of an un-
precedented new power in biological science. 
* * * * 
The values assigned to technology have frequently been based on an 
inadequate, simplistic concept of nature and man's relationship to it. 
Both the 19th and much of the present century have been dominated by the 
Newtonian world view in which man stands apart from the natural wor l d 
which he scientifically describes. The scientist is assumed ~o be in-
trinsically apart from the nature which he strives to understand, and 
when his efforts are successful he presumably finds aspects of a rigor-
ous machine-like entity . Man differs because he has consciousness; 
and, even though parts of his being are obviously of the natural world, 
it is assumed that there is an essential human component, often assigned 
a religious significance, which lies beyond the reach of science . 3 A 
concomitant of this anthropocentric view is that man should regard the 
natura~ world as something to be used for his benefit and enjoyment, 
with no realization that there may be a price to pay . If man regards 
himself as separate from nature he tends to think that what he does with 
nature will not have any ultimate effects upon himself. 
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In practice, for the most part, the technology of the 19th century 
seemed not to contradict the independence of man from nature. The fell-
ing of the forests and the building uf cities did obviously change the 
natural environment, but that alteration was generally seen as being for 
soverei<m man's own good. ~ ' For the :most part, technological advances in 
manufacturing, in agriculture, in transportation, and in communication 
were regarded as steps toward greater happiness and achievement for man-
kind. And, indeed, to a considerable extent they were. But with further 
development and proliferation of technology we have seen, as in the case 
of the automobile 1 " that the terrestrial environment is not an infinite 
plenum, able to repair itself and return to an earlier state no matter 
how man may have disturbed it. It is not necessary to go into detail. 
We have already indicated the problems entailed by a worldwide technolo-
gy: pollution of air, earth, and water; overpopulation consequent upon 
an effective medical science; and, most threatening of all, the catas-
trophic nuclear-energy warfare that can now be waged, with possibilities 
for destruction of all civilization and perhaps even of the human spe-
cies. 
We have learned that there is no division of realm between man and 
nature. When we use technology for realization of such values as greater 
comfort, better health, or a more attractive quality of life, we cannot 
think only of the immediate technological object or process. We are part 
of a balance which has permitted the wondrous development of the Earth 
and its creatures. The fact that fluorocarbons in spray paint cans, 
seemingly so harmless, can perhaps destroy the ozone layer which pro-
tects us and other living things from ultra-violet rays in sunlight is 
an especially telling illustration of how an immediate boon from tech-
nology may have damaging effects of the gravest import. 
* * * * 
The increased awareness in the past decade or two of the hazards of 
technology was preceded, in the 20's and 30's of this century, by the 
attainment of a more adequate understanding of the relationship between 
science and the natural world. This development occurred on the most 
basic scientific level: specifically, in physics, in the study of the 
elementary micro-processes at the level of the molecule, atom, and even 
smaller natural particles. The new physical philosophy was established 
by what is known as the quantum theory, which showed that the assumption 
of a clear separation between the describing scientist and described 
nature is not tenable. Rather, to a degree which clearly becomes sig-
nificant on the level of the very small, the nature which man describes 
is in part the result of an interaction between the scientist arrd the 
natural domain which. he is observing! the act of observation is a factor 
in determining the inherent magnitudes of the physical properties of the 
observed system. One manifestation of this observer-dependence is ex-
pressed in the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle. The principle tells us, 
for example, that the determination of the position or the velocity of 
an electron depends on the kind of measurement we choose to make, and 
that there is ~n.VU:.VL.6~~ uncertainty, in the electron itself, for the 
non-measured property : with respect to position if we measure velocity, 
or, conversely, with respect to velocity if we measure position. 
With the acceptance of the quantum theory, scientists had to give 
up such pillars of the older mechanical world- view as complete determin-
ism of natural events, unlimited accuracy of description, and a role for 
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the scientist as purely a spectator of the processes of nature. Thus 
even on the fundamental, inanimate level, man and nature are closely in-
terdependent, and the concept of a natural world which man controls or 
uses, while remaining in essence apart from it, is discredited. What we 
have been learning in a practical way, on the ordinary large-scale level 
of experience, is that the extensive manipulations which are made pos-
sible by technology can in fact destroy the qualities of nature that 
make life possible for man. We did not need to know what quantum theory 
tells us in order to learn the lesson of the inexorable unity between 
man and nature. But the similar message coming from fundamental pure 
science reinforces the principle. 
An inexorable conclusion drawn then, both from science and from 
practice, is that the values of technology are in no sense absolute. 
Their realization always involves some change of a natural product, or a 
disturbance and innovation in natural processes, and these may be life 
destructive, either for man directly or for properties of the natural 
world on which his life depends. Generally, as science provides greater 
knowledge of some aspect of nature, the technology based on that science 
becomes more powerful; we can expect the consequent hazards to be all 
the greater because larger deviations from the natural order then tend 
to be introduced. Man, along with other living things, has in his de-
velopment maintained traits that are in harmony with the natural world . 
When he changes that world, he is obviously disturbing the harmony not 
only between himself and the rest of nature but also for other forms of 
life. 
* * * * 
It hardly seems possible to provide specific rules which should 
regulate the degree to which we use technology in reshaping our world. 
Experience from the past and judgment based on estimates of future ef-
fects must be used in making decisions in any specific situation. How 
difficult the making of such judgments can be is illustrated in the cur-
rent discussions about the construction of nuclear-energy power plants. 
Though it is not easy to determine the proper course of action, thought-
ful consideration will certainly, for the most part, lead to wiser 
choices than a simple response to short-run advantage. 
The experience of the past few decades suggests some general prin-
ciples about our use of technology. Obviously , the value which some one 
group puts on a technological innovation is not sufficient justification 
for permitting its introduction. This means that military advantage, or 
commercial profit, or even increased human comfort cannot alone be a 
ground for developing a new technolo~. We should adopt, rather, an at-
titude of extreme caution, both with respect to existing technology and 
to new possibilities. Man's policy in the past seems generally to have 
been to rush ahead with technological developments for the sake of their 
positive values, even in the face of concomitant demerits. Hence, we 
have had such consequences as the "black cities" of the 19th century in-
dustrial expansion, notably in Europe. In our own day, the development 
of the nuclear fission bomb in the 1940's and, much less justifiably, of 
the fusion bomb in the SO's gives evidence of an attitude in technologi-
cally advanced societies that seems to be neglectful of life -- although 
life is what our human activity is all about. Already, harmful radio-
active contamination has spread over all the Earth, and we now live with 
the possibility of cat astrophically increased dissemination. 
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We must come to the view that we will not proceed with a technolog-
ical development unless clearly it will, ave.A.ill and in .the. long Jtwt, 
improve man's quality of life. In a broader sense, one should specify 
"improvement of the natural order," for man does not live alone on the 
Earth, and he must think of his ecological relation to the whole biolog-
ical world. Kis destiny -- and in a sense this is the central point --
is part of the destiny of life. 
The reassuring aspect of our technological values is that we prob-
ably can in large part maintain and realize them, while at the same time 
avoiding negating destructive consequences. We can both have our cake 
and eat it, if we are sufficiently careful in monitoring the uses of 
technology and in restraining developments that are of questionable val-
ue. The need of a farmer or a rancher for an automobile should not mean 
that every city commuter must drive his own car. And the supersonic 
passenger plane should be discouraged as it was by Congress, when it is 
of no clear benefit and constitutes a possible hazard. Precisely how we 
are to control technology so as to realize only its positive values is 
not easy to say. We should not rely for the most part on governmental 
agencies although indeed these ·must have a role, as in the case of the 
Food and Drug Administration or the legislation which sets standards for 
control of automobile emissions. Basically, however, we must work for a 
suffusion of a new attitude throughout our society so that consumer, 
manufacturer, and lawmaker all come to think in a double linkage for 
each artifact of technology, not only what will it do for me but also 
what will it do to the larger natural world. Only those productions 
should be acceptable which could become a harmonious and integral part 
of that world. We want a "naturalistic trend in technology," to use a 
phrase of KOestler: 4 a revision such that technology moves toward the 
goal of providing the same stability and life enrichment that we asso-
ciate with nature itself. 
* * * * 
To what extent do we . desire that our lives be reshaped by technol-
ogy? Consider just one current device, the tel~vision receiver. I am 
not considering its obvious possibllities for harm, as in the capture of 
a sizable fraction of children's time in physical inactivity, but in-
stead, questions as: Do we want the wide-ranging conununication, the 
stimulation of information from all over the world that it provides as a 
daily ingredient into our lives? · Do we want our nightly relaxation to 
be chiefly the entertainment that comes from sitting passively in front 
of the television screen? Clearly, many people have in effect answered 
these questions in the affirmative, and their choice is not necessarily 
wrong. But this exemplifies that technology is rapidly changing our 
lives and seems certain to continue to do so. 
During the mediaeval Christian era, many respected persons decided 
that the best way of life was one of renunciation of all but its most 
elemental physical aspects. Hence, for t hem rejection of much of the 
existing technology was essential. Today there are but few who follow 
such a course, yet thoughtful people cannot but ask the question: "Are 
we moving in the direction that we want to go?" The counter- culture 
movement which was evident on American campuses during the past decade 
was a movement among young people who answered the question negatively 
and asked for a de-emph.asis of material affluence. Assent to the conunon-
ly accepted positive values of technology is dependent on broader values 
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about life generally. People of different religious and cultural tradi-
tions put different values on technology, as is evident from the exist-
ence even today of religious groups in the United States who spurn much 
of t he 20th century technological advance in their way of life. And, of 
course, there are differences among individuals within a general cul-
tural group in terms of the degree to wliich they welcome the results of 
technology. 
Yet there continues to be a world trend toward expanding technology; 
witness the fact that the so-called underdeveloped countries seem every-
where eager for its achievements. The values of technology are such, it 
seems, that human beings wish to have it for what is believed to be a 
general betterment of life. But we now understand that technology can 
disrupt and destroy the harmony with the natural world on which our 
lives depend. Our continuing existence depends on sufficient control of 
technology so that we do not lose the natural grounds for life itself. 
And, secondly, we have to decide how far we want the values of technol-
ogy to be central in our lives. 
Consideration of the second problem soon leads into enormously com-
plex issues. Most of us would agree that the basic human values are 
those which are associated with human relationships and with activities 
in the arts and sciences (broadly taken). But one cannot, therefore, 
shan:ily exclude technology from these basic values. For we know, to give 
specific examples, that the telephone can add much to the communication 
between two people; or that gra.vth of scientific understanding is close-
ly intertwined with technological advance; or, finally, that electronic 
gadgetry has far extended the possibilities our enjoyment of music. Per-
haps what we can say, however, is that, when technology becomes too im-
portant in its own right, we are then losing our way for, to paraphrase 
the Christian injunction, we should not forget that man lives not by ma-
chines alone. 
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ON SOME MORAL OBJECTIONS TO TECHNOLOGY 
Pobert Hollinger* 
ABSTRACT. This paper considers three basic moral objections to technol-
ogy: technology dehumanizes people; technology alienates people from 
themselves and each other; technology manipulates. An attempt is made 
to uncover the assumptions and norms underlyinq these objections, in or-
der to evaluate their cogency. It is maintained that technology is not 
necessarily or intrinsically dehumanizing and alienating. Several of the 
key assumptions which have conspired to produce the present inadequacies 
of technology are discussed. Modification or elimination of these as-
sumptions can allow us to humanize technology, so long as we recognize 
that technology must ultimately be guided by moral and social ideals, 
rather than the values and goals intrinsic to technology itself. 
INTRODUCTION 
Among the current moral objections to technology, the following seem 
the most fundamental: 
1. Technology dehumanizes people. 
2. Technology alienates people from each other and 
themselves. 
3. Technology either produces or accompanies a ma-
nipulative ideology, which treats people as 
things, ob~ects and instruments. 
It is not clear whether these assertions are intended to be taken as 
basic moral objections to technology as such, i.e., as claims that tech-
nology is intrinsically alienating, dehumanizing and manipulative, or 
rather as claims that, as a matter of historical fact, technology has 
resulted in these states of affairs. Although I shall take account of 
both of these construals, I am concerned primarily with a related issue 
which may be summarized as follows: Each of th~ above claims, to the 
extent that it constitutes a moral objection to technology, rests upon 
certain normative standards and assumptions. The charges mentioned, 
therefore, presuppose at least two things: (al that the normative stand-
ards and assumptions underly ing each charge are defensible; and (b) that 
technology is guilty of these charges according to the relevant moral 
standards and assumptions. Following I shall analyze what I understand 
to be the moral positions underlying each of these objections, and eval-
uate their cogency. 
TECHNOLOGY DEHUMANIZES 
I beoin with a conversation between the Controller and the Savage in 
Huxley 's - Bn.av e.. Ne..w OJofll.d. 1 
*Department of Philosophy, Iowa State University, Ames, Iowa. 
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" ... I don't want comforts," said the Savage, "I want God. I 
want poetry, I want real danger, I want freedom, I want good-
ness, I want sin." 
"In fact," says the Controller, "you' re claiming the right to 
be unhappy. 11 
"All right, then, 11 said the Savage defiantly, 11 I 'm claiming the 
right to be unhappy." 
"Not to mention the right to grow old and ugly and impotent; 
the right to have syphillis and cancer; the right to have too 
little to eat; the right to be lousy; the right to live in con-
stant apprehension of what !nay happen tomorrow; the right to 
catch typhoid; the right to be tortured by unspeakable pains of 
every kind." There was a long silence. 
11 I claim all that, 11 said the Savage at last. 
The Controller shrugged his shoulders. 
said. 
"You're welcome," he 
This passage captures the issues concerning technology and dehuman-
ization. Kuxley's savage is unmistakably a surrogate for Rousseau's 
"noble savage," and thus embodies all the alleged virtues of that think-, . 
er's Romanticist ideals: he is close to nature; he has none of the hypo-
critical values and habits associated with modern civilization; he is 
almost child-like in his simplicity and innocence, etc. In short, he 
embodies what for Huxley and Rousseau are the virtues of "natural man." 
The controller, by contrast, personifies all that is allegedly corrupt-
ing in civilization. 
Rousseau, and evidently Huxley, believed that people are naturally 
good, but are corrupted by society. On this view, one who is closer to 
nature, i.e., whose true self shines forth amidst the immorality of so-
cial custom, is the noble savage. There can be little doubt that Hux-
ley's savage comes off as .the hero of BJtave_ New Wo!r.ld . 
It is clear enough that there are certain c9nceptions of human na-
ture at issue between the Controller and the Savage or, in the terminol-
ogy of Skinner's Be.yo~d, FJte.e.dom, ~a~d Vign,,{_;ty (1971), between scientific 
and autonomous man. According to the savage, human life is a mixture of 
pain and pleasure, good .and evil. In order to achieve happiness or moral 
virtue, one must experience and overcome life's miseries and one's own 
evil nature. A society which provides what Skinner calls "automatic 
c:roodness" would hardly be fit for human habitation, precisely because it 
eliminates the very factors -- misery and evil -- which make for human 
life. 
What this claim boils down to, I think, is the belief that free will 
is a necessary ingredient in human nature; so that a society which elim-
inated the need for people to choose good over evil, or pleasure over 
pain, would be a society in which human b eings as we know them would not 
exist. Such a society would not, in Leibniz' terminology, be the best 
of all possible worlds. 
The opposing view, defended by Skinner and the Controller, argues 
that this conception of people and the ideal society is based upon a 
prescientific conception of the world and human nature, which postulates 
free will in accordance with certain theological beliefs about persons, 
e.g., that we are created in God's image, that we are born with original 
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sin, and that human nature is fixed according to some divine plan. In-
deed, some attacks on technology, e.g., J. Ellul's The TeQhnolog~Qal. So-
~e;ty,2 are based upon the idea that technology is dehumanizing because 
it has made it possible for society to eliminate the miseries and evils 
which the Savage and the Controller are surveying. It is fair to say, 
therefore, that one justification for the claim that technology dehuman-
izes is based upon a cluster of theological doctrines about human na-
ture, values and society, which sees any basic changes in human life or 
human nature as almost sacrilegious. 
Of course, it is precisely at this point that the issues become 
joined. Why should one accept the belief in a divinely created, fixed 
human nature? Why should one see any attempt at changing human behavior 
as an attempt on the part of persons to play God? Why should what is 
"natural" -- if indeed certain facts about human beings are entirely 
"natural" -- be good? In short, why should we accept the primitivism 
that this line of reasoning embodies? After all, there may be some 
"natural" traits -- e.g. , aggression -- which ought to be eliminated or 
at least suppressed by society, on the grounds that they are not morally 
desirable. Perhaps man is born evil, and society makes him good! There 
is as little evidence for the one belief as for the other. 
One claim, often associated with these issues, is that human beings 
are infinitely plastic. Although this theme will be discussed later, a 
word is in order here. It certainly is true that our ability to shape 
human behavior, when coupled with the loss of faith in a fixed concep-
tion of human nature, has its dangers. At the same time, it holds out 
some hope that people can take control of their own destinies. As phi-
losophers such as Sartre and Heidegger emphasize, the realization that 
human nature is essentially historical means that we can become what we 
strive to become, since we are our possibilities. In short, recoqnizing 
that we are "plastic" allows us to continuously create ourselves anew, 
thus realizing more and more possibilities for human existence. If this 
is to play God, then so be it. 
However, while the primitivist's longing for some totally natural, 
simple ideal is at best an illusion, and while the belief that knowledge 
is intrinsically evil is insane, a word on behalf of the Savage is in 
order. Those who envision a world which is totally man-made, e.g., uto-
pians, are in a curious way just as much to blame for certain misguided 
views about technology as are the Romanticists,· for the utopian is just 
as unhappy with the present as the primitivist qnd just as blind to the 
interaction between nature and society. The desire for a totally man-
made world is merely the mirror image of the primitivist's ideal of a 
return to nature, and generates the same naive attitudes. In particular, 
it fails to distinguish, as the remarks of.the Controller and Skinner 
make clear, scientific and technological progress from moral progress. 
The key question that Huxley neglects is: Why can't we have a world gov-
erned by technology which is also morally good? Why not indeed! 
TECHNOLOGY ALIENATES 
One reason people feel technology alienates is that science and 
technology are not governed by moral considerations, but by values such 
as efficiency and expediency. Therefore, morality and technological 
progress vary inversely. This theme is aptly expressed by Frorran in his 
book The Revolc.Ltion 06 Hope (1968). In discussing the "guiding prin-
ciples" of technological society, Fromm says: 
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It is programmed by two princi ples that direct the efforts and 
thoughts of everyone working in it: The first principle is the 
maxim that something ought to be done because it is technically 
possible to do it. If it is possible to build nuclear weapons, 
they must be built even if they might destroy us all .... This 
principle means the negation of all values which the humanist 
tradition has developed. This tradition said that something 
should be done because it is needed for man, for his growth , 
joy, reason, because it is beautiful, good, true. Once the 
principle is accepted that something ought to be done because 
it is technically possible to do it, all other values are de-
throned, and technological development becomes the foundation 
of ethics. The second principle is that of maximal efficiency 
and output .... In order to reach this result, men must be de-
individualized and taught to find their identity in the corpor-
ation rather than in themselves.3 
Fromm divides the issues into positions which parallel those of 
Huxley: the advocates of these two "maxims" represent the sort of views 
defended by the Controller (and Skinner) ; and those who deride the max-
ims presumably are in favor of the assumptions and ideals of the noble 
savage -- Fromm's "humanist tradition." 
I do not understand how any sane person, let alone "everyone" in 
modern technological society, could accept these two maxims. Maxim one 
is clearly not true; the fact that we Qan produce a doomsday device pro-
vides absolutely no reason for building one. In general, the reversal 
of the philosophical maxim "'ought' implies 'can'" - appears p!Uma 6aue 
ridiculous. But we cannot dismiss Fromm's analysis, because it derives 
from certain historical factors, which I will try to clarify. I will 
concentrate on maxim one. since maxim :two ("the bigoer the better") is 
but corollary and stands or falls with it. 
According to this view, tracing to Heideoger, Husserl, and Marcuse, 
science was originally rooted in certain practical or moral situations 
(e.g., geometry was related to the need for precise measurements). Seen 
in its laroer cultural co~text, scientific knowledge was valued instru-
mentally, as a means for realizing the practical and moral ideals of 
civilization. Later in "modern" western history, science lost its roots 
in practical concerns and beoan to develon values and techniques which 
proceeded in a cultural vacuum. Once this was done, the progress of 
science came to be measured by standards that actually undermined the 
social utility of knowledge, because science and its values came to be 
seen as ends in themselves, rather than as means to human goals such as 
happiness and well-being. 
Two assumptions influenced this chancre: that knowledge is power 
(pragmatism), and that reality can be identified in terms of what can be 
measured and controlled by human beings (i.e., subjectivism). When sci-
ence was still a practical instrument for social and moral progress, 
these two assumptions could be used as standards for the use of knowl-
edge. The rrore we learned, the more power we had to bring about the ends 
which science was designed to fulfill. However, if science becomes iso-
lated from the social and moral concerns which were to guide its devel-
opments, these two assumptions are no longer merely instrumentally valu-
able as means to ends, but they become ends in themselves, i.e., as the 
knowledge, power and the ability to control nature. Once the social and 
policy sciences develop, the extension of these values equates with a 
thesis that it is intrinsically valuable to be able to control human be-
havior. Coupled.with the assumption that all there is to things is what 
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can be measured and controlled Cby behavior) , the uses of social sci-
ences and technology come to be guided by the maxims Fromm discusses. 
The result is that science and technology come to control our lives , in-
stead of funtioning as means to human ends. This is alienation in a 
nutshell. 
For instance, on the assumption that scientific knowledge should be 
seen in a laraer social framework, the ability to build more sophisti-
cated weapons would have to be justified in terms of whether such activ-
ities further what Fromm calls "humanistic values ." But on the assump-
tion that the ability to produce technological improvements is an end in 
itself , i.e., worthwhile for its own sake, the very ability to build 
such weapons becomes a justification for doing so. Taken together with 
certain other assumptions, e.g., that science and technology are either 
morally neutral or a substitute for morality, or that values and ends 
cannot be rationally evaluated, or t hat the expedient and the right are 
the same, we come full circle to Fromm's initial remarks. 
Although this analysis of western history can certainly be chal-
lenged, it provides some food for thought. One thing it suggests is that 
science, as a cultural institution, cannot be divorced from practical 
and moral ideals even for the sake of so-called "pure" knowledge. How-
ever, the view that science is purely practical , and thus to be judged 
only in terms of its utility, is equally objectionable, as it turns sci-
ence into a political ideology which perpetuates the status quo. (If 
science is merely a means to a given set of ends, those ends must be ac-
cepted as legitimate.1 Interestingly enough, Marcuse and others claim 
that modern science is a conservative ideology, on account of its uses 
in rrodern society, and on account of the attitude expressed in the idea 
that science is value neutral. 
The real problems, as I see them, are t hese. First, whose values 
is the scientist to follow? Those intrinsic to science itself, or those 
of the larger society? Surely the answer must be: it depends upon what 
the values are. If the values of Nazi Germany are at stake, we surely 
would not b lame the scientist for divorcing himself from the larger cul-
ture and following the values of science (which according to some writ-
ers are basically democratic). However, in some other society, ionoring 
the cultural values in search of scientific ideals may be unwarranted. 
Second, the relationship between knowledge and its uses needs to be dis-
cussed. The way knowledge is to be used is not itself a scientific ques-
tion, maxim one notwithstanding. Hence , the sorts of moral and social 
standards that are, strictly speakinq, extrinsic to science must have a 
certain primacy, even where laypersons do not have the expertise to make 
fully intelligent judgment about the scientific data. (Here is one so-
cial responsibility for the scientist: public education). Consequently, 
any attempt to reduce all values to scientific reports or claims is both 
wrona and pernicious. Claims that only the survival of a culture is an 
ultimate value, and that all other values, such as freedom, are to be 
allowed only to the extent that they promote survival of the culture --
which the utilitarian views of Skinner and social policymakers rest 
upon -- must be rejected. For if it is not, B~ave New Woflld and 1984 are 
closer than we care to think; if a person 's freedom or even his very 
existence is valuable only as a means for promoting the survival of the 
culture, and if this latter is the only thina intrinsically valuable, 
then there is no value to human life except as an object for some other 
end. In short, we must accept the Kanti a n principle that human life is 
inviolable, and that no amount of social utility can ever allow us to 
use people as objects. Contrary to maxim one , neither normality nor 
justice is a statistical or experimental concept. 
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While the line of reasoning I have adumbrated shows that, as a mat-
ter of fact, science and technology have become ideological instruments, 
and have produced a classic syndrome of alienation, it is not, I think, 
necessary that this be so. In particular, if we can put science back 
into the larger framework of practical and moral concerns -- which in-
cludes the task of bringing morality instead of expediency back into 
politics and technology -- then things might change for the better. To 
the extent that this goal amounts to the view that we should return to a 
more "natural" state of affairs, I am all for it. 
TECHNOLOGY MANIPULATES 
I have just assumed that technology is not intrinsically bad, but 
that historical developments have produced a state of affairs that has 
given rise to certain misuses of technology. There are many people who 
would disagree with this view and claim that technology, indeed knowl-
edge itself, is intrinsically evil. I do not think these views merit 
discussion, since they represent the lowest form of primitivism imagi-
nable. However, the posture that technology is intrinsically manipula-
tive, since it rests upon the assumptions that reality is what can be 
controlled and that knowledge is power, deserves some comment. We saw, 
in connection with Fromm's maxim one , that manipulation becomes an end 
in itself once the values of scientific expediency become ends in them-
selves. I suggested that this state of affairs could be overcome if the 
uses and goals of science and technology become subservient to moral 
rather than purely utilitarian concerns. 
This suggestion implies that moral values cannot be treated in a 
reductionist fashion, i.e., analyzed as e:xperimental scientific state-
ments. It also suggests the view that the pursuit of truth is a moral 
value, which might be overridden by other moral values (e.g., when pur-
suing the truth would violate a person's rights}. If this is so, the 
pursuit of scientific knowledge may have to be weighed against other 
factors, such as its effects upon a society. At the same time, freedom 
to engage in science is a hallmark of an open so.ciety. Can we preserve 
both of these requirements on science, i.e., the need for free inquiry 
and the demand that the search for knowledoe be morally and socially 
beneficial? 
I think we can and must. To see why, I shall discuss a passage in 
Orwell's 1984 (1949). Orwell says: 
Science and technology were developing at a prodigious speed, 
and it seemed natural to assume that they would go on develop-
ing. This failed to happen •.. partly because scientific and 
technological progress depended on the empirical habit of 
thought, which could not survive in a strictly regimented soci-
ety .... The search for new weapons continues unceasingly, and is 
one of the very few remaining activities in which the inventive 
or speculative type of mind can find any outlet. In Oceania at 
the present day, Science, in the old sense, has almost ceased 
to exist. In Newspeak, there is no word for "science." The em-
pirical method of thought, on which all the scientific achieve-
ments of the past were founded, is opposed to the most funda-
mental principles of Ingsoc. And even technological progress 
only happens when its products can in some way be used for the 
dimunition of human liberty ... in 111atters of vital importance --
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meaning, in effect, war and police espionage -- the empirical 
approach is still encouraged, or at least tolerated. The two 
aims of the party are to conquer the whole surface of the earth 
and to extinguish once and for all the possibility of indepen-
dent thought. There are, therefore, two great problems which 
the party is concerned to solve. One is how to discover, a-
qainst his will, what another human being is thinking, and the 
other is how to kill several hundred million people in a few 
seconds without giving warning beforehand. Insofar as scien-
tific research still continues, this is its subject matter. The 
scientist of today is either a mixture of psychologist and in-
quisitor, studying with extraordinary minuteness the meaning of 
facial expressions, etc., and testing the truth-producing ef-
fects of drugs, shock therapy, hypnosis and physical torture; 
or he is a chemist, physicist, or biologist concerned only with 
such branches of his special subject which are relevant to the 
taking of life .... s 
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Here, in quite a striking passage, is the logical outcome of Fromm's 
maxims. What has gone wrong? Possibly belaboring the obvious, let me 
list some of the factors that perverted science and technology. For see-
ing that they have been perverted will, I think, sustain my view that 
there is nothing intrinsically or inevitably dehumanizing, manipulative, 
or alienating in them. 
1. The empirical habit of thought is stifled, i.e., free scientif-
ic inq~iry, diversity of opinions, lack of authoritarianism, the need 
for independent evidence, etc. are lost. Science is an ideological tool 
which must serve as a means to pre-ordained goals. 
2. The loss of free thinking -- which is considered both useless 
and dangerous -- turns science into a purely practical concern. But 
there are no standards to tell whether "what works" is good or bad. 
Rather, the standards for utility are the survival of the society and 
the perpetuation of its goal, no matter how morally objectionable. 
3. Scientific research is not, although it might be claimed to be, 
morally neutral; and the search for truth, together with democratic pro-
cedures for finding it, is absent in science and the rest of society. 
This is a classic illustration of how the open society and free scien-
tific inquiry are related. 
4. What is real is a function of what is manipulable; indeed, one 
of the doctrines in 1984 is that reality is what is in the mind of the 
party. That is, subjective idealism, coupled with the lack of any inde-
pendent evidence, or independent thought, conspires to keep people in 
iqnorance, and thus in slavery. 
5. Morality and truth are defined in terms of what some authori-
tarian fiat defines as "moral" or "true." That is, an extreme form of 
relativism, coupled with an equally radical variant of idealism, lead to 
the absence of both knowledge and morality. Whatever is expedient for 
the sta\ed aims of the party becomes true and moral. 
6. Science and technology are no longer paths to utopia, nor even 
important in the practical affairs of life for everyone, but are the 
property of dictators and their lackeys. 
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I believe that what lies b ehind t h e perversion of science and tech-
nology in western thought, which Orwell captures in a frighteningly ac-
curate way, involves certain philosophical assumptions which have had a 
tremendous impact on western culture. The often imperceptible impact of 
some of the assumptions discussed in this paper h as recently given rise 
to philosophical criticisms which I hope will make people aware of their 
consequences. To the extent t h at this is so, there may still be time to 
reverse t he trends they have generated . At the very least, critical re-
flection on these matters may allow us to channel our knowledge into so-
cially and morally beneficial dire ctions. This is our best, indeed our 
only , hope for th.e future. 
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TECHNOLOGY AND VALUES: 
FROM DIALECTIC TOP~RD SYNTHESIS 
Victor Ferkiss* 
ABSTRACT . The several views of the relationship of technology and val -
ues are reticulate ly related . Technology is not autonomous; it both af -
fec t s and reflects human values. Technology , ho.vever , cannot be usefully 
subjected to value - ori ented criticism unless the subject values are 
clear l y identified . 
INTRODUCTION 
The subject of this collective inquiry has been ·._he dialectical re -
lationship between technology and humanistic values. This review of 
these relationships derives neither frcrn the physical sciences nor the 
humanities , but from the podium of the soci al sciences . One need not go 
so far as to accept , as a general proposition, the suggestions of C. P . 
Snow that the social sciences have a special role to play in bridging 
the gap between his posited "two cultures"l in order to recogni z e that 
the insights of socia l science may have a ro l e to play in t his s pecia l 
case . For, increasing l y , the interrelationship between t echnology and 
human values is a conscious social product, an interface mediat~d 
through social institutions . Technology affects our social values as i t 
and its norms become basic to the workings of ou r educational ins titu-
tions and of our social institutions generally, while, t hrough such 
mechanisms as government-sanctioned "technology assessment ," society 
seeks to grasp the re i ns of an otherwise runaway technology . 
The attempt to f ind a single t hread of overt commcn concern or ap-
proach in the various v i ewpoints expressed in this volume woul d be a 
futile exercise in fac ile syncretism , given t he eclecticism of the sub-
ject s t reated and the inevitable i diosyncrasy of the viewpoints express -
ed . So , instead of e ngaging in t his vain endeavor, I will try t o shed 
some light upon the universe of our concern from a specific view of the 
interrelationship between technology and va lues ; although it i s apparent 
that such a process cannot only illuminate but may cast shadows as well. 
SOME AXICMS 
All human societi es possess t echnologies -- all are "techno l ogical 
societies ," to appropri at e Jaques Ellul ' s terminology . 2 The most p rimi -
tive hunting tribe uses arrows or snares , and agriculture is perhaps the 
most significant of man ' s (more probably woman' s) technological inven-
tions . Also, as Mervi n Kranzbe r g says , during most of human history , 
"art and technol ogy were the same thing . "3 What distinguishes our con -
temporary society from human societies of the past is not the fact that 
it is based on technology (more properly on a variety of technolog;e6) , 
*Departme nt of Government, George town University , Washington , D.C . 
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but that the social -- indeed the intellectual -- influence of technol-
ogy is so open , ubiquitous, powerful, and accepted. And not only is the 
objectifying model of technological rationality a ccepted as valid in it-
self, but it is increasingly regarded as the normative model for every 
sphere of life, from economic production to culture and even to biologi-
cal existence. 
To make this statement is, of course, t o take a pos ition on the 
whole question of the nature of the interrelationship of values and 
technology. Peter Caws has p roposed models of how technology and values 
may be said to affect each other , though his c:wn views seem t o emphasize 
the concept of a value-neutral technology. Kranzberg -- though he con-
siders technology in general "civilizing" -- is in essential agreement: 
if technologies lead to results which offend against our humanistic val-
ues, it is because human beings have chosen to misuse certain technolog-
ical possibi lities . But this is, perhaps , to take a somewhat narrow view 
of technology, restricting it to actual particular tools and techniques . 
Implicit in the criti c ism of the impact of t echnology upon society made 
by Ellul and many of the preceding papers is a broader definition of 
technology which extends also to organizing principles -- to models of 
economic and eng ineering efficiency whi c h have become normative in our 
society4 to the detriment of humanistic values such as spontaneity, va-
riety, unpredictability, individualism, and concern with the rationality 
of ends as well as instrumental efficiency. In this view there are val-
ues inherent in technological society independent of individual technol-
ogies, values which many see as presenting a challenge to humanistic 
values in principle and in practice. 
Also axia.natic is the fact that human beings are both purposive and 
playful animals. We seek to achieve ends but we also enjoy processes for 
their own sake . Hom o .tu.den/.> and homo 6abeA often meet in the technolog-
i ca l enterprise, and technology becomes an end in itself for many. Johan 
Huizinga has written of the extent to which war and economic activity 
may be regarded as playful and gratuitous activities as well as instru-
mental ones designed to fulfill needs extraneous to the activities them-
selves. 5 The same could be said of atomic research, space exp loration, 
supersonic travel, genetic manipulation, and new information technolo-
gies such as the computer , among other current manifestations of techno-
l ogical prowess . The desire of technologists to p lay with new gadgets 
finds its counterpart in the eagerness of many contemporary human beings 
to join in this play as consumers or as political supporters of such ac-
tivities. But this is hardly a new phenomenon, especially in the United 
States. We have been a nation of gadget-lovers since the time of Jeffer-
son. Much of the supposed autonomy o f technology in our society is 
traceable to our choice of technology as the major -- perhaps even the 
prjmary -- means of expressing the value we attach to play. Yet who 
could deny that play itself is a profoundly humanistic value, however we 
choose to fulfill it. 
To say this is not, of course , the same thing as to argue for the 
general proposition that t echnology is autonomous in contemporary soci-
ety . 6 The assertion that what we ~an do technologically we w,,Lll do is 
simply false. We can build more durable buildings , safer automobiles, 
longer-lasting appliances, more attractive cities , but choose freely 
through our economic and political p rocesses not to do so. We have al-
ways been able to build more fuel-efficient motor vehicles ; we begin to 
do so only now, not as a result of t echnological innovation but in re-
sponse to the econcmic and political pressures of fuel scarcity and 
cost. 
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Yet to say that technology is not auton omous is not to say that 
technology is value-neutral. Cbce accepted by societies, technologies 
have necessary consequences. In some sense it is true to argue, as do 
opponents of gun control, that "guns don't kill people, people kill peo-
ple." But who would deny that the more guns there are around, the more 
people are killed? Given technologies produce social effects which are 
both predictable and capable of being subjected to value judgments. The 
automobile has a definable impact on the shape of our urban and suburban 
life and economy and on parental control over children. Contraception 
does not lead to an increase in the birthrate despite the irony that 
some forms are based on scientific research originally designed to alle-
viate infertility. Both Richard Schlegel and Robert Hollinger have ad-
dressed themselves in this volume to the general philosophical problems 
of evaluating technologies and their impacts and have provided a valu-
able proleganenon to further discussion. 
VALUES AND PREFERENCES 
The question of how technology and values affect each other is ob-
viously an exceedingly complex one, made even more so by the fact that 
technologies not only produce effects in society as such but, in addi-
tion, beget new technologies which also have ascertainable and value-
laden effects, as illustrated by Robert Multhauf's discussion of aspects 
of the development of the chemical industry. Discussion of these complex 
issues is often rendered more obscure and confusing than necessary by 
the loose contemporary usage of the term "value." This usage, which 
dates from the late 19th century and attributable in part to the influ-
ence of Nietszche, treats values not as inherent in objects or relations 
themselves but as matters of subjective preference. This posture is in 
direct contrast to the classical natural law doctrine of most ancient 
and medieval philosophers and to the American naturalistic tradition as 
exemplified by such thinkers as G. H. Mead and John Dewey; instead, it 
accepts the views of G. E. Moore on the "naturalistic fallacy," which is 
allegedly inherent in seeking to derive the "ought" from the "is. 117 
But -- even leaving more abstruse epistemological consideration~ 
aside -- this approach to valuation has an inevitable tendency to de-
grade discussion. The equation of values with subjective preferences 
means that my preference for chocolate over vanilla ice cream is an act 
of valuation on the same level as your possible preference for not na-
palming Vietnamese children over the willingness of the military to do 
so or a community's preference for clean beaches over an oil company's 
willingness to pollute them. 
This confusion between values and preferences -- in which major 
moral choices are equated with everyday questions of taste -- does much 
to skew the discussion of whether or not technology changes values or 
creates new ones. If all choices are on an equal logical footing then 
the creation of new possibilities for behavior can be said to create new 
values, ranging from the trivial (as when a new fast food is developed) 
to the socially significant (as when cheap and efficient contraception 
makes possible changes in family patterns and female career opportuni-
ties). But if one restricts the term value to such basic human ends as 
nutrition, security, self-expression, or adventure, new technologies are 
seen as involving not the c reation of new ends but of new (though per-
haps not always mo re effective) means to the accomplishment of basic and 
traditional human ends or, in some cases, as altering the hierarchy and 
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incidence of these ends, as in a case where contraception permits a wom-
an to choose the hardly new value of self- expression through work over 
the value of having an additional child . 
SYMBOLIZING TECHNOLOGY 
In addition t o being both playful and purp os ive creatures , human 
beings are also symbolizing animals. We deal with the world about us, 
inc luding technologies, not directly but through our perceptions of it. 
Sometimes our perceptions are direct and individual: the burnt child may 
fear the fire without being taught to do so . But usually we deal with 
our surroundings through socially mediated perceptions expressed· in sym-
bols. Every society looks at the world, including t echnology , through a 
somewhat different set of symbolic lenses. In the pape rs of Sonia Pat -
ten, Shu-min Huang, and Stefan Schmidt we see how human societies in 
Northern Ghana , Taiwan, and Latin America have perceived , conceptual -
ized, and responded to te chnologies , and the rational- economy mode of 
conduct which usually accompanies technology, in different ways. Even 
the very definition o f technology can d iffer from society to society and 
from time to time, depending on the parti cu lar system of symbolization. 
Folsom has vividly illus trated how the definitions of science, magic, 
and technology have varied over time and could - - literally -- over 
space . Much of the confusion and acrimony often manifest in discussions 
of the relationship between t echnol ogy and humanistic values is clearly 
due to the different ways in which technologists and humanists perceive 
and hence symbolize technology . 
Human beings are not only symbolizing but also social animals. In -
deed, the existence of symbols presupposes the exis tence of societies, 
groups which create common symbol systems in the course of ccmrnunica-
tion . Different human societies, symbolizing technology in differing 
ways , attach different values to particular t echno l ogie s and their dif -
fusion . Garside has pointed out the influence on technological develop-
ment in France , Britain , and the United States of the differing values 
attached to technology by societies as such or , more precisely , by domi -
nant c lasses within them, while Arnelinckx has discussed the conflict 
among intellectuals - - always a major force in French society -- over 
the values to be attached to technology during the ear l y modern period . 
As both these papers demonstrate, the act of weighing technology on the 
scale of human values has been primarily a social act, carried on in 
public by societies as a whole, albeit societies in which certain groups 
have had more influence in the weighing process than o thers . But in the 
pas t this social judgment passed on technology was informal and decen -
tralized , the product of broad cu ltural and literary (as we l l as econom-
i c ) forces. What distinguishes the current situation in contemporary 
socie t y , above all in the United States , from t hat in societies in the 
past is that the dialectic between t echnology and human values is in-
creasingly carri ed on in the political arena, so that the social act of 
passing judgment on technology involves - - at least potentially - - the 
coercive and legal mechanisms of the state. 
How can t echno l ogy be made to serve our human values? Before we 
bring the political system into the process -- or certainly at leas t 
while we do so - - we must do our intellectual homework . There is little 
point in setting up e laborate me chanisms for the assessment of t echnol -
ogy - - as in the United Stat es Offi ce of Technology Assessment , the En -
vironmental Protection Agency , or other bodies - - until we are clear 
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about which values we wish to submit to the collective national judg-
ment. Just as technologies cannot be value - neutral in their effects they 
can never be value -free in their gestation, development, and diffusion. 
Technologies which are designed to level cities or to intercept tele -
phone messages are at the service of human ends to which we attach val -
ues just as much as are those designed to cure disease or to reprint the 
poetry of Shakespeare. The p roblem of the interface between t echnology 
and values is not one of non-value (technology) versus value (humanism) 
but one of differing if n ot conflicting values. 
JUDGING TECHNOLOGIES 
From our discussion of the problem of hew to judge technologies and 
the values they represent, two general approaches seem to emerge. One 
approach attempts to treat technology - - and especially the instrumental 
rationality so central to modern technology -- as a whole, and to inte-
grate the technological mode of dealing with perception and value into 
some larger humanistic context. The second approach seeks to confront 
technology -- or technologies -- in a more direct manner, as tools or 
sets of tools, and to evaluate these according to general or particular 
humanistic norms. 
A popular examp le of the first approach is the attempt at synthesis 
between technological and humanistic values found in Pirsig's Zen and 
the Atr.J:. on MotO~QyQfe MaA-ntenanQe , 8 analyzed herein by Benson. Pirsig, 
as Benson points out , identifi es techno l ogy with the classical objective 
mode of thought and contrasts this mode with the subjective romanticism 
of many "anti-technologists." Pirsig argues that these two modes can be 
synthesized in the notion of the "exce llent. " Though I believe this 
point of view to be incomplete , I find it congenial , providing at least 
a useful focus for discussion. The humanist and modern critic of tech-
nology , Goodman, Aristotelian by mental set even though a member of the 
"counter-culture" in life style, argued, following Aristotle , that tech -
nology should be classified with the pract i cal rather than the specula-
tive sciences since it involves the making of things, and that the prac-
tical sciences are the domain of mortals. 9 It follows that there are 
right a.nd wrong ways of doing things and, of course, a hierarchy of v a l -
ues governing choices should be available to promote human happiness. 
For Pirsig's "excellent" an Aristote lian would use the word "virtuous." 
Prudence is the virtue involved in doing and making things, and it is 
prudence which must govern technology . 
But prudence to be effective requires knowledge. One cannot deter-
mine how to use technology t o serve human values if one simply looks 
upon it from the outside as a vas t inchoate mcnster which , if not wor-
shiped , must be slain . It is necessary to understand and respect tech-
nology, to be morally sensitive to its poss ible effects, and to govern 
it accordingly. In the TeQhnologJ.Qal Man lO and The Fu:tWte on Temnolog -
iQal Civ~zation,11 I have tried to explicate what the v irtue of pru-
dence requires of us in the contemporary context , not so much by passing 
judgments on particular technologies as by asking what kind of a world 
we wish to build with the powers given to us by technology . 
The second approach to relating technology and values seeks in ef-
fect t o make prudential judgments of value about technology as such and 
about particular technologies, though most of its proponents might es -
chew the use of the term prudence . This approach does not of course 
contradict but rather overlaps the more general approach of seeking a 
296 PERKISS : TECHNOLOGY AND VALUES 
reconciliation within technology of rationality and value . But in this 
second approach, the problem is one of how to define what is p rudent 
within a given context. We need standards about ends (values) before we 
can judge the p rudence of means . 
Insofar as we as a society have sought publicly to pass judgments 
on t echnology our efforts have tended t o become trapped in the confusion 
over the nature of value discussed earlier , so we add up preferen ces and 
interests of ind i viduals and groups as if they were all of equal worth. 
But no amount of cost-benefit or utilitarian ca l culus c an b e of use if 
phi l osophers -- professional or otherwise -- are not available to sug-
gest , critique , and refine standar ds , inc l uding even questioning the 
rati onale of accepted forms of ana l ysis themselves , as has been done so 
suggestive l y by such crit i cs of technology assessment as Tribe . 12 
The social sciences can help mea!.>UJz.e the effec ts o f t echnology (as 
can , of course , the phys i cal sciences ) but on l y humanistic values can 
provide a standard for evaJ>n.a;U,ng these effects . This can be done in a 
vicarious , hypothetical way, which is apparently what William Robinson 
has i n mind when he ' speaks of "testing before doing ," and when he pre-
sents us with such questi ons as whether specific technological develop-
ments offer new choices, or whether they increase the power of t echnolo -
gists over o thers . I n the same vein , Robert Hollinger asks important 
questi ons about whether technologies alienate , dehumanize, or produce 
manipulative ideologies. The Ghandian philosophy described by Ted J. 
So l omon provides a precursor of an important approach to the evaluation 
of technology increasingly advanced in our own time -- the "alternative 
technology" movement exemplified in the work of such men as Schumacher 
and in the phi l osophy implicit in the Whole Ea!Lth Ca.,tafog. 13 The propo-
nents of alternative technology try to force us to ask not what can be 
done but what needs to be done to serve human values and how be st it 
might be done in terms of those same human ends . 
OTHER ISSUES 
One important question in the area of the relationship of technology 
to human values which has perhaps received insufficient attention in our 
discussions is the effect of technology on social structure. One need 
not be a Marxist to note, as does Leiss in The VorrU.na;U,on 06 Na;tUJz.e,1 4 
that the control of man over nature also involves t he increased power of 
certain men over others, and not merely that of technologists over lay-
men. This important problem is obliq uely raised in the philosophy of 
Ghandi and is mentioned in Patten's discussion of the Tallensi but it 
needs to be more squarely face d in discussions of technology. 
Another problem which needs discussion is evident in the remarks of 
Robert Multh auf. Not only does he show how technologies tend to fore-
close choices by spawning other technologies but he alerts us to the 
problem of scale. Big problems are not just small problems magnified --
they are often different in kind. Massive uses of technology create 
problems, e. g ., air pollution, which small uses do not. Our criteria for 
judging technologies must take this factor into account. 
As most symposia, this one has raised more issues and questions than 
it has resolved. But .theoe M.e not v.io;teJl.,{_c_, "ac.aderrU.c." iJ.iJ.iu.eo. Rather 
they go to the h eart of the questi on of what is going to happen to us, 
where we as a nation and as members of a world society are going, and 
what kind of future we are creating for ourselves and our descendants. 
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It is possible to interpret American history as the attempt to cre-
ate a utopian society upon the material base made available by ample re-
sources and a powerful science and technology. In this kind of society , 
questions about humanistic values such as justice and beauty could be 
set aside. If we all could be ·materially rich, justice in the distribu-
tion of goods would not be a burninq issue. If we could all go off and 
do our own thing in our own private worlds, we could each create our own 
beauty . Now we are waking up to reality, entering the era which Miles 
has labeled Awakening F~om the AmeJU.c.an V~eam. 1 5 There is not going to 
be enough for everyone to have everything and do everything. We are be-
ing forced to allocate scarce values through the political process, 16 
and this means that we as a people must now address ourselves to such 
traditional humanistic questions as the nature of the true, the good, 
and the beautiful. Our technol ogy can no longer enable us to finesse 
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